The political situations in Ghana and Zimbabwe represent interesting contrasts on the continent at the present time. The Zimbabwe elections were held in an atmosphere of turmoil, with the opposition claiming to have won the parliamentary elections, but to have been robbed in the presidential elections in particular, by both fraud and brute force on the part of President Mugabe’s government and ruling party. On the other hand, Ghana’s elections, held last week, were generally conducted in a peaceful atmosphere. There the opposition New Patriotic Party won a comfortable majority of the parliamentary seats (128-94) over the ruling National Democratic Congress, while neither presidential candidate reached the fifty per cent that was necessary with the NPP candidate obtaining 49.1% and the NDC 47.1.
But unlike the Zimbabwe case the electoral process in Ghana has been played according to the constitutional rules and a run-off for the presidency is to be held on December 28. And though the Ghana elections are not complete, we can reasonably expect that while with the presidential results so close a certain tenseness might be expected, the disorder that has occurred in Zimbabwe is unlikely to take place.
Looking at recent African politics from these two poles of electoral behaviour gives the observer a reasonable perspective on the limits within which governmental changes have been taking place on the continent in recent times. The last presidential elections in April 2007 in Nigeria gave rise to expressions of concern about the extent to which manipulation played a substantial role, and prejudiced the results. But some degree of consensus emerged to allow the announced winner to serve the requisite term. Perhaps this was due to the fact that Nigeria’s constitutional arrangements, being federal in nature, are almost devised to ensure that different parties will play roles in the multiple (state and national) governance systems, so that a variety of prizes are seen to exist, as against the systems in either Ghana or Zimbabwe for example.
On the other hand, the elections in Kenya in December 2007 resulted, to some extent unexpectedly, in a substantial degree of chaos, again resulting from widespread claims of electoral fraud, but with an eventual solution that resulted in a de facto sharing of power between the Party of National Unity and the opposition Orange Democratic Movement. In the case of Kenya, external (though largely African external) assistance was required to facilitate arrival at a solution acceptable to the opposition. And indeed it has become the norm that the African regional institutions, or African political personalities of repute, are accepted as observers or diplomatic conciliators in national elections, giving them a stamp of legitimacy, or otherwise.
In the recent case of Ghana, the main observer team was able to give quick assurance to the major parties and the electorate that, in spite of the narrowness of the presidential result, the elections were reasonably “free and fair” (the now conventional phrase of approval in these matters). But that is exactly what President Mugabe was unable to receive after the results in Zimbabwe were tallied. So in this case, the election has been followed by inter-party dispute, continuing violence and a persistent deterioration of the economy. This has been the case in spite of external attempts at conciliation initially by the Southern African Development Community and in particular by now former President Mbeki, ending with the recent refusal of the Mugabe government to accept the interceding of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and former President Jimmy Carter (it will be recalled that Mr Annan played a substantial role in the achievement of a resolution of the Kenyan difficulties).
In many of the instances of political turmoil that have taken place on the continent in recent times, a significant fear has been that such turmoil would spill over into neighbouring countries once it became severe. This has been the case particularly in Central Africa and in the Southern Sudan, and it has been a contributing factor to the increasing South African concern with the intractability of the situation in Zimbabwe. Streams of refugees have flowed into South Africa, resulting in some degree of social turmoil and resentment. Indeed it could even be argued that the situation, and his approach to it, have been contributing factors to Mr Mbeki’s loss of office in South Africa.
Now calls are beginning to be made for intervention in Zimbabwe more forceful than President Mbeki’s approach. It is noteworthy that in addition to such a suggestion from Archbishop Desmond Tutu, this approach is being proposed by the current Prime Minister of Kenya who, as opposition leader, was in the midst of the dispute following the Kenyan elections. References have been made to President Julius Nyerere’s intervention in Uganda when, in his judgement, the rule of Idi Amin became intolerable not only for the people of his country, but for neighbouring countries themselves. And there is no doubt that Archbishop Tutu must have in his mind the persisting situation of liquidation of the peoples of Darfur, felt to be supported by the Government of the Sudan.
So far, the leadership of the African continent has been substantially content to allow the Southern African Development Community, led by South Africa, to continue to take the lead in dealing with the Zimbabwe situation. But that situation has begun to take on a different colour. Not only is deprivation becoming more and more severe, but cholera has now become widespread in the country, and the government, including President Mugabe himself, seems to be adopting a nonchalant attitude to the spread of this plague.
In effect the situation in Zimbabwe is seen to be evolving from a political dispute, severe as it is, to the level of a humanitarian disaster. The question then arising is that of the extent to which the issue is now one of wider international concern, requiring more extensive political and diplomatic pressure. The question also seems to suggest this approach particularly as the African Union seems so deeply involved, and perhaps even overwhelmed, by the Darfur situation, with both its diplomatic and military hands full Darfur has indeed exposed the limitations of the African states (and thus the African Union’s) military and relevant infrastructural capabilities. And the question is likely to become more prominent in the face of President Mugabe’s peremptory rejection of diplomatic intervention by both Kofi Annan and President Jimmy Carter.
In this era, the issue of humanitarian intervention has become intertwined with the doctrine of a “responsibility to protect” – and therefore with governmental or UN consideration of the issue of the propriety of force in certain situations that are giving rise to mass human deprivation, suppression and even death. It is to be hoped that the international community will seek, in advance of consideration of the use of force, to make yet another, more consolidated diplomatic effort, to get President Mugabe back to the bargaining table.
The fiftieth anniversary of the independence of Ghana (1957), and Kwame Nkrumah’s vision of African continental unity, have continued to be celebrated during the course of this year. In that period African regional institutions have developed, and Ghana itself has consolidated its governance systems after some degree of instability. No doubt the leaders of the continent must be concerned to act, in the face of humanitarian disasters, in such a manner as to inhibit the possibilities of external involvement in their affairs just because they themselves are loathe to go the distance in that regard.
