Dear Editor,
I find your editorial, “The other Iran,” (February 22), rather enlightening and stimulating, but especially the strong insinuation that the Bush administration, despite repeated denials, plans to launch a pre-emptive strike against Iran.
Indeed, speculation abounds that a pre-emptive military strike is on the table, particularly in the wake of the Pentagon sending two naval ships to probably monitor Iran, and the White House’s recent insistence that Iran is directly involved in causing the deaths of American forces in Iraq.
But would an American attack be based on Iran’s alleged role in Iraq to kill American soldiers? Or would it be based on Iran defiantly insisting, in direct contravention of UN Security Council orders, on promoting its nuclear programme?
While an attack on Iran is not outside the realm of possibility, the front and centre attention Iran is getting obviously is designed to let it know that it is under intense scrutiny, and that if UN imposed sanctions fail to get it to halt its nuclear push, then some kind of unilateral military action – Russia, China, and France definitely won’t go along – could not be ruled out in the long run.
To me, the biggest question is: Can America afford a military attack on Iran?
Right now, America’s armed forces have been stretched thin in Iraq, Afghanistan and in other geographical locales helping protect America’s interests/allies. But it’s in Iraq, where the White House has heavily invested and American troops are being psychologically and physically tested, that an answer may be found.
While a recent poll said that 57 per cent of Americans want to see the job in Iraq finished before a complete military withdrawal, most Americans aren’t sure there is an easy exit strategy that would result in a tranquil and unified Iraq. They also have no stomach for another potential war (Iran) while still looking for an exit strategy from an existing one (Iraq).
Hypothetically speaking, though, if America were to use both Iran’s refusal to comply with the UN as well as its possible involvement in Iraq as reasons for a pre-emptive strike on Iran, logic dictates it has to be effected with surgical precision against only major military installations and all known nuclear sites. But then what would be Iran’s reaction? Even if President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad does not have a direct military answer, then Iran’s ‘Supreme Guide’, Ali Khamenei – to whom Ahmadinejad is spiritually subjected – does. At least so it seems. He already made it known that if America strikes, Iran will retaliate by striking America’s interests all over the world. How so?
Khamenei, because of his religious authority and influence, gives the impression he either has people (Quds?) in Iran who can do just that or he is capable of awakening Islamic radicals now lying dormant in sleeper cells in various countries to help make good on his threat.
Meanwhile, it is against this background of dormant threats to America’s interests that pre-emptive strike supporters now ask: Can America afford not to strike first? Apparently a failure to strike first could also result in 1) Iran hardening its stance against the UN and boldly going for nuclear weapons that can fall into the wrong hands, and 2) tilting the balance of power in Iran’s favour resulting in its dominance of the region and the regrettable loss of America’s long-standing claim to the region as a part of its vital economic interests.
There is, in fact, a school of thought out there that says Iran, in anticipation of an American attack and a bid for regional dominance, has already made significant in-roads among radical Islamic elements in Afghanistan, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, among places, to help create waves of instability in the region.
So, barring an actual pre-emptive attack on Iran, which may have unpredictable global ramifications, America has one difficult option: rely on Saudi Arabia to step up as a ‘big brother’ and spearhead a regional conflict resolution confab that would bring Iran to the table of negotiations. The problem here is, if Iran goes along with such a plan, it could position Saudi Arabia as the region’s de facto power broker and displace Iran’s bid for the coveted spot.
Whatever the next move is – whether peace talks or plenty trouble – one thing is sure: because there is no Saddam Hussein with designs on being the region’s strongman, there definitely is no turning back in Tehran in its bid now for regional dominance via the acquisition of nuclear power. It may slow down, but it won’t stop unless it is forcibly stopped.
Yours faithfully,
Emile Mervin
