Two branches of the Guyana Police Force – the Criminal Investigation Department and the Tactical Service Unit – seem to be working at cross purposes.
The Guyana Police Force hands out monetary rewards for “outstanding performance” every July. This year was no different. As the Force celebrated its 170th anniversary, Commissioner Henry Greene handed out $6.7 M dollars to 1,053 policemen and women − about one-third of the force − for their achievements.
The striking but unsurprising feature of the handout was that the operational arm − the Tactical Service Unit which does most of the brawny manhandling and shooting − received $500,000 for its deeds. The investigation arm − the Criminal Investigation Department which should be doing the more brainy type of scrutiny − received only $200,000.
Intelligence
When the celebrations are over, it will be realised that the catalogue of cases not solved has been growing in relation to those for which convictions were secured in the law courts. The heap of corpses of ‘wanted men’ who have been killed during law-enforcement operations is higher than those of their victims. Despite the high death tolls of both victims and criminals, the police have found it difficult to prosecute successfully a sufficient number of the perpetrators of the bloodiest atrocities.
Criminals operating in large gangs – over twenty were alleged to have perpetrated the Agricola-Eccles and Bartica massacres – generate much information. Careful collection and collation of data on their appearance, accommodation, addresses, social habits, telephone numbers, transport, medical treatment, girlfriends and contacts — will yield dividends in the long term. But Guyana’s crime intelligence system seems to suffer not only from a lack of resources but also from a lack of patience and the unbearable pressures to show results.
By way of comparison, Suriname’s Minister of Justice Chandrikapersad Santokhi explained that Shaheed ‘Roger’ Khan had been kept under surveillance “for over two years” as he travelled between Guyana and Suriname before his spectacular arrest on June 15, 2006. A US Embassy official also explained that the US Drug Enforcement Administra-tion played a part in advising Suriname’s law enforcement authorities to move against Khan. In short, Khan’s arrest was the result of good local intelligence gathering and international co-ordination, things that were “lacking in Guyana.”
Guyana’s intelligence deficiencies are no secret. It can be recalled that when President Bharrat Jagdeo first announced his counter-crime plan to deal with the Troubles on the East Coast in June 2002, he promised that “A comprehensive reform of the intelligence sector to strengthen intelligence-gathering to support the fight against crime, narco-trafficking and threats to internal security will be undertaken. This will be accompanied by improvements in the investigative capacity of the Criminal Investigation Department.”
Launching the National Drug Strategy Master Plan three years later in June 2005, he again spoke of the need for the intelligence-gathering capabilities of law enforcement agencies to be significantly enhanced. He promised as part of the anti-narcotics measures, that the ‘operationalisation’ of the Joint Intelligence Coordinating Centre which brings together the intelligence gathering apparatus of the Joint Services, will aid in better intelligence-led counter-narcotics operations.”
If the President’s promises had been fulfilled in a timely manner, the Force would have been better off today. There has been some improvement, nevertheless. Under the British-funded Security Sector Reform Action Plan 2007-2011, two consultants − Tim Hanley and David McWilliam from the Police Service of Northern Ireland – came in March 2008 to work with the Police Force to help develop crime intelligence, advise on structures, provide training and conduct a needs analysis for the setting-up of the new, expanded Criminal Intelligence Unit. Binoculars and cameras have helped the improved unit which has also been re-equipped with computers and other office equipment. A data processing and management computer system was also installed at Force Control, the ‘brain’ of police operations at the headquarters in Eve Leary.
Investigations
Over the past seven years since the Troubles on the East Coast erupted, Guyana recorded a grisly tally of about one dozen massacres − at Nathoo’s bar in Kitty; Lamaha Gardens; Light Street, Bourda; Buxton-Friendship; Prashad Nagar; Agricola-Eccles; La Bonne Intention; Bagotstown-Eccles; Black Bush Polder; Lusignan; Bartica and Lindo Creek − in which about eighty persons died in addition to others. Many of the murders occurred noisily and in public places with some assaults lasting over an hour. They ought to have been easier to solve than the furtive assaults of a solitary bandit but this has not been the case.
