When the Director General of the Caribbean Regional Economic Machinery (CRNM) and his team concluded their negotiations with the European Commission, he no doubt felt a sense of relief that this long drawn out and complex discussion had come to an end, and that Cariforum governments could compliment themselves on the results. He would no doubt be surprised at the extent to which the small cadre of initial critics originally from within narrow academic and technocratic circles, has now expanded to include other groupings, among them parliamentary parties, business stakeholders, trades union organizations and the broad grouping that now comes under the heading of civil society.
There were, at an early period of the negotiations hints that the course was not entirely smooth. At one point, the leadership of the Ministerial Council on Trade and Economic Development (COTED) had cause to complain of an insufficient liaison between the CRNM team and that grouping formally charged with overseeing the negotiations.
It was perhaps felt at that time that the process of decision-making was ascending too quickly to the higher Caricom body, the Prime Ministerial Committee on External Relations, led over many years by an experienced negotiator and diplomat himself, Prime Minister PJ Patterson of Jamaica. But this was hardly a problem that could be effectively dealt with given the extremely hierarchical nature of our political decision-making systems, and given too the fact that the system of select committees and parliamentary oversight that exists in the Mother of Parliaments and in the American congressional system, hardly function in our parliaments and houses of assembly in a consistent manner, and least of all in the realm of foreign affairs.
Then, in the course of the negotiations, Mr David Jessop, head of the Caribbean Council in the United Kingdom, and a regular commentator on Caribbean affairs, had cause to observe that, at a certain point, Mr Peter Mandelson the EU Trade Commissioner had “comprehensively outmanoeuvred” the ACP grouping. To close observers, this perception indicated a change in the nature of the negotiations undertaken on this occasion by the EU, for it had become quite clear that the ACP were not, as in previous Lome and Cotonou negotiations, operating as a collectivity or alliance in trying to forge a new, post-WTO relationship.
The point had been made by the previous RNM negotiator, Sir Shridath Ramphal, that the small Caribbean countries in particular needed to maintain a large degree of cohesion with the countries of Africa and the Pacific, forming an alliance that would provide them with a certain amount of protection from the pressures that are so often exerted against very small states.
The European Union formula, however, of dividing the ACP grouping into a series of regions, dismantled the pre-EPA framework, and in a sense dismantled even the unity of the African countries as a whole, leaving smaller formations to fend for themselves. Sir Shridath has himself since lamented this outcome, noting that a unified EU has proceeded at different paces with negotiations with specific countries or regions, and that the nature of the conclusions of these negotiations has depended in each case on the strength of the particular country or region.
From the point of view of this region, the outcome of the negotiations is now reflected on the variety of perceptions as to whether we have gained a beneficial arrangement for the future. Some claim that the EPA leaves these countries dangerously open to economic penetration, even though access has been phased, and that what was intended to be a relationship of trade reciprocity is likely in the future to be excessively one-sided, with the EU states the main beneficiaries. In addition, they claim that the aid aspect of the relationship, which in the past had been given almost equal prominence with the trade relationship, has been whittled down, and does not really reflect the European commitment to strongly support regional economic integration, in the context of a widespread understanding, that the encouragement of economic grouping providing a basis for achieving substantial economies of scale in production, was a vital aspect of the future economic growth of the developing countries.
But the CRNM negotiators themselves, entering the fray with much vigour – indeed a vigour uncharacteristic of public servants in our part of the world – have defended the arrangement arrived at as the best that could be achieved in present circumstances. They seem prone to argue that the Caribbean in particular, no longer in this world of competition among emerging powers among developing countries, a favoured grouping of the EU, have done the best that it was possible to do. They further assert that those who place emphasis on the importance of a “development dimension” having a prominent place in the EPA, have simply not liberated themselves from the “begging bowl” mentality.
Though curiously, this charge is thrown at a grouping of academics who, in an earlier era, were accused of being overly critical of “dependency” approaches to North Atlantic-Caribbean relations. And it is in a sense regrettable, that a certain amount of name-calling has pervaded this discussion among the already so small grouping of regional academics and technocrats who frequently exchange institutional places.
But as this disputation among the academic grouping has proceeded, and as information has come through that the EU, which had insisted that their negotiations with the Cariforum needed to be concluded by December last year, were still busy negotiating and renegotiating with some African states and groupings, the arguments, as we have indicated, have infiltrated a wider cross-section of the general Caricom business, trades union and civil society fraternities, and then of Caricom states themselves who, in their majority had decided to sign the EPA agreement with any changes.
The Government of Guyana which, as last December came and went seemed to be in an isolated position, has now been joined by others, including governments of St Lucia and Grenada, with other states now defending the agreement as a necessity rather than an achievement. Civil society groups have taken up the refrain of the need for renegotiation, even in the Bahamas which does not normally get involved in the economic aspects of the community.
This seems to have forced parliamentary oppositions in some countries to take part in the discussions, though with many of our constitutional systems, there is no requirement for a parliamentary debate before signatures are attached to the agreement.
But it is beginning to seem that even those states which were severely critical of the non-acceptors have toned down their criticism, with Prime Minister Golding of Jamaica, for example, no longer emphasizing that those who do not agree are simply infected with an attitude of “mendicancy.” This would seem to suggest that countries of differing views are beginning to accept that a certain unity of this small Caricom arena has to be maintained even in the face of disagreement. And this would appear to be a reason for the decision of the Government of Barbados to summon a special meeting of Caricom heads.
At the same time it is noteworthy, Caricom’s Cariforum partner, the Dominican Republic, has consistently argued that what the EPA arrived at is good enough to work with. One of the original intentions of the European Community as it then was, was that there should be a certain cohesion between the anglophone states of the region and their neighbours, the Dominican Republic (DR) and Haiti. DR leaders have always been more enthusiastic about this, given their anxiety to access the EU single market, banana exports being one of their crucial considerations.
DR leaders of whatever political stripe have tended to take an extremely pragmatic approach to regional and international relations, no doubt believing that it is always better to be in than out.
This disposition is one which Caricom has not really accustomed itself to; but there seems to be a feeling in the air that the CRNM has taken the view that it is time for the Caricom states to begin to accommodate to the new geoeconomic realities of the region, and in particular to the positioning that the DR has sought for itself as economically institutionally positioned between the US and the EU-Caribbean free trade areas. It is, however, not clear whether the Caricom Secretariat, as the chief adviser to Caricom governments has articulated this view to its masters.
Finally, the smaller countries of the Caricom arena have had to take cognizance of the ease with which, at the WTO negotiations, the EU was ready to further reduce the tariff on banana exports from the Latin American states in order to achieve its wider goal of concluding the Doha Round.
No doubt our banana producers would have been told that the ‘aid for trade’ provision would permit the continuation of the necessary adjustment. And it is likely that they do not feel that they are in a position to influence the higher deals between Latin America and Europe. It is interesting that St Vincent’s government, usually prone to a certain radicalism in other regional and hemispheric affairs, has taken the view, through the mouth of its Prime Minister, that what is on the table is what is available. His voice is an influential one in wider regional circles, and some of his colleagues must be wondering about the rationale for his orientation.
