Dear Editor,
Ever since the report of the NIS Reform Committee was submitted to the administration, there have been discussions and commentaries, some less informed than others, concerning the revision of the retirement/pensionable age in the Guyana Public Service, as distinct from the public sector. More recently there was a news item to the effect that the Guyana Public Service Union had re-issued a call for public servants to be retired at age 60, rather than the current age 55.
First of all, it would appear that any policy decision taken in the issue of the restructure and implementation of superannuation benefits for public servants in the future, should be related to the actual implementation of other organisational arrangements, which substantively impact on a range of human resources issues in the public service.
For example, attention needs to be paid to how acknowledged constitutional entities such as the Guyana Elections Commission and the Audit Office of Guyana are actually being directed and managed. The same examination should be focused on a once ‘independent’ entity like the Guyana Sugar Corporation (GuySuco).
Despite the formal recognition by the National Assembly of the constitutional status of GECOM and the Audit Office, the former is actually treated as an agency of the Office of the President, certainly in matters of salaries and benefits; while in the case of the latter, the Public Accounts Committee, in defiance of the Audit Act of 2004, is by-passed by the Audit Office whose budget continues to be submitted to and approved by, the Ministry of Finance.
In the case of GuySuco, despite the installation of a rather high-powered management consultancy in the sugar industry since 1990, there is recent evidence of increasing micro-management of the corporation’s decision-making process. Dedicated senior managers, for whom the sugar industry has long been an inheritance, are therefore disenchanted with a management leadership which refuses to make the point of the illogic of the application of annual across-the-board increases to salaries within the most highly target-oriented organisation in the nation, and the substantive contradiction of its application to managers, while the workers they direct and manage to achieve the targets, continue to be awarded incentives. This ill-conceived diminution of a historic component of managers’ compensation packages could have resulted not only from insensitivity to the impact on morale, but most unpromisingly from a glaringly uninformed approach to productive compensation management.
Next, there is increasing resort to contract employment in the traditional public service. This is particularly evident among the donor-funded project activities so prevalent in various ministries. As regards establishment positions its incidence is disturbingly high at the level of entry grades in the various agencies. The contract employment process by-passes the scrutiny of the Public Service Commission, and there appears to be no alternative control centre that defines and monitors the consistency or otherwise of the application of salaries and benefits in the circumstances.
These developments may well point to the need to analyse departure trends in the public sector as a whole, and to compute, both by individual and categories of entities, the prospective incidence of retirement over say the next 15 to 20 years. In the process the statistical analysis should take account of the number of retirees that are being retained by means of contract employment (of which, incidentally egregious examples can be found in the incumbencies of Chief Labour Officer, and Chief Valuation Officer).
In the case of project employees, the contract usually provides for the payment of a ‘gratuity,’ as understandably, there is no expected longevity of service and therefore eligibility for a pension. It is uncertain, however, whether there is a similar consistency regarding i) entry-level recruits, and ii) retained retirees who are contracted in the traditional public service.
A review of a sample of public sector entities, together with constitutional agencies, may also show variations in the retirement benefits policies:
a) Institutions like the GRA and the Audit Office, with the approval of government, have converted to a pensionable age of 60 years, based on an employer/employee contributory pension agreement.
b) GuySuCo observes a retirement age of 60 (but still has to rely on retirees to operate in strategic areas).
c) Guyana Shipping Corporation observes a similar retirement policy as GuySuco, as does Guyana National Printers Ltd.
However, it seems fair that in an effort to establish as level a playing field as possible, a comprehensive review also should be undertaken of the modalities of the various benefits regimes being implemented by such institutions like the Cheddi Jagan International Airport Corporation; the Guyana Civil Aviation Authority; the Guyana Lands & Surveys Commission; the Guyana School of Agriculture; the National Agricultural Research Institute; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Geology and Mines Commission; the Guyana Public Hospital Corporation, to name a sample few. It is understood that the Guyana Defence Force has a different dispensation from the Guyana Police Force.
There is also the possibility that one or two organisations actually allow their employees to work up to age 65 years. What may possibly emerge is a disaggregation of approaches to, and applications of compensation, including superannuation benefits, which are uninformed by any coherent policy. There may well be a case therefore for attempting to design a more integrated pension benefits policy, one pillar of which, given the current migratory mindset, must be the retention of desired skills and competencies (including the proven competencies and experience available at the upper end of the employment service range). The implementation of such a policy can have a positive effect on the wide ranging Competitiveness Programme so assiduously promulgated as a strategic economic development intervention.
It is public knowledge that pension funds throughout the world have been under siege for some years.
Governments have had to make, for some employees, the hard decision of raising the pensionable age in France for example, where there is significant public sector employment. The retirement age of public servants in Barbados is now 65. That government has further won a referendum from the citizenry, including trade unions, to increase the retirement age to 67.5 years within the next decade.
Here in Guyana it is reported that longevity averages only 62.5 years. The implications therefore for considering a later retirement age must be one for the actuaries to determine. Hopefully, it does not mean that more people are likely to die on the job. Yet this possibility should not be excluded, taking into account the high proportion of public service vacancies which result in too many persons functioning at more than one level above their substantive grade, while others are performing the tasks of as many as two other persons at the same level. It can easily be verified that too many acting incumbencies have persisted for as much as a decade or more, and that there are instances where after such extended periods the ‘actors’ are retired at 55 years to a pension valued at the salary of their substantive position. This is a real human resource issue that needs to be addressed, if at least it will help the pensioner to live long enough to qualify for an NIS pension at age 60.
One negative aspect of the payment of the across-the-board increase utilised in place of the performance merit increment is that persons who entered the public service say in 1998, except those few fortunate to have achieved a confirmed promotion, would in 2008, still be at the minimum of that entry level scale.
Counterparts entering the public service in 2008 start exactly at the same (current) minimum. No recognition therefore is given to the value of ten years service in the applicable grade.
Upward mobility is too often limited by the number of acting incumbents for extended periods. Only confirmed appointments will free the relevant positions for consequential promotions. Hence the significant incidence of non-promotions. This devaluation of the public servant’s worth during a constricted career, is eventually reflected in the quantum of pension benefits received.
There are adequate models within the Caribbean from which Guyana can learn in reviewing its retirement/pension scenario. The exercise should however be undertaken by acknowledged experts, amongst them, managers of pension trusts; accountants with proven records of monitoring pension funds, actuaries (preferably regional) and human resource specialists with relevant experience. Trade unions as important stakeholders should be involved.
The selected group should be charged to examine comprehensively the retirement regimes, actuarial reviews, pension fund management issues and related material that will facilitate the promulgation of a viable retirement and pension benefits policy for the public sector in Guyana as a whole.
Yours faithfully,
E B John
