As the American presidential race draws to a close and Senator Obama maintains a reasonable advantage over Senator McCain, speculation has begun in the Caribbean about the effect of an Obama presidency on Caribbean expectations of the United States. In particular there is concern about the response of the new administration to our desire for continuation in some form of the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Agreement (CBTPA) legislation which had extended the life of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) to 2010. The broader question is put by way of asking what sort of priority the new presidency will attach to the Caribbean.
The speculation arises in respect of Senator Obama, and what looks like a Democratic majority in both the Houses of the Congress after the elections, since there is a general assumption that the Democratic Party is supposed to be generally more favourable to Caribbean interests. This is not only because of its post-Franklin Roosevelt tradition of a certain liberalism, but also because it is the party of choice of most persons of Caribbean descent living in the United States.
Yet it is good at the outset to remind ourselves, in what is obviously a period of pro-Obama euphoria in this region, that it is a Republican President, George W. Bush who brought the CBTPA legislation into effect eight years ago, after the Democrat President Clinton, much admired in the Caribbean, failed to do so. And that President Clinton’s administration showed little sympathy for the Caribbean on the matter of the maintenance of a reasonable margin of preference for our exports of bananas to the United Kingdom after the establishment of the European Single Market and Economy in 1992. And speculation is now rife as to the attitude of a new American administration of whatever political stripe, to the implications for Caribbean-United States trade of the new Economic Partnership Agreement that we have recently signed with the European Union. This agreement appears to grant Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to the countries of that grouping.
It is now commonplace to observe, on the other hand, that the Cold War having disappeared, the concern of the United States to ensure the allegiance of Caribbean countries, and in particular what were once considered new and relatively inexperienced Caricom states, no longer has the salience that it once had. In the context of President Bush’s War on Terrorism and American concern with the effects of the movement of narcotics from South America to her shores, the United States has not taken any ideological attitude, but is merely insisting that it is in the self-interest of both herself and ourselves that there should be a relationship of close cooperation between us. And in that regard, as can be seen from the close cooperation between Trinidad & Tobago and the US authorities on the issue of the movement of nationals from Guyana and Suriname allegedly involved in the narcotics trade, the Caribbean has been generally, positively reciprocating the American concern.
At present a certain concern exists in Caricom governmental circles about the attitude of a new Obama administration to US-Caribbean trade, because the Senator, early in his campaign, began to insist on the need for a revision of the current NAFTA legislation which is allegedly “pulling jobs away” from the United States. Senator McCain, in response, indicated a much firmer allegiance to NAFTA, arguing that protectionist legislation cannot, de facto, remove or inhibit the effects of free trade in this age of globalization and economic liberalization. But it does seem that Senator Obama has muted his concern on this issue in recent times, possibly for two reasons. The first is a strong response from Canada that were the US inclined to revise the NAFTA legislation, then Canada would want to raise some concerns of her own – opening the proverbial can of worms leading to a possible unravelling of the agreement. Secondly, as the financial cum economic crisis has engulfed the United States, it has become increasingly clear to the general population that alleged problems relating to the position of the United States in global trade generally, can hardly be due simply to advantages gained by other countries in the context of new rules of a WTO which the United States itself strongly promoted.
The US has defined us as its Third Border, and Caribbean governments seem to have accepted this. It implies, as in the case of her relations with Mexico, the necessity for close and mutually advantageous relations, and therefore decision-making on our part, particularly in the realm of security. This decision-making is required to take her interests into account, but Caricom countries have long complained that they see little sense of reciprocity, or urgency, on the part of their big neighbour when what we deem critical interests of ours are involved. The long delay in extending the CBI is taken as an example, and reference is made to the fact that when this was eventually done, the legislation (CBTPA) came as a mere addendum to free trade legislation for Africa – indicating to some the lowly place on the American diplomatic totem pole that is now allocated to us. Reference is also made, in that context, to the hardline position taken by the US on the issue of the method of deportation of Caribbean nationals involved in criminal activity in that country, on the unwillingness of the US to support Caricom-sponsored legislation for an International Criminal Court, and for the lack of sympathy on the part of American negotiators for the Caricom requirement of special and differential treatment for small economies in free trade agreements – in particular the Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement that was being negotiated, and which now appears to be dead.
