The depth of the food crisis in Haiti draws the Caribbean into the general food crisis afflicting many parts of the world, including the affected states in the continent of Africa. It has indicated how quickly the progress made in the security area in Haiti could be destroyed, reminding us that the issue of security in much of the world is not simply a question of civic order and the rule of law, but has roots also in the social realities of deprivation under which so many citizens in the developing world have been living.
The social realities of Haiti have therefore been dramatized in the international community as a whole, in much the same way that the situation leading to, and arising from, the removal of President Aristide from office in 2004 dramatised the continuing political trauma of that country.
The 2004 events brought major countries in the hemisphere into attempts to resolve the continuing problem of sustaining democratic political order and governmental continuity in Haiti. Significant states like Brazil, Argentina and Chile have been participating in the peace-maintenance process in the country, being able, with the military capabilities at their disposal, to do what the Caribbean Community states could only do in a very limited way. In addition, France and Canada have played significant roles, Canada in particular on a continuing basis in terms of aid; though it would appear that France’s original motivation was to remove an Aristide who, in the year of the 200th anniversary of Haitian independence, had brought to the fore the issue of reparations from France. There are now 9000 troops and civilian police in Haiti.
The Haitian issue has been institutionalized in regional terms by the close involvement of the Organisation of American States (OAS). The latest initiative of the Secretary General has been to seek to promote the sending of food to the country, and more importantly from a long run perspective, to advocate for the development of a medium term plan for food production in Haiti itself. He has been quoted as asserting that “the agricultural problem is not a threat, it’s an opportunity” since Haiti “has the capacity to produce a lot of grain, a lot of rice”.
From the point of view of Caricom, in 2004 a degree of dissatisfaction with the United States’ mode of arranging the removal of Aristide, and the quick rallying to the American position of countries like Canada and France, kept the Caribbean Community largely out of the initial arrangements for institutionalizing the peace-keeping there. This exclusion was reinforced by a lack of commonality of positions among Caricom member states, and the Community’s failure to follow through on an initiative to have the matter dealt with at the UN General Assembly level. It led to a certain diplomatic isolation of the Community on a matter involving one of its member-states.
Caricom now has a civilian presence in Haiti, with St Lucian Ambassador Earl Huntley heading a Caricom Representational Office (CRO) there since October last year, when the Haitian Parliament also ratified the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, while delaying actual implementation. Caricom Chairman, Prime Minister Ingraham of the Bahamas, has recently held talks with President Preval on the facilitation of financial assistance to the country. But the emphasis of the relationship will not be so much on the present political and food crisis, but on having the CRO focus on preparation of Haiti for operational integration into the Community, particularly from the point of view of the country’s effective participation in the Caricom Single Market and Economy.
This seems reasonable in the light of Caricom’s limited capabilities for peace-keeping, though it will be easily recognized that a stabilization of the political and social system there is a prerequisite to the integration goal. But on the other hand, it would be worthwhile if the Community would also focus at this time on the circumstances which led to its isolation after 2004, and its lack of effective communication with the main players who became involved in the Haitian crisis.
Such a focus would lead the Community to ask about the nature of its relationships with the major players – the US, Brazil, Canada and France, as well as with other contributors to the UN stabilisation force in Haiti like Argentina and Chile. It is true that individual Caricom countries have bilateral relationships with these countries, and that some of them will have representatives in Guyana accredited to the Caricom Secretariat. And it is also the case that there are fairly strong linkages between the Secretariat and the OAS.
Yet, these diplomatic arrangements did not prevent the Community from being, or feeling, out of the loop during the crisis of 2004. The differences of opinion within the Community did not help, since these would cripple the capacity of the Secretariat to act. But what the situation then, and now, suggests is that the Secretariat itself should be taking the initiative to project an agenda of discussion with some of these major Hemispheric states – in particular Brazil and Canada – specifically on issues that concern the stability of the Community from a medium term point of view, particularly in the context of these countries’ links with specific Caricom member-states.
Haiti today, for example, is as much a domestic as a foreign relations issue for Canada. The agricultural production and food security issues must be of specific relevance to Guyana’s relationship with Brazil. But, as can be seen from the recent projection of the Trinidad and Tobago Government of a major interest in agricultural production in Guyana, there is obviously scope for some degree of multilateralisation of the issue, with the Community as a convenient umbrella.
In addition, the future of the Economic Partnership Agreement as an effective instrument must surely, from Caricom’s perspective, involve particular arrangements with Haiti, with implications for the cohesion of the Single Market from a medium-term perspective.
All this raises the issue of the appropriateness of the present foreign relations machinery of Caricom as a collective instrument, particularly as major changes of statuses and roles are taking place in the hemisphere in particular. It is not sufficient to have individual memberships of institutions like the Rio Pact and the Union of South American Nations. The stability of the Caricom Region must involve some collective diplomatic framework that can continuously assess the implications of changes in our hemisphere, and our ability to maintain, in that context, the identity of the Community and the validity of its boundaries.
