December 27 will have been a year since the assassination of Mrs Benazir Bhutto, then on the brink of resuming the leadership of her country after her removal by the military, and then the politically forced demitting of office by General-President Musharraf. Mrs Bhutto’s anticipated resumption of office was seen as providing yet another chance for that country to deal with a series of issues, domestic and external, needing some form of resolution. Friend and foe alike in Pakistan, including her main opponent Mr Nawaz Sharif, had been forced to concede that she should have the next shot at leadership of the country, even though the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) would have had to form of coalition with Mr Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League.
On the other hand, though she had never been a favourite of United States’ administrations, Mrs Bhutto had pursued an active diplomacy in recent years towards the American political elite, to the extent that she eventually arrived at a situation where they felt it necessary to accept her as the next, best leader of the country after the General’s departure.
Her assassination put paid to any hopes either by her supporters at home, or the country’s close allies abroad, that Pakistan was in for a period of possible reconciliation and stability, and a more forceful approach by its government to objectives which the United States in particular, and Pakistan, were presumed to have in common. Confidence that Mrs Bhutto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari, who subsequently assumed the presidency, would be an effective leader was never high, a perception made worse by the subsequent breaking down of the alliance between the PPP and the Muslim League.
Since then, the Americans have pressed hard for a more decisive approach to the situation in Afghanistan by the new Pakistan government, without much real success. The Americans have insisted that a more forthright attempt by Pakistan to curb the Taliban operating in the borderlands encompassing that country and Afghanistan was necessary at this stage, as the situation in the area surrounding Kabul has become more and more fragile. But the Pakistanis have their own assessment of the need to maintain some form of balance in the border areas in order to sustain some degree of allegiance from the populations there, or at least not to create a situation resulting in their alienation.
So while the US and other NATO allies were substantially concerned with Pakistan’s role in their attempt to shore up the regime in Afghanistan, and to sustain enough governmental and political stability there to shift the focus of their military effort from Iraq to that country, the Pakistan government’s concern has been with stability in Pakistan, bearing in mind their own awareness that there was a time when the Taliban were allies of both Pakistan and the United States against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. That alliance included a substantial association with the Taliban, and the granting to them of refuge in the border areas.
The American interest in a continuing close association with Pakistan, including its new government, has implied a similarly continuing close association with the Pakistan military and the country’s intelligence services. But these associations have often been of concern to Pakistan’s neighbour India. The government of that country has tended to see both the Pakistani military and intelligence services as embroiled in Pakistan-India border controversies, including the situation in Kashmir. India’s diplomacy for many years, and particularly in the post-Cold War period, has been aimed at drawing the United States more closely to her own perception of the Kashmir problem. This included India’s own view also, that the extent of Pakistani civilian control over the military and intelligence services, even when civilian administrations are in office in Pakistan, has been at best tenuous.
What now currently appears to have been the virtual invasion of terrorists into Mumbai in India, has brought these Indian perceptions and concerns to the fore. The Pakistan government has been at pains to deny any prior knowledge of plans for such an invasion and the murderous attack on civilians that followed. But there appear to be increasing indications that the group claimed, at this time, to have been involved, the Lashkar e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) bears responsibility for the attack.
The situation so far has had two main effects. First, it appears to have shown up the continuing fragility of control of Pakistan over such groups operating on its territory. This, in itself, is not news. But what it suggests (and naturally opponents of the government will support this) is that elements of the Pakistani intelligence services may have been involved, along with a suggestion that even Indian counter-intelligence may have been mixed up with them. This situation highlights the tenuousness of President Zardari’s hold on the situation and, his opponents will claim, an inability on the part of the government to cope with either the domestic or external aspects of it.
But a second effect has been on the Indian government itself. There seems to be a widespread perception that the government was caught by surprise. It seems to be widely felt that the government was indecisive in reacting to the attack in this very important city of Mumbai, both from the point of view of its importance to the economy of India, and to the maintenance of external confidence in the country as a whole. There was almost a deafening silence from the government as the attacks continued, and what seemed to have been much hesitation in deciding on what the response should be.
Resignations from the Indian administration have been inevitable. And so, in turn, has been the Indian government’s demand for credible accountability on the part of the Pakistan government.
In effect both India and Pakistan have been politically and diplomatically wounded. Yet the complexity of their relations over the years inhibits a mutually acceptable approach to dealing with issues of this nature by either of them. This leaves a diplomatic vacuum which, from the exertions of Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, seems to require third-party intervention in the case of the United States. Recent American diplomacy towards India has, of course, been aimed at arriving at a reasonable agreement on India’s determination to pursue her nuclear goals, a diplomacy which has not been particularly pleasing to Pakistan, historically America’s No 1 ally in that part of the world.
But while the US’s determination to conclude a nuclear agreement with India before the end of President Bush’s tenure of office has been that country’s focus, American diplomacy towards the regional issues that at the same time bind and create conflict between these two Asian countries has been at a virtual stalemate.
In addition, there has continued to be a degree of American resistance to the participation of other world powers in this geopolitical arena. But as the Russians could probably advise, based on their own tragic intervention in Afghanistan in the 1970s if not before, the issues involving that country’s strategic location as central to the ‘Great Game’ which has bedevilled every great power in that region since the 19th century, can hardly be resolved, then or now, by one country seeking solutions in opposition to the interests of others.
