Not since William Demas’s anguished personal communication on the occasion of his discovery of the neo-conservative proposal known as the ‘Shiprider Solution: Policing the Caribbean’ in the Spring 1996 issue of the National Interest, which he circulated to those whom (I have since come to learn) represented every thinking West Indian he could reach, has there been such profound intellectual unease about the future direction of the region. On that occasion the Shiprider Solution was offered as the basis of US government policy towards the region in its prosecution of the “war on drugs” and the use of newly independent Caribbean countries as transit points for trafficking narcotics to the United States. On this occasion, however, the recently concluded Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the European Union (EU) and Cariforum (Caricom plus the Dominican Republic) is the cause of the profound disquiet.
As on the previous occasion with Demas and the proposed Shiprider Solution, it is the stark and brutal reality of asymmetrical power masquerading as an intellectual and intelligent solution for addressing fundamental problems facing the region that has generated the prevailing sense of anger, despondency, and despoliation among thinking West Indians. At the ninth hour (November 14, 2007) an ‘Open letter to CARICOM Prime Ministers’ and the general public was issued by persons including Professors Havelock Brewster and Norman Girvan, calling for the Draft EPA Agreement to be made available for public discussion before signing. To the best of my knowledge this letter has had no material effect on either the contents of the EPA or its time-tabling.
There were also reports in the media in December at the time of the Heads of Government Summit (Georgetown, Guyana) that as the end of the year was rapidly approaching Caricom leaders/negotiators were “drawing a line in the sand” to secure Mode IV movement for artists, other cultural professionals and practitioners from the region to Europe in the agreement. This seemed odd, to say the least, in that the larger class of professionals (many of them trained in the EU) were not included in this demand and also in light of the consideration that many of the competitive music and entertainment professionals are already working out of OECD countries. True to form, however, the EU negotiators exaggeratedly protested this “huge” concession they were being asked to make, but quickly gave in to the CRNM in order to secure a “timely” agreement!
As I shall endeavour to show, through a mixture of blatant bullyism, bribery, cajolery, deception, intellectual dishonesty and plain bluff the EU has ‘worked’ a monumental deception on the region. Unlike the Shiprider Solution for policing the Caribbean, the EPA was considerably aided by the successful implantation of the EU’s world view of the region and its future among significant sections of the region’s intellectual and ruling elites, including those holding influential positions in the negotiations. In this regard, it is useful to note that the EU has played a crucial role in training and financing a multitude of activities and actors serving Cariforum’s negotiating remit over the past few years.
The EPA itself is a huge document; the main text exceeds 400 tightly packed pages. Over the next several weeks I shall endeavour to demonstrate how weak its theoretical and empirical underpinnings are. I shall not be summarizing the EPA for the convenience of readers. My task is to critically evaluate it. For the rest of this article I shall indicate the key areas of contention I shall be addressing in the coming weeks. For interested persons the CRNM has circulated (December 5) a summary comment, (6 pages). As would be expected this is not a summary of the contents of the full EPA but it does offer a useful summary of the CRNM’S views of the agreement.
Contentions planks
There are many contentious planks on which the EPA rests. I have singled out 15 of these as representing major theoretical and empirical positions adopted by the EPA, which cannot be logically sustained. These are listed in the schedule below:
Schedule 1: Contentious Planks of the Economic Partnership Agreement
Number Item
1. Trade Liberalisation, WTO-plus Agreements and the DOHA Round in the Context of Asymmetrical Development Levels and Capacities
2. The European View of “preferences” versus the Rest
3. The DOHA Development Round as it relates to Special and Differential Treatment (SDT)
4. Responsibility, Accountability and Functional Autonomy: the EU Trade Commission, CRNM and negotiation modalities
5. Shaping Reality: The “Global Europe” project
6. One-size-fits-all: Negotiating in Complex Circumstances
7. The Uneasy Relation Between Legal Construct (CARICOM)/and Negotiating Abstraction (CARIFORUM)
8. Other ACP Regional Responses: Do They Matter
9. The “WTO Waiver Deadline: 31/12/07” as Absolute
10. Aid For Trade Adjustment Measures as Facilitating EU Access and Entry to CARICOM Markets
11. Characterizing Special Products: The On-Going Debate
12. The Sugar Protocol as a Special Case
13. Promoting CARICOM Integration with the EPA as baggage
14. Negotiating Other External Trade Agreements post-EPA (USA and Canada)
15. Coping with the World Economy then and now, Post-WTO and post- EPA
Source: C.Y. Thomas 2008 (op cit).
The first of these contentious planks is the theoretical and empirical premise underpinning the trade liberalisation and WTO-plus agenda of the EPA, considering that it serves countries with vastly different levels of development and capacity. This is critical as the EPA focuses largely on market access arrangements and not enough on capacity to utilize access via effective entry. The second is the European view of ‘preferences’ embedded in the EPA as being invariantly dysfunctional, inefficient, backward looking, and outdated. Third, is the linkage between Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) and preferences in the context of the DOHA Development Round of trade negotiations.
Fourth, is the relative autonomy achieved over time by the negotiating entities of both the EU (its Trade Commission) and Caricom (the CRNM). The issue is whether this became dysfunctional. Fifth, is the vision of the European project of ‘Global Europe’ and its relevance to integration and development in the Caribbean.
Sixth, is the inherent risk attached to a one-size-fits-all approach towards negotiating on behalf of Cariforum. Seventh, the problems created by the fact that Caricom is a legal construct and Cariforum a negotiating abstraction and convenience engineered by the EU. Eighth, is the juxtaposition of other ACP (regional positions) in the EPA. Ninth, is the so-called absolute deadline attached to the WTO waiver (31.12.07), as portrayed by the EU.
Tenth, is the EU offer of “aid-for-trade” as a financially appropriate and viable solution to the problems of adjustment costs occasioned by trade liberalisation. Eleventh, is the issue of characterizing “special products” from a development standpoint. Twelfth, there is the very special case of the Sugar Protocol.
Finally, we have three other contentious issues namely, 13) whether the EPA is consistent with promoting the deepening of Caricom integration; 14) how will Caricom handle future external trade negotiations with Canada and the USA; and 15) a political economy assessment of the role of “leadership, vision, political will, and peoples’ involvement” as promised in something as profound and far reaching in its consequences for the region as the EPA in a post-WTO world.
I shall be addressing each of these contentious planks in turn, beginning next week.
