We have already noted the amount of controversy characterizing the Summit of the Americas to its very end. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago itself has received much criticism from within. The Government of Cuba, particularly through former President Fidel Castro, kept up a running commentary on the conference, even making some critical cum sarcastic remarks about Prime Minister Manning’s handling of the conference and the preparation of the communiqué. And Caricom itself gave the appearance of a split when the Dominican Government joined other members of Alba in signing what might be called a counter-communiqué.
It is true that Caricom heads had the opportunity to meet, for a short while, with President Obama. And it is also true that even though Trinidad & Tobago was host to the summit, we should not have necessarily expected undue or extra-favourable attention to Caricom’s specific concerns. But we do not have the impression, as Caricom joined others in their insistence on President Obama dealing with the issue of Cuba’s prolonged absence from the inter-American family and the United States’ extended embargo on that country, that the opportunity was taken to do something else. This, it seems to us, was to seek to locate itself, as the smallest of the small, in the wider context of the non-US hemisphere, and to indicate our concern not only with the historic imbalance between the US and other countries of the hemisphere, but with issues that we have, and are likely to have in the future, with those other hemispheric countries.
Specifically, the WTO process has created a situation in which many countries of Latin America have vehemently opposed the extensive arrangements that the European Union and the ACP countries have tried to make, in order to find a reasonable solution on the issue of the export of bananas to Europe. Much damage has been done, and much distress felt by the populations of Caricom – few as some hemispheric countries might think we are – over the years since the mid-1990s. Might we not have taken the opportunity to ask and to continue asking, even to the annoyance of some and in the presence of the United States President, whether this prolonged pressure and unwillingness to settle until the last pip is squeezed from us, is good for balanced development in our hemisphere and for good relations in the area? For one thing, the protracted nature of this issue, originally coming up during the presidency of the last Democrat sitting in the White House, is in part due to the pressure of the American banana businesses which, it is no secret, exert a substantial influence in the politics of that country.
A similar concern might relate to the region’s sugar industry. As our neighbour Brazil has, with other emerging states, gained victories in the WTO system in their pressure to force concessions from the United States, President Lula himself has conceded the collateral damage that can be done to the Caribbean sugar industry. And it is also true that he has sought to encourage Guyana and Jamaica in particular, to move to manufactures (ethanol) as derivatives of sugar, as well as arranging infrastructural assistance for Guyana. But does this end the matter? It is surely not enough, as even some Caricom leaders seem to say, that we must meekly accept that the era of protection is over, and that there is no sense in insisting on special and differential treatment although we notice the United States taking all kinds of actions to protect its own cotton and ethanol industries?
Opponents of this diplomatic approach of continuous pressure seem to equate it, as the Jamaican Prime Minister has tended to say, with a stance based on a mentality of continuing dependency and inclination to beg. But the point of the line of argument which we are putting here is really to suggest that, just as we accept that there is an apparent change in the balance power within the hemisphere that can influence United States behaviour in the medium term, we are entitled to go further. That is we are entitled to initiate more active diplomatic movement among other Latin American states to gradually build up an acceptable sentiment that alternative arrangements and interventions in the developing process in the hemisphere have to be found, by seeking to reinforce the view that the differences in endowments and capabilities among states will not disappear by waving a WTO wand and then doing nothing.
It is important that the summit has paid attention to increasing resources available to the Inter American Development Bank (and by extension the Caribbean Development Bank). But this can only be complementary to an understanding that the processes of development in the hemisphere cannot be identical as between large and small. The argument which Caricom makes today for increased security assistance in a situation where the limited resources of Caricom states cannot cope with the severity of the security issue in this hemisphere, must apply to the development issue as well. After all, no one says that we are in a dependency mode when we ask, as we are doing now with increasing force, for increased security assistance to make up for our limitations of size and capability.
We take the view that the changing global and hemispheric environments necessitate a new emphasis on, and consequently a new approach to what we can call a regional integration approach to Caricom countries’ development. The major Latin American states themselves, led by Brazil, have increasingly been emphasizing what they call an “infrastructural integration” approach to development among neighbours in a world of economic giants. Guyana is increasingly aware of this orientation, and Belize is indeed increasingly drawn to the possibilities of a degree of integration led by its major neighbor, Mexico, even as that country grapples with its own serious difficulties. And further afield we see the successful Singapore, whose economy has benefited substantially from international integration, leaning today towards its regional neighbours Malaysia and Indonesia in pursuit of the creation of new integrated economic platforms directed to new bases for economic growth.
We must take every opportunity to raise this and related issues with our hemispheric neighbours. It is obvious that the United States’ 1994 solution of a Free Trade Area of the Americas is making no progress. And it is also true, though some may not like it to be said, that Caricom countries in their relations with Venezuela are in an asking mode in situations of economic emergency, rather than in a pro-active mode of themselves suggesting regional integration development strategies that will enhance their prospects of growth with national autonomy as against dependency.
Caricom heads of government should spend some time at their July meeting in dealing with these issues: issues of placing ourselves within the hemisphere from a perspective of our long-term location as small countries wanting to maintain their autonomy while pursuing viable economic growth. It sometimes sounded in this summit as if we were no more than advance guards for Cuba’s reintegration (important as that is for us and the hemisphere generally), or for the anti-imperialist stances of Nicaragua and Bolivia. We must, as we did in our relations with the African and Pacific states in 1973 and after when the end of Commonwealth protection began to dawn, show our sense of self-assertion, pride of autonomous place among the large states, and a secure sense of the direction of economic growth and development that we wish to take. And to do that, our heads of government must begin to tell us what they are going to do about the Development Vision Report which they contracted from Professor Norman Girvan as the basis of the new integration of the CSME , which they seemed to accept in their conference of 2007, and which they now seem to have forgotten.