A huge rock concert on the Colombia-Venezuela border has signaled the end of the apparent threat of military conflict which seemed to overshadow the relations between the three countries over the last few weeks. A peaceful resolution of the immediate threat has taken place, and it is fortuitous that as the storm of charges and counter-charges and movements of troops moved to a crescendo, the planned Rio Conference was scheduled to take place and provided a forum for conciliation.
What appeared to be a relatively swift calming of tempers, amid various predictions of imminent warfare, is a reminder that though the continent of South American is marked by a variety of territorial and border disputes, warfare has not really characterized relations between the countries for a very long time. This is an area which has, over the last century, evolved an elaborate tradition of international law, and a practice of dispute resolution, and for which, despite its various deficiencies, the Organisation of American States has played a role as an institutional mediator within the context of established law relating to both military conflict and economic relations.
It is fortunate, too, that the South American countries themselves took care to contain the dispute between Colombia and Ecuador, and between Colombia and Venezuela, which had folded into a sort of tripartite dispute. Colombia has, in recent years in the course of its internal war against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), had the very strong support of the United States in terms of both financial and military resources; and to this has been added in recent times a strong US support for the Colombians in their on-again-off-again contentions with Venezuela under President Chavez, as the diplomatic hostility between Venezuela and the US has heightened.
Such is the posture of Venezuela and its leader in contemporary Inter-American relations and beyond, that it seemed to matter little in circles outside of the continent that the immediate casus belli was the invasion of Ecuador by the armed forces of Colombia as the latter sought to follow the FARC and its leadership in “hot pursuit”. The claims and counter-claims of Venezuelan collusion with the FARC tended to take precedence both among the disputants and in the eyes of the United States. But what we can perceive is that the diplomatic and legal traditions of the continent rose to take precedence over other considerations, as conciliators placed the emphasis on the illegality of the Colombian invasion of Ecuador’s territory, and sought, and achieved, a Colombian apology in this regard.
The immediate resolution, or should we say diplomatic calming, of the dispute also reflects the concern of other Latin American countries that at this time, the continent should not be diverted from its attempt to reorganize its regional and international economic relations. This is a particular preoccupation of the area’s largest state, Brazil, with its own extensive tradition of peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, having none with any of its own numerous neighbours.
The countries of the Andean Pact (with the exception of Venezuela) have been involved in a process of seeking a Free Trade Area Agreement with the US, now before the American Congress. The United States government, in spite of rising Congressional opposition to free trade, is anxious to have this approved, particularly in the face of President Chavez’ attempt to construct an alternative regional economic regime, the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America (ALBA). In the face of increasing difficulties within the MERCOSUR grouping itself, in a context in which Brazil has become a leading protagonist, of rebalancing of the economic relations between the major economic powers (in particular the United States) and the emerging economies, President Lula would hardly have wished for any diversion that further aggravated the relations among Latin American countries themselves.
President Chavez’ activity in the contention is no doubt a result of his desire to reduce United States influence in respect of Colombia’s attempt to come to terms with what is widely asserted to be a combined narco-guerilla threat from the FARC. In this, Venezuela has not been alone, since other South American states have for sometime now seen the mode of US support for Colombia in its battle against the FARC as pushing the conflict over the borders of neighbouring countries, which have then felt it necessary to take certain kinds of pre-emptive actions which the Colombians in turn have defined as hostile to their own objectives.
Chavez’ attempt to deal with this imbroglio has obviously led to an activist relationship with the FARC which some countries have been inclined to overlook. This applies particularly to certain European states, including France, who have been concerned to seek the release, from the FARC, of certain of their nationals held hostage for some time now. No doubt President Chavez has felt that a success on his part in this regard would gain him the diplomatic sympathy of members of the European Union which would be beneficial to him in building international support in his various contentions with the United States.
In response, President Uribe of Colombia has been steadfast in his view, strongly supported by the United States, and perhaps by others in Latin America, that no action, however diplomatically useful to the continent or the international community, can be tolerated if it compromises Colombia’s effort to rid the country of its long-standing subjection to extensive FARC occupation and contention against the authority of the national government.
The success of this Latin American collective mediation has reinforced the continent’s tradition of peaceful resolution of disputes, and is beneficial to small countries like Guyana. After the Surinamese use of force in its maritime dispute with Guyana, many looked with foreboding on the consequences of the precedent set for relations among our small Caricom grouping, particularly given the continuing controversy between Guyana and Venezuela over the former’s territorial claim. The Surinamese action would certainly have inhibited the establishment of our area as a “security community” accepting the non-legitimacy of conflictual approaches to the resolution of disputes, and joining the Latin American tradition in that regard.
The acceptance of the tribunal approach by Suriname was very welcome in that context, as was the commitment of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago to a similar arrangement in their more recent maritime contention.
The increasing prevalence of the narcotics trade in northern South America, spilling over into the Caricom states of Guyana and Suriname, and up the chain of the archipelago, must give us a certain sympathy with the predicament of Colombia whose territory has been thoroughly penetrated by the narcotics barons, and whose political system has, from all accounts, been similarly penetrated, threatening the very sovereignty of the state. The issue has become further complicated by the contention between the United States and Venezuela over a wide variety of issues, and it therefore has the potential for further flare-ups in spite of the current settlement.
We must therefore hope that the Rio Group, in addition to the OAS, will sustain their interest in developments in this sphere.
