By Dr. Mellissa Ifill
This article is the second of a two-part series that examines the pre-independence alliance between the PNC and the UF. The first part examined the 1955 split in the multi-ethnic PPP and the first failed attempt by the PNC and the UF to establish an alliance in 1960. This article examines the circumstances surrounding the formation of the PNC-UF coalition in 1964 and its demise by 1968.
The relationship between the leadership of the PNC and UF deteriorated rapidly following their inability to form an alliance in 1960 and both parties hurled accusations of racism against each other. Two main factors changed the tone of the relationship between the PNC and the UF. First was the US’s determination to politically dispose of Jagan and ultimately British persuasion that this was the best course of action and second was the civil and ethnic strife that gripped the nation between 1962 and 1964 that hardened racial sentiments but also allowed the two competing parties to work together against the agenda of their common enemy the PPP.
By 1961, the US was keenly interested in finding an alternative to Jagan, but the British government was convinced that British Guiana was ready for independence and it had not identified a suitable alternative for Jagan and the PPP, who had secured three successive electoral victories in 1953, 1957 and 1961. Britain therefore remained committed to granting independence no later than 1963, as promised at the March 1960 Constitutional Conference in London.
The U.S. offered several suggestions to Britain in order to prevent British Guiana gaining independence under Jagan. One suggestion was to hold another election prior to independence to see if the government would change. The US also explored the possibility of establishing a multi-ethnic alliance between Burnham, D’Aguiar and the “more moderate” leaders of the PPP if they could be persuaded to defect. Additionally, Washington proposed that Britain suspend the British Guiana constitution, dispose of the PPP and reinstitute direct rule. The latter proposal was the one determined to be most unacceptable to the British government since not only would there be military and financial consequences but any such action would generate strong opposition both in and out of British Guiana.
The U.S. was encouraged by the possibility of a British policy change after the civil disturbances in 1962 that stemmed from a strike by civil employees over conditions of service and a strike by a number of trade unions over the controversial 1962 Kaldor Budget, which required the intervention of British troops. The US through the CIA and American union representatives financed and supported the striking workers and their leadership in an attempt to destabilise and oust the Jagan government, or at the very least, delay independence.
The unrest during 1962 did give Britain reason to pause and review its position of granting independence to British Guiana under Jagan. Thereafter there was a notable change in British policy from an uneasy acceptance of Jagan, towards the adoption of a joint programme with the US to discredit and expel him from power. Thus in September 1962, the Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys proposed to delay the hosting of the constitutional conference and allow the conference to ‘break down’ over a submission by Forbes Burnham for proportional representation. Whilst Britain historically had a preference for the first past the post system, it was also undeniable that Burnham had a point and that is, in the 1961 elections, 57.3 per cent (PNC and UF tally) of the voters elected 43 per cent of the legislature while 42.6 per cent (PPP tally) of the voters elected 57 per cent of the Council. In the circumstances of the ‘breakdown’ of the conference, the PR system would be imposed, new elections would be recommended and a PNC/UF coalition would presumably form the government.
The 1962 unrests were equally exploited by the PNC and the UF. It was D’Aguiar that first launched an assault on the budget under the slogan ‘Axe the Tax’ with great success and the group opposed to the budget quickly expanded to include most trade unions and the PNC. Moreover, D’Aguiar was receiving widespread support from urban Africans for his militant stance against Jagan and this must have concerned Burnham. It was at this point that the collaboration between the PNC and UF commenced and this period gave these two ideologically opposed parties an opportunity to demonstrate to themselves and to the US who would become their main sponsor, that they could work together.
The disturbances in 1963 presented yet another opportunity for the PNC and the UF leadership to work together on the domestic front against Jagan.
In fact, the PPP appeared to consider the UF as its main pre independence and potentially post independence threat, specifically as the embodiment of continued imperial domination through neo-colonialist strategies and moreover it perceived the UF to be at the root of the earlier social upheavals along with other imperialist actors as revealed by Hugh Fraser, British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Colonies who remarked in March 1962 that “Jagan thinks D’Aguiar and the CIA were probably responsible for the recent riots.”
The PPP however seemed interested in establishing an alliance with the PNC since they both publicly embraced a socialist ideology. The PPP and the PNC exchanged a series of letters after the riots in 1962 regarding the question of an alliance, while three Commonwealth nations, Ghana, Trinidad and Tobago and India had attempted to broker coalition agreements between the PNC and the PPP to no avail starting in 1957. The alliance proposals will be examined in a subsequent article.
With post independence governance at stake, the 1964 General Election was intensely contested with 96.9% of the registered voters exercising their franchise. The results of the 1964 elections were that the PPP won 45.8% of the votes and secured 24 seats, the PNC won 40.5% of the votes and secured 22 seats and the UF won 12.4% of the votes and secured 7 seats.
The UF was convinced that it held the balance of power and posited that the party would “act as a brake on excesses from any quarter.”
