By Dr Clive Thomas
For the past two weeks, this column has been assessing the consultation process pursued by the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) during negotiations leading up to the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). I have argued that although the CRNM negotiators and the EU Negotiating Body wanted those consultations to be meaningful in order to secure better results, more “partnership” and less exposure to criticism after the event, this did not occur. Failure to achieve this intent speaks volumes to the wider issue of economic governance in the regional integration arrangements of Caricom.
The decision to create a specialized agency – the CRNM — to pilot the negotiations with the EU was made as part of a broader remit to have that agency deal with all issues related to external trade negotiations. This was necessary at the time, given the fiasco attending the preceding WTO negotiations, where there was no effective Caricom coordination.
The weakness of that decision was its failure to locate the CRNM properly into the governance framework arrangements of Caricom and, in particular, to specify unambiguously its relations to the Caricom Secretariat. The result of that failure is a “dual-headed” arrangement, which has systemically weakened efforts to integrate external trade negotiations with the promotion of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy. There is clearly an organic relation between the two areas, but the “dual-headed” arrangement militated against this, unintendedly.
This contradiction has not led to any discernible public conflicts between the two bodies thus far. But if priority is to be given to the regional integration process, then the CRNM must necessarily be reporting directly to the Caricom Secretariat. This has not been the case.
The consequence has been that the just concluded EPA has administrative and organisational arrangements, which give EPA institutions a greater degree of “sovereignty” over the domestic economic affairs of Caricom, than the Treaty of Chaguaramas which established it gives to the Secretariat and organs of Caricom. It is clearly unacceptable for organs created by the EPA, which are jointly controlled by the EC and Cariforum Member States to have more authority over Caricom than its own organisation and bodies.
There is also the vexatious issue of funding. Both the Caricom Secretariat and the CRNM are predominantly externally funded. I have always found it anomalous that the Region’s political leaders advocate Caricom as the topmost priority, and yet do not feel compelled to ask their constituents to fund the process! Apart however, from this general concern there is also a more specific concern, which arises from the fact that the region has the CRNM requesting funding for negotiations from the very countries with which it is negotiating. Such efforts should be funded by regional taxpayers.
As far as I am aware, no spoken or written directives have been given by the EU to Cariforum states but clearly there must have been an uncomfortable conflict of interest on the part of both parties to the agreement. How much this has led to self-imposed restrictions on the scope of CRNM actions we will never know. Once again the fault of this situation does not lie at the door of the CRNM, but speaks volumes to the quality of economic governance that prevails in the region.
Next Steps
According to the agreement the legal steps necessary by Cariforum to put the EPA into operation are 1) formal ministerial signature by March 15 and, 2) putting in place the administrative and legal instruments in order to make the EPA operational by April 15.
At the recent Caricom Summit (March 7, 2008) it was decided to reschedule the formal signing by Caricom governments to June. The reason offered for the postponement relates to the completion of the legal text and translational into other Caricom languages. It is not much referred to but the EU also has two steps: 1) A council decision to authorise the signature of the initialled Agreement and, 2) Assent of the European Parliament. After that the Parties to the EPA have to notify the WTO.
The institutional framework for the next steps including provisions, bodies and scope of operation are legally specified in the text of the EPA (Part V).
At the apex is a Joint Cariforum-EC Council, whose responsibility it is to actualize the EPA in all its aspects including monitoring, trouble-shooting and reviewing the EPA. This council will comprise representatives of signatory Cariforum states and members of the Council of the European Commission (EC) and the EC itself. This joint council will have the power to take decisions on all matters covered by the EPA. In this regard, it seemingly has more authority over the region’s external trade than Caricom itself.
There is also a Cariforum-EC Trade and Development Committee comprising senior officials of both parties. This body services the council and assists it in the execution of its responsibilities. It is thus responsible for ensuring that disputes are resolved and that the opportunities afforded by the agreement for trade, investment business ventures are utilized. In this regard it has responsibilities for securing the development objectives of the EPA.
There is in addition a Special Committee on Customs Cooperation and Trade Facilitation, which is responsible for the effective implementation/administration of the EPA Chapter on Customs and Trade facilitation.
There are also two other non-specialist committees, namely the Cariforum-EC Parliamentary Committee and a Cariforum-EC Consultative Committee. The former comprises representatives of the various parliaments that are party to the agreement and the latter organizations of civil society.
