While it would be fair to say that the Guyana government held a fairly successful National Consultation on the CARIFORUM-EC, EPA, its aftermath has been much more uncertain. The Agreement has turned out to be a very difficult subject for public debate because of its length and technical content. Most of the public exchanges I have come across in the media appear to be taking place “well above the heads” of the average lay person. It seems to me impossible to accept that the average lay person will ever be able to participate in effective public discourse on the EPA. That said this column has tried against the odds to provide a mixture of information on the EPA in an accessible form and critique.
Thus I have tried to make it clear that the Agreement, because it will only be fully implemented over a period of 25 years, provides considerable scope for governments to practise moral hazard. That is, to take poor and reckless decisions now, in the full knowledge that the costs or burdens on the economy and society, which flow from these will be carried by future generations of politicians and CARICOM citizens.
Jamaica Switch
Last week I had highlighted this risk and referenced Robert Buddan’s article in the online Jamaica Gleaner of last July 13, which indicated that despite the harsh tones of criticism coming from the Jamaican government against critics of the EPA, the government had in fact through its Minister of Foreign Affairs (Kenneth Baugh at the United Nations) and Prime Minister Golding uttered very strong criticisms of the EPA and the negotiating positions taken by the Economic Commission late in 2007, when it first came to power.
No reasons for the switch in position have been offered, but explanations circulating among political insiders in the Region suggest the basest of motives for this volte face.
As we previously noted the EPA has already undermined the Common External Tariff (CET) in place in the Region. It has also effectively preempted all efforts to autonomously promote regional integration in those areas the EPA covers. This is because CARICOM Member States are Parties to all the Agreement’s provisions with the European Commission and thereby simultaneously with each other.
ACP FALL- OUT
In addition to such consequences the EPA also takes a serious toll on several strategic areas in which CARICOM had previously invested a lot of political capital. Let us consider two practical examples. The African, Caribbean and Pacific group (ACP) with which the Economic Commission has been negotiating to create six (6) separate EPAs amongst 79 countries, was established in 1975 in Georgetown , Guyana. The Georgetown Agreement as it is called is a tri-continental political grouping with one clear overriding objective. That is, to promote solidarity and unified action across the area based on the view that this is necessary because of the many small, poor, and vulnerable states that make up the ACP. As a consequence the ACP has in the past forged common positions on several global development issues. Thus they have pressed the rich countries to meet their obligations, pledges and commitments to the international community. They have also demanded and exerted political pressure on the international financial institutions (IFIs) to fulfill their obligations to poor countries in a humane way, which recognizes the priorities and needs of poor countries in the global system.
The ACP operates with a Secretariat and has important political bodies such as the Council of ACP Ministers. With this already in place the EPA now creates organizations in which will be located most of these activities. Thus at the apex of the institutional provisions in the EPA is the Joint CARIFORUM-EC Council, which has overall responsibility over actualizing the Agreement in all its aspects including supervision, monitoring, trouble-shooting and reviewing the EPA. This Council is at the Ministerial level with representatives from Signatory CARIFORUM States, Members of the Council of the European Commission (EC) and the EC itself.
There is also a Trade and Development Committee comprised of senior officials of both Parties in the EPA.
When examined carefully it will be seen that these bodies have wider powers than those given to CARICOM institutions in areas where CARICOM has created its own governance structure. There is in this situation no provision in event of a conflict as to which legal text will take precedence – the CARIFORUM –EC, EPA or the Treaty of Chaguaramus (1973).
SIDS FALL-OUT
The second example is the grouping known as the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Like the ACP this organization was originally hosted in CARICOM –Barbados 1995. SIDS and the related global Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) have been formally recognized in the United Nations system.
This grouping has operated within the WTO, pressing along with the groupings for recognition of small poor vulnerable states as being intrinsically disadvantaged in the global trading economy.
Such arguments about the intrinsic disadvantageousness will fall by the wayside the moment CARIFORUM agrees to trading provisions, which other similar states reject at the WTO.
Next week I shall wrap up this series of columns on the Guyana Consultation and its aftermath.