Some critics of this Caricom position see our governments as being over-sensitive, painting the US attitude as a general one reflecting her current posture to developing countries in general, and not specifically pointed at the Caribbean. In addition, they argue that the US has been similarly uncaring towards her NAFTA partner Mexico, who she pushes for increasing liberalization of economic policy positions, and for a harder position on the drug trade, while constructing a huge wall to keep Mexicans from transiting to the US in search of employment.
There does seem a rationale, in this period, for Caricom to take a look at our current policy posture to the US, and particularly the implicit assumption in much of our concern with US-Caricom relations that proximity entitles us to some form of special consideration from the US. As a (perhaps still the) major power in today’s world, the natural tendency of the US is to assume that in respect of what she is prone to consider certain strategic aspects of her international relations, less significant states should have some sense of obligation to her policy requirements. This is a hard nut for us to swallow, but it is similarly hard, in diplomatic terms, to take the opposite view that we must always have clear mutuality of obligations in our relationship, moral as this position may be, in both the short and the long terms. It is a point, though to some an arguable one, that even the Mexicans – large as their economy is, and strategic as their location may be for the US, have sort in their continuing negotiations to balance their gains and short terms losses, seeing the relationship as open-ended and subject to persistent efforts of exploitation to their advantage. (And it is fair to say also, that many Mexican scholars of international relations do not necessarily accept this position as intellectually or morally valid).
On this basis, we are asked to give up the claim for the extent of special and differential treatment that we require from the US at present, a position that will no doubt be stressed by the US as they review the outcome of our negotiations for an EPA with the European Union.
But perhaps the time has come for us to look, as we contemplate future relations with the US, at the wider Caribbean of which Caricom is geopolitically a part, and look at the behaviour of other countries in the area who are also constrained by geopolitics to engage the United States giant. We should note that the Central American states quickly concluded a free trade agreement with the US (CAFTA), many governments taking extensive political risks to get approval in their legislatures. This seems to have been done, not simply because in our Caribbean historical perspective they have traditionally been more pliable, but also because of what appears to have been a strategic position, as a region, to take immediate advantage of the US offer in a period of changing American attitudes to free trade. From a Caricom perspective, we need in that context, to examine what will certainly be an evolving policy attitude on the part of Belize which has joined the Central American integration process while retaining membership of Caricom.
And we should note too, that to the surprise of many, Honduras has not allowed this Central American relationship with the US to prevent it from joining the ALBA initiative sponsored by Venezuela.
Similarly we need to closely, and increasingly, take a close interest at the trade and political policies of our Cariforum neighbour, the Dominican Republic, and what they imply for our diplomacy towards the US. That country too, decided that it was in her interest to rapidly negotiate membership of CAFTA, even going as far as offering President Bush some troops for Iraq as a sweetner. We might object to this on grounds of excessive opportunism, but we do need, even when doing so, to examine also the agility of the Dominican Republic attitude to the European Union in the context of her determination to achieve parallel access to that country in the context of the EPA. And we can note too, how the EU exploited the DR’s interest as a form of pressure against the Caricom states.
So we might conclude that at this time in US-Caribbean relations, the question may not be so much what will be the US’s attitude under a possible President Obama. But rather how should we in Caricom reassess our various positions on the possibilities for positive intervention in the American process, seeking in a persistently pragmatic way to find channels of influence, more effective than we have been able to do in the past. And to what extent in this era, the search for influence depends on a deepened diplomatic cohesion among ourselves, as very small players in the system. We shall return to this after the result of the election is known.