The visit of a Taiwanese delegation to Beijing over the last fortnight suggests a determination of both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the new government of Taiwan to begin a process of normalization of relations – though without an as yet clear indication as to what form this will eventually take.
The PRC’s ultimate aim, of course, is the acceptance by Taiwan of its sovereignty over Formosa and the other islands currently under the practical jurisdiction of the Government of Taiwan. On the other hand, the Government of Taiwan wishes to have close economic and political relations with the mainland while insisting that the present realities of autonomy of Taiwan have to be recognized by the PRC and accommodated in some institutional form acceptable to the people on the islands. It is indeed a fact that the original Taiwanese, as distinct from those who settled and took control of the island after 1949, have had a strong sense of cultural autonomy.
The PRC has tended to suggest that it has accommodated the relative autonomist aspirations of both Hong Kong and Macao in the “one country two systems” formula. But Taiwan rejects this solution as not recognizing their realities. Taiwan differs from Hong Kong and Macao to the extent that, directly prior to their incorporation into the PRC, those territories were under the direct colonial jurisdiction of European metropoles, while Taiwan, following a brief Japanese domination prior to World War Two, has had de facto autonomy since the establishment of the PRC in 1949.
Towards the end of the 1980s, the Government of Taiwan decided that it would give up the formula that “there is but one China” which both sides had proclaimed – a China that included Taiwan and the islands.
For both sides the only dispute was who had legal jurisdiction over that China. Instead Taiwan began to emphasise its de facto autonomy as the Republic of China, in the face of the United Nations’ recognition of the PRC as the rightful representative of the people of China and entitled to UN membership and a presence in the Security Council. That position was taken to its logical conclusion in the change of name from the Republic of China to Taiwan, and in recently defeated President Chen’s insistence that the country must continue to fight for separate representation at the UN.
The PRC has persistently taken umbrage at the “two Chinas” proposal, and fought vigorously to prevent recognition of Taiwan by the colonial countries emerging into independence. The Caribbean states have been prime objects of Taiwan’s efforts at recognition, a situation typified by the recent derecognition of Taiwan and recognition of the PRC by the Government of Grenada, and the reverse situation by the Government of St Lucia. The PRC has taken the latter particularly seriously, in spite of the small size of St Lucia, since it represented an uncommon reversal of the general trend of diminishing recognition of Taiwan and increasing recognition of China.
Now, it appears, the new Taiwan government of President Ma has decided to revert to the “one China” policy based on the so-called “1992 consensus” which confirmed “one China,” but left the Taiwanese, in particular, to interpret this to partially reflect the islands’ status of de facto autonomy. This is, in effect, reflective of Taiwan’s anxiety to put itself in a position to effectively exploit the realities of China’s rapid economic growth, to ensure a certain security for its investments in China and to normalize the movement of goods, capital and people between the two entities. Taiwan, in particular, is interested in capitalizing on the growing possibilities of the movement of the Chinese people as tourists, and to this end has also wished to reduce the possibility of military conflict in the seas between China and Taiwan and the presence of extensive military capabilities across the Taiwan Straits.
From a Caribbean perspective, it would appear that, implied in the recent agreements between the two governments (though China does not formally recognize Taiwan as having a sovereign government), is a decision on the part of Taiwan not to persist in seeking recognition by states which currently recognize the PRC. This would be an important concession to China. On the other hand it would suggest that the countries which now recognize Taiwan would have their status as stakes in the diplomatic competition, which has taken the form of ‘highest bidder’ gambling, somewhat reduced. For we can also assume that China will continue to press, however subtlety, for a return of St Lucia to its original choice, while pointing out to others the long-term realities in the game between herself and Taiwan.
This paradox of representation is, presently, no more visible in the Caribbean itself than in the Dominican Republic. The DR is increasingly taking the view that it needs to be able to penetrate the Chinese market, and, indeed, to receive investments from China in furtherance of the DR objective to be an entrepôt in the context of its free trade relationship with the United States. The present government of President Fernandez can be seen stretching to upgrade its formal relationship with China, while not appearing to diminish the status of Taiwan which it has recognized for a long time. We can be sure that this situation will eventually change, as the emerging relationship between the PRC and Taiwan in spite of possible stops and starts, becomes clearer. Then, the other Caribbean countries recognizing will have to follow suit.
