By Dr. Clive Thomas
Re-cap
This series of articles assessing the CARIFORUM-EU, EPA sought to establish early on that the agreement rested on several contentious planks as a result of being based on: 1) lack of empirical evidence supporting several theoretical propositions implicit to its formulation; 2) several of the evaluations, assessments and interpretations utilized in the EPA are in strong dispute, lacking consensus among analysts and scholars and 3) design and architectural flaws, including those embedded in its negotiating modalities. This assessment provided insights into the nature of the political economy of this North-South trade and economic arrangement. In categorising issues as contentious I was careful to point out that I was claiming (no more and no less), that the issues so identified are in contention because there is no settled consensus or firm empirical base on which to determine ‘correct’ policy formulations.
In light of this, the recent discussion in this column over the past two weeks focused on both the broader opportunities and challenges posed by the initialled interim EPAs in Africa and the Pacific. This discussion leads in to the final topic I will engage in this series evaluating the CARIFORUM–EU, EPA. Broadly speaking, the topic I wish to engage is about the way forward and the possibilities, even at this stage, of accommodating to the conceptual, design, and other flaws of the EPA. In exploring ideas for a way forward earlier insights can help to guide the technical considerations on which efforts to re-strategize the EPA should be founded.
Challenges and opportunities
As we have seen the challenges posed by the interim EPAs are many and complex including two particular worrisome considerations. One is that the interim EPAs have been hastily configured to specific regional, sub-regional and country circumstances without any clear economic rationale.
As I observed the most consistent feature might well be the negotiating capacity vis-à-vis the EU of the various Africa and Pacific countries that are parties to the interim EPAs. The other is that the interim EPAs have already posed a serious challenge to the regional integration process on these two continents and in particular the deepening rift between LDC and non-LDC parties in the various regional integration schemes.
Of over-riding concern is the fact that North-South trade and trade-related agreements now constitute a major direction of global trade policy reform, and by all accounts seem here to stay. This reflects in large measure the stalled Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations. But we need to constantly remind ourselves here in Caricom that this approach can only be at best, a second-best approach to global trade reform.
Strategically, a multilateral approach to global trade reform is in the best interest of small poor vulnerable economies. The Doha Round has been stalled because there are many deep and complex global trade issues that cannot be resolved by resort to technical quick-fixes or political enforcement. In the long-run, global agreements based on this reality will serve not only Caricom, but the global community well. It is for this reason we must keep alive the awareness that the CARIFORUM- EU, EPAs are not cast in stone, nor they a done deal; the process is still ongoing.
Road map
When assessing the opportunities posed by the interim EPAs last week, I identified three major markers or signposts for a creative way forward. First, I called for an effort to forge a political agreement at the all-ACP-EU level to the effect that at the completion of the process all parties to all EPAs may have imported to their specific EPA any provision agreed to by the EU, in any other EPA. This can be expressed in a time-constrained manner Three important considerations flow from this first marker (signpost).
One is that this stipulation does not predetermine that the EPAs over the six regions should be uniform and identical, unless the parties to the agreement freely require this outcome. It would, however, accommodate for asymmetric negotiating capacities across the regions.
Another is that pursunit of such a political accommodation at the all-ACP level could very well re-invigorate the ACP as a tri-continental grouping of poor developing economies, most of which are small.
Finally, pursuing this goal offers the EU a splendid opportunity to show good will and commitment to the much heralded development dimension of the EPAs.
The second marker (signpost) is that the agenda and time-frame should be more explicitly goal-driven than time-driven, now that the WTO-waiver deadline has been accommodated. Such a commitment would place a high premium on all parties to ensure transparency, effective participation and real ownership of process. This would also reinforce commitments to compensate and redress asymmetric negotiating capacity wherever it emerges.
The third marker (signpost) is that every opportunity should be taken to creatively explore non-EPA alternatives to the development and trade goals of the ACP countries within a broader multilateral framework than the constrained bilateral constructs implicit to the present EPAs.
This exploration of a way forward depends on a number of economic, legal and other technical considerations, which I shall examine next week.