In the wake of the 1964 elections, the PNC again rejected PPP overtures to form an alliance. Burnham did not find it necessary at this stage to entertain PPP proposals because the calculation of the anti communist and anti Jagan group proved correct, that is, on the existing voting trend, the PPP could not acquire power under the PR electoral system unless it formed an alliance and, with the bitter enmity both ideologically and personally between the PPP/ Jagan and the UF/ D’Aguiar, it was highly unlikely that their differences could be resolved to form a coalition government. Moreover, neither Burnham nor D’Aguiar was willing to sacrifice their political ambitions since both realized that support for Jagan was equivalent to political death as the US refused to entertain the possibility of any post independence government that included Jagan.
The UF meanwhile believed that great benefits would be derived from a PNC/UF alliance. Jagan’s defeat for the UF signalled that the communist threat to capitalist interest was obliterated and the UF’s capitalist oriented, western aligned vision for Guyana would be realized. As the party editorialized in 1965 in its newspaper The Sun, “The communist threat has been firmly contained and the prospects are that it will be utterly destroyed in due course… local and overseas confidence in Guiana’s economic future has been restored. Prospective new investors are already on the scene and potential investors are knocking on Guiana’s door.”
In the 1964 alliance negotiation, unlike the attempt in 1960, the PNC and UF did not appear to have much difficulty in negotiating potential cabinet formation. The main conflict of the PNC/UF coalition was determining the guiding philosophy of the coalition and, since one wasn’t identified, determining the principle that applied in specific circumstances. The only common positions held by the PNC and the UF were those that would guarantee Jagan’s demise and their accession to political power so they agreed at the 1963 Constitutional Conference that the voting age should remain at 21, that there be elections before independence and that the electoral system of proportional representation rather than first past the post should be employed.
Apart from the agreements at the constitutional and independence conferences, policy differences between the PNC and the UF were numerous, starting with their ideological underpinnings. From its inception the PNC leadership declared that the party was ‘unapologetically’ left wing and the UF identified itself as firmly capitalist and right wing. Burnham signalled his intention to ‘decolonise’ foreign owned industries, a clear indication of his intention to pursue nationalisation while D’Aguiar went on extensive overseas missions to secure foreign aid and investment from the US, Canada and Western Europe as he talked about the need for increased foreign investment in order to facilitate the country’s development.
The PNC desired Guyana becoming a republic while the UF wanted the retention of the monarchical system since among other factors the latter believed, “Loyalty to the crown represents in the minds of the people a psychological symbol of detachment, protection and impartiality”. Burnham pontificated that “The PNC does not want Guyana to be a satellite of some great power bloc, it wants Guyana to have a personality of its own and to be a prosperous and progressive country.” To this, the UF warned “…It may be hoped that in our new role among nations we may not join with certain others to introduce spurious revolutions. Nor do we hope to shelter under the banner of so called non alignment while seeking the favours of or carrying out the wishes of one group of nations or the other.”
Initially as the coalition was comprised of two parties with different preferences, important policy making powers were delegated to individual cabinet ministers who then attempted to pursue policies favoured by their party even if these policies did not please their coalition partner. The UF certainly believed that the three ministries assigned its members, namely Finance, Local Government and Works and Hydraulics were to be administered in the interest of the nation on the basis of UF’s philosophy, in particular, the Finance and Works and Hydraulics Ministries which they believed were key to the implementation of the Highway to Happiness vision forwarded by the party. Consequently D’Aguiar’s few years in office as finance minister were spent trying to secure foreign investment and aid from western sources and consolidating the role of capital in the economy even while the public posturing of the PNC continued to suggest that their philosophy was based on nationalist and socialist principles.
The PNC seemed aware of the risks inherent in delegating power to individual ministers and on occasion directly challenged them and thus undermined their influence. This led to the UF complaining that consultations were of a token nature, that they did not have much legislative influence, that they were essentially required to rubber stamp decisions that had been made by the dominant coalition partner and, that these policy decisions that they were expected to approve often ran counter to their party philosophy.
As independence approached, the differences between the two parties intensified, even regarding the timing and conditions of independence. The two coalition partners went to the 1965 Independence Conference as separate parties with differing agendas. Burnham wanted independence in February 1966 while D’Aguiar felt that Guiana would not have been fully prepared by that date and that August was more appropriate; Burnham wanted to indigenise high level positions in the civil service, D’Aguiar was pushing for the retention of a non Guianese Governor General for at least the first years of independence. Thus both in overall policy and in the details, the differences between the two parties prior to Independence were so grave that they coalition was on the verge of disintegrating and egos had to be massaged by the US to keep the two parties together and keep Jagan out.
The coalition government of Burnham’s PNC and D’Aguiar’s UF encountered even greater difficulties after independence as Burnham ideologically embraced socialism and sought to break away from the restrictions imposed by an alliance with a conservative capitalist partner. The UF had become an unnecessary appendage to the PNC and the coalition had completely disintegrated by the 1968 election. Ultimately, the UF’s backing became unnecessary as Burnham had the support of the US who was instrumental in engineering his rise to power and he effectively ethnically controlled two key sectors – the public sector and the security forces and thus he was able to use his control of these administrative structures to manipulate the electoral process to perpetuate his hold on power.
