Next month, on September 26, Venezuelans will vote to elect a new National Assembly. This could prove to be a watershed in the evolution of the country’s highly charged political climate. Ever since the 2005 elections, when the opposition blundered by boycotting them, the Venezuelan parliament has been dominated by President Hugo Chávez’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), allowing him to do pretty much as he pleased, with no restraint on his authority to pass revolutionary proposals into law.
This time around, a still fractious and somewhat disorganised opposition is seeking to recover lost ground in the National Assembly and, more importantly, to take the national temperature before the presidential election in 2012, when Mr Chávez is expected to run again.
The parliamentary campaign has officially begun, with Mr Chávez in the forefront, no doubt with one eye on 2012, as he seeks a two-thirds majority of representatives in the National Assembly to continue with his ‘Bolivarian’ project. There are, however, indications that his personal popularity is diminishing in the midst of serious social and economic problems.
Violent crime is reportedly on the rise, in spite of official claims to the contrary, and ordinary citizens are increasingly fearful about their personal security. A legal ban (subsequently lifted) on the publication of “violent, bloody or grotesque” photographs for 30 days, covering most of the electoral period, only served to confirm perceptions that the government was unable to arrest crime, with murder rates estimated to be among the highest in the world. The Economist puts the national murder rate at around 57 per 100,000 people. The Venezuelan Observatory of Violence, an NGO, says it is 75 per 100,000, up from 49 just four years ago, and in Caracas it is reckoned to be as high as 200 per 100,000.
The government claims that negative reporting is aimed at discrediting the government before next month’s elections. But it is the government that stopped releasing statistics on murders several years ago and it has a similar approach to economic and financial data, with figures either manipulated or information suppressed to avoid bad news on the economic front.
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, “even with the rise in oil prices, there is considerable doubt about Venezuela’s oil production and oil export figures – which account for 95% of foreign-exchange earnings and more than half of government revenue. Independent estimates suggest that Venezuela’s output and export volumes have been falling and that official data for the sector may be inflated.” The shortage of foreign currency has also served to fuel the illegal black market and the EIU’s outlook is gloomy: “As Venezuela’s foreign-exchange needs increase in the next two years – to fund imports, debt obligations and other capital outflows – the hard-currency squeeze is likely to worsen. And risks to the country’s balance of payments and to the public finances will grow.” There is therefore a strong likelihood that funding for President Chávez’s massive public spending on social programmes aimed at the estimated 70% of the population who live in poverty will suffer swingeing cuts. The implications for social stability are very worrying indeed.
And now there is evidence that the President’s own popularity is suffering. The pollster, Alfredo Keller, says that Mr Chávez’s acceptance rating has dropped to 37%, as opposed to 57% a year ago and 71% recorded in 2005. Another poll by Hinterlaces has found that his popularity has declined to 41%. According to the experts, more and more Venezuelans are blaming the President personally for the country’s problems, which is of particular concern to the government, as Mr Chávez himself insists on treating every election as a plebiscite on his mandate.
Nevertheless, the PSUV is still expected to obtain a majority of representatives in the National Assembly, even if the opposition gets more votes, thanks to a modification of the electoral law in January, which allowed for gerrymandering in eight states, most of which are governed by opponents of Mr Chávez. Whether the chavistas get the two-thirds majority they are seeking, however, remains to be seen.
As the election nears, opposition criticism is focusing on the lack of security, the economy, unemployment and inflation, and on Mr Chávez and his controversial policies. Even if the government does win a majority of representatives with, paradoxically, fewer votes than the opposition, Mr Chávez is not expected to deviate from his favoured tactics of distraction, intimidation and populist politicking, as he prepares for the 2012 presidential election. But if the numbers keep adding up against him, he will no doubt come under increasing pressure, with unpredictable consequences.
