Colombia’s raid into Ecuadorian territory and the subsequent revelations about the files on Raúl Reyes’ computer have done more damage to President Chávez’s grand hemispheric projects than anything Washington in its wildest dreams could have conceived of. Among other things, it has killed his ALBA defence pact proposition, which he had put forward to his ALBA partners as a possibility before the Colombian incursion. While Mr Chávez has beaten a tactical retreat for the moment at least, his new less combative posture has created space for the continental colossus to enter the defence arena with its own South American Defence Council (CDS) proposal.
It is not that Brazil has suddenly seen the opportunity to draw up plans of its own in this regard; the idea has been gestating in Brasilia for at least a year, according to reports, and was intended to assuage elements in the Brazilian military which wanted President Chávez and his military spending curbed. What has happened is that in the aftermath of the Ecuadorian incident Brazil was unexpectedly presented with an ideal moment to promote the idea, and given the revelations exposing him, the Venezuelan head of state perceived it as being in his interest to support it.
While amity at a public level between Caracas and Brasilia is the order of the day, the two governments are in reality rivals on the continent and in international affairs. And Brazil regards itself as the natural leader in the hemisphere, which is hardly surprising given its size, population, GDP, access to the ‘green room,’ etc. Furthermore, it is on the brink of becoming one of the world’s oil giants, almost on a par with Venezuela itself.
Last week Bloomberg, using STRATFOR as a source, made reference to Brazil’s discovery of what may be two of the world’s three biggest oil fields in the past three decades. As a consequence, Brazil could become one of the seven largest oil producers in the world by 2020, which in turn could assist in ending the West’s dependency on Middle Eastern oil. Venezuela’s oil dominance in the region, therefore, and by extension its manoeuverability in terms of oil diplomacy may have a limited shelf life.
STRATFOR elaborated on the implications of the Brazil oil finds for American involvement in the Middle East, one of them being a reduction in the US navy’s presence in the Gulf and environs. Coincidentally, perhaps, it was announced last week that the US had resuscitated the Fourth Fleet, which had been disbanded in 1950.
Based in Florida, and led by a nuclear aircraft carrier, it will operate in Caribbean and Central and South American waters in support of “counter-terrorism operations.”
Whatever the rationale behind the re-establishment of the Fourth Fleet, one presumes that in a general sense Washington has belatedly recognized that the southern continent has slipped its tether and is following its own trajectory. Whether the present White House has also seen that increasingly US influence will depend on its ability to operate in concert with others in the hemisphere – more especially Brazil – is not known.
Brazil, for obvious reasons, does not want the US in the proposed defence council, which no doubt has Washington uneasy. However, Brasilia’s approach is altogether more subtle than the US one would be; the idea is to control Mr Chávez within the context of a ‘friendly’ regional group, rather than confront him from behind the screen of a hostile body as the Americans would inevitably have sought to do. President Chávez, of course, is hardly naïve, and understands very well Brazilian motivation; however, no doubt the council allows him to save a certain amount of face after the Ecuador fiasco, and opens the possibility that he could inject his own ideology into its thinking. In any case, if enough South American heavyweights sign on he could ill afford to stay out. He is not, however, accustomed to playing second fiddle, so it might be interesting to see how relations develop, although he would be at a distinct disadvantage if he ever pulled out having once joined.
Brazilian Minister of Defence Nelson Jobim has emphasized that the proposed defence council will not be the South American equivalent of NATO with operational units. It should be observed, however, that as with all institutions, it could potentially evolve along lines not foreseen or intended by its founders. According to Mercopress, Mr Jobim told the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees of the Brazilian Congress that the council was not designed to “face down a common enemy in the region.” It was intended, he said, to co-ordinate joint military exercises which could extend to collective participation in UN peace missions. “Later on,” he continued, “we could even consider the integration of the defence industries and procurement of the region.” It was an alternative mechanism of regional security, he was reported as saying, to help protect the sovereignty of countries.
Certainly if the proposed council did eventually move to centralize regional defence industries and procurement, Brazil could only benefit. Southern Pulse Network reported last week that as things stood, the Bolivian army was heavily dependent on Brazilian vehicles, parts and service, and that Colombia uses Brazilian Supertucano aircraft. These have allowed it to increase its air raids in FARC-held territory considerably, and they were also employed on the raid into Ecuador. As we in this country are only too aware, Brazil has the largest arms industry on the continent, and no doubt is looking at expanding its markets.
On the first leg of his continental tour to sell CDS, Minister Jobim did not omit the small countries. He duly touched down in both Georgetown and Paramaribo, and according to Caribbean Net News, the Surinamese, at least, indicated themselves prepared to entertain joining the proposed defence council, although they gave no definite commitment. New Garden Street, it seems, was less positive. Following a question on the subject from Stabroek News, Dr Luncheon said that Guyana had no immediate intention of becoming a member.
That is the correct stance for the country to take at this stage. Apart from anything else, our situation territorially speaking, is fairly complicated and we could be disadvantaged if we joined, while we would find our decision-making space in a critical area curtailed. As it is, with the new Takutu bridge in place and plans for a reliable Lethem road and a deep water harbour to serve the Brazilian Amazon, we have not worked out the implications for our future.
We are, of course, very small players in the continental game, but that is all the more reason to keep apprised of what is going on at the macro level, and to move with caution.
