Dear Editor,
The Government of Guyana (GOG) continues to deny the purchase or importation of the spy equipment. It contends that there is no evidence linking the GOG to the purchase. Peter Myers testified under oath in a court of law in a democratic jurisdiction with a remarkable system of law and justice that his firm sold the equipment to the GOG. Minister Ramsammy was mentioned in the trial as the agent of the GOG on the transaction by the defence. A trainer was reportedly dispatched to Guyana to train individuals on the equipment. Roger Khan was apparently trained to use the equipment. Unless the GOG could prove that the credentials of Minister Ramsammy and the GOG were unknowingly abused the evidence is strongly suggestive of the GOG’s involvement. The GOG simply cannot expect the public to believe its denials. After all, this is the government of a corrupt state where drug lords appear immune from prosecution. It has to prove more or take steps to repudiate the evidence to date. The GOG reportedly requested information from the US State Department on this matter last year and is yet to disclose whether it has received the information and to reveal the information received.
The government raises two countering arguments of (1) authorities in the exporting state (the USA in this case) usually require the authorities of the importing state (Guyana) to verify the authenticity of the user of such arms and equipment and (2) an export licence is required. First, there is no evidence that these requirements applied in this particular case. Second, ‘usually’ is not an absolute, which means the USA could have very well not demanded verification or that no export licence was required in this particular case. Third, certain equipment is not subject to the USA export licence requirement and the government is yet to prove that the equipment at issue was subject to such requirement. Fourth, if a USA export licence was required in this case and none was granted but the equipment still made its way to Guyana the FBI should launch an investigation for possible evasion of US laws. An exporting party could creatively identify items to evade the licence requirement. Fifth, if a government official purchases the equipment it should satisfy the verification requirement. Sixth, it has been reported that undercover investigations by US authorities earlier this year had revealed serious loopholes in the security equipment purchase sector. The GOG’s position supposes the system was working perfectly when it may not have been at the time of the purchase. Finally, the GOG’s reference to its failed attempt to import MP5 weapons from the UK as proof of the difficulty obtaining export licensing approval for sensitive arms and equipment is a red herring. MP5 weaponry from the UK is different from intercept software purchased in the USA with different applicable export laws.
Finally, if we are to accept that the GOG itself did not purchase or import the equipment does this mean that someone else could not have done so with/without the GOG’s permission? The defence in the case had earlier claimed that an FBI probe found that the GOG had given Khan permission to purchase the equipment.
The GOG denied this on June 9, 2008 by issuing a statement that referenced strict controls on security and arms sales by both the US and Guyana, a position that I have challenged above. The bottom line is that the spy equipment could not be purchased without the approval and/or knowledge of the GOG unless someone orchestrated a magnificent forgery. But forgery of governmental authority warrants prosecution.
Roger Khan was never prosecuted in Guyana. Even if the GOG is entirely innocent this fiasco confirms the current government is a major mistake for the security of this nation and the safety of its citizens.
Yours faithfully,
(Name and address provided)