In the case of the La Bonne Intention massacre in which Minister of Agriculture Satyadeow Sawh was assassinated on April 22, 2006, Head of the Guyana Police Force’s Criminal Investigation Department Seelall Persaud recently admitted that everyone who had been charged for the murders was now dead. The police therefore would have to withdraw its case. The police had begun boldly by issuing wanted bulletins for several men. Then the enforcers went to work and, when they had finished, all of the identifiable wanted men except one, David Leander, had been shot dead. When Leander appeared in court, there were signs that he had been tortured. This led the magistrate conducting the preliminary inquiry to rule that the man’s “purported oral confession” was not “free and voluntary” and was inadmissible.
The Rondell ‘Fineman’ Rawlins gang was held responsible for the Agricola-Eccles massacre in which eight persons were killed on February 26, 2006. The same gang was blamed for the Lusignan massacre of January 26, 2008 in which eleven persons were killed. In the case of the Bartica massacre of February 17, 2008, a gang of 20 bandits was involved but only a couple of suspects have been brought before the court so far.
The victims were killed during an hour-long assault but the police seem not to have been able to make a conclusive case against those who have been arraigned. The prosecution itself often seems to be ill-informed and uncertain about the identities of the suspects. In one case, when given a chance to respond, the accused told the court that he did not recognise the call names by which he was identified and blurted out that he could not have signed the confession because “me ain’t know fuh read an’ write an me ain’t neva sign to nothing from de police.”
Crime Chief Persaud declared, in the case of the Lindo creek massacre, that the Guyana Police Force had “definitively” concluded that Rondell ‘Fineman’ Rawlins and his marauding gang were responsible for the gruesome killing of the eight miners whose burnt remains were found on June 21 last year at the Lindo Creek camp where they were mining. After the miners were killed, their bodies and belongings were burnt. This posed a serious challenge to the CID which does not possess the laboratory facilities and human skills needed to conduct certain types of forensic investigation and analysis and assistance had to be sought from the Jamaica Constabulary Force. Investigations are often compromised by the contamination of crime scenes by untrained soldiers and policemen engaged in joint service ‘enforcement’ operations.
System
The Troubles on the East Coast have been a severe test for the national crime intelligence system. It failed to predict the crisis, prevent criminal violence and protect innocent citizens. It also failed to provide sufficient evidence to bring the culprits to justice.
In his testimony before the Disciplined Forces Commission over five years ago, then Minister of Home Affairs Ronald Gajraj had conceded that intelligence-gathering by the Police Force “leaves much to be desired.” He admitted that this was in part because agents of “the Police Special Branch did not have the same usefulness of years ago since they had become well known to the public and were unable to infiltrate certain areas for intelligence-gathering.”
Former Head of the Police Criminal Investigation Department Leon Trim also admitted that there was a “weakness in intelligence-gathering.” It is evident from these remarks that several big problems still face the Police Force and impair their ability to investigate serious crime.
The first problem is the determination of its operational arms, usually TSU-based patrols, to shoot to kill ‘wanted men,’ taking no prisoners. This has resulted in the extirpation of the best sources of information, elimination of evidence and engendering fear in other witnesses to come forward. This practice is kept alive by the reward-system in which, every year, the TSU gets big bonuses for its shooting skills and the CID gets the blame for not solving serious crime.
Second, as a result of the first, many families and villagers have been alienated by the harsh treatment they receive during police searches and arrests and, therefore, are unwilling to provide information which could lead to the arrest of criminals. In addition, because of their dubious methods, the police often do not receive the level of cooperation from foreign sources that is necessary; this was proven in the case of the roles played by the security forces of Suriname and Trinidad in arrest of the drug-smuggler, Shaheed ‘Roger’ Khan.
Finally, salaries and conditions of work in the Police Force deter intelligent, ambitious young persons from enlisting. The Force has earned an image as a refuge for underperformers who are employed to conduct ‘brute force’ operations against citizens.
Until policy-makers decide to conduct serious reform and change the character of the Force, it will remain incapable of overcoming the challenges of investigating crime.
