The post-election circumstances in Zimbabwe should not be entirely surprising. It was likely that President Robert Mugabe would seek to resist moving out of office in the event of defeat. But his effort to not even release the results of the presidential electoral vote certainly is surprising, and marks yet another indication of the President’s inclination over the years to be constantly attempting to outmanoeuvre his opponents at every turn. And the decision to release a result of the parliamentary elections shows the President’s ego well involved as he obviously seeks to make a distinction between his party’s defeat and his personal defeat.
The decision of the main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), at least initially, to refuse to concede that there should be another election for the Presidency seems wise. It indicates an unwillingness to accept that they should agree to, in effect, annul the results of an election which they have not even seen. And it would seem an appropriate response to the President’s attempt at political gamesmanship.
The response of the electoral observers most concerned, those representing the Southern African Development Community(SADC), seems to be muted so far, this suggests that they are following the lead of President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. But observers from around the world will surely be waiting to see how South Africa in particular will react if the present situation is unduly prolonged, leading to a political stalemate that can have the potential for an increase in tension and, ultimately, violence, whether arising spontaneously from the ground or whether provoked by the Government. The apparent resort to forceful action by the so-called Veterans of the liberation period is not an encouraging sign.
The initial result of the elections as indicated by the MDC opposition, and then the formal announcement of the parliamentary elections, seemed to suggest that the strategy which President Mbeki was pursuing for quite some years now might eventually have been successful. The President has been much criticized for his strategy of patience, and what might be called non-excessive intervention in the Zimbabwe political and electoral process. He has sought to nudge Mugabwe in what he considered the appropriate direction, apparently knowing the latter’s predilection for stubbornness. Mbeki has therefore tried to find negotiated solutions to problems arising in Zimbabwe, his main aims seeming to be first, to avoid the internal precipitation of violence, secondly to avoid “external” forceful intervention in the country and thirdly, to avoid the overt intervention of the Zimbabwe armed forces in the political process by way of a coup.
The South African strategy therefore seems to reflect the geographical proximity of Zimbabwe to the country and an awareness of the implications for this of an outburst of violence, and the probable Zimbabwe government response of extreme forceful oppression of its citizens. In particular President Mbeki would wish to inhibit a situation in which many more thousands of Zimbabweans than are already doing so come streaming over the Zimbabwe-South Africa border. Nonetheless, it is also obvious that an increasing deterioration of the economic situation in Zimbabwe can have much the same result as the President fears.
We are now left to see how long the present stalemate will continue, with skirmishing between the main political forces continuing. No doubt there is a substantial degree of diplomacy, particularly by interested African countries and by the African Union, taking place. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has sought to publicly advise that it would be a disaster not only for Zimbabwe and its people, but for the African continent as a whole if the recent events in Kenya should so closely be followed by a similar situation. The role for outside diplomatic intervention is however circumscribed by President Mugabe’s inclination over the years, to quickly identify persons or institutions that he considers not acceptable as mediators, or generally persona non grata.
Traditionally in a matter of this kind, and as far as a country like Zimbabwe is concerned, the diplomatic intervention of the Commonwealth, and its Secretariat would be deemed necessary and obvious. The normal course would be that the Commonwealth Secretary General would act in close consultation with countries in close proximity to the specific state concerned, or with their regional institution. Many will remember the extensive role played by the Commonwealth and its then Secretary General Sir Shridath Ramphal in the evolution of Zimbabwe to independence.
But Zimbabwe has been suspended from the Commonwealth, and unlike Pakistan in times of its own suspension, President Zimbabwe does not seem unduly perturbed by this. In addition the seat of the Commonwealth, and its own government, are highly disparaged by the President. He has, over the years, been continually highly undiplomatic in his statements on former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s attitude to the situation in Zimbabwe; and more recently become even more enraged by Prime Minister Brown’s unwillingness to attend the meeting of Presidents of the African continent held in Portugal under the auspices of the European Union. Finally the United States is no doubt concerned and engaged, but in a highly cloistered, if not covert manner.
So traditional sources of diplomatic involvement are somewhat restricted in their abilities to act. This places an even heavier burden on South Africa and its President, and on other leaders from the environs of South Africa like Tanzania. Recently, there has been an African military intervention in the Comoro Islands to effect the removal of a discredited leader and restore political stability in that small archipelago; and the Government of France has intervened in both Chad and, earlier, the Ivory Coast.
But that formula can hardly apply to Zimbabwe, especially where extensive violence and civil strife are not presently the case. And we can be almost sure that neither President Mbeki nor Kofi Annan would give material (in the case of South Africa) or public (in the case of a notable like Kofi Annan) support to such a course.
Yet the dangers for South Africa are potentially substantial, especially as Mugabe’s claimed motivation for much of what has happened, and is happening in Zimbabwe – the land distribution issue – appear to have a certain salience in contemporary South Africa.
