Contrary to expectations that a negotiated solution to the four-month-old crisis in Honduras was near, the stalemate continues. Both the de facto leader, Roberto Micheletti, and the ousted president, Manuel Zelaya, are refusing to budge from their respective positions.
Last Friday, Mr Zelaya walked away from the latest round of negotiations, initiated on October 7, under the watchful eye of the Organization of American States, in the face of Mr Micheletti’s dogged refusal to agree to Mr Zelaya’s reinstatement. Mr Micheletti, on the other hand, has offered to step down if Mr Zelaya renounces his claim to the presidency. In a bid to break the deadlock, the US State Department announced earlier this week that it was dispatching senior officials to Honduras to try to encourage flexibility on both sides.
It appears that, up to last Friday, representatives of Mr Zelaya and the de facto government had reached agreement on seven of eight proposals arising from the San José Accord originally proposed by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias. The seven points of agreement are reportedly on:
A government of national unity and reconciliation;
Amnesty for political crimes;
Renunciation of the convening of a national constituent assembly or any attempt at constitutional reform;
The holding of the November 29 elections and the transition to a new government in January 2010;
The respective roles of the army and the national police;
A truth commission; and
The normalization of relations with the international community.
The Gordian Knot was, however, the question of Mr Zelaya’s reinstatement, the key point of discord being who should pronounce on this intractable problem. Mr Zelaya is proposing that it should be the National Congress which decides the issue, while Mr Micheletti favours the Supreme Court. Neither Mr Zelaya’s preference for a political solution nor Mr Micheletti’s more legalistic inclination has found mutual acceptance. It was at this point, last Friday that the Micheletti camp proposed the idea of both men removing themselves from the equation and the establishment of a government of transition and reconciliation, something Mr Micheletti had actually floated previously in media interviews.
In a recent statement to the BBC, Mr Zelaya flatly rejected this proposal, calling it a “second coup d’état”, since it would be imposing the will of the de facto leaders on that of the electorate. Mr Zelaya has also said that he withdrew from the talks because he thought that the de facto regime was just trying to stall for time ahead of the November 29 elections. This has been obvious for some time now, as has been their steadfast refusal to countenance Mr Zelaya’s return to office, even with his powers circumscribed.
Mr Zelaya is moreover maintaining that Mr Micheletti’s refusal to reinstate him will strip the elections of any legitimacy and further isolate the de facto government. And he continues to insist that he should return to the presidency to complete his rapidly diminishing term.
It now seems that Mr Zelaya believes that, notwithstanding the fact that he has accused the OAS of “weakness”, reflected in the breakdown of the negotiations, he can force the OAS, the United States and other regional governments to bring more pressure to bear on the Micheletti government to back down, not only to allow the elections to go ahead but also to ensure that they receive international recognition, thereby permitting Honduras to return to the fold of democratic nations.
While Mr Micheletti’s intransigence has been remarkable, it is beginning to appear that he may have his finger closer to the national pulse than Mr Zelaya, who has now been holed up in the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa for 40 days. For even as the Micheletti team claims that it is willing to resume the negotiations whenever Mr Zelaya is ready, a recent poll in Honduras has shown that the majority of Hondurans are tired of the impasse, want Mr Micheletti to withdraw and Mr Zelaya to give up the idea of returning to the presidency, and are in favour of international mediation to resolve the crisis.
Mr Zelaya, however, rejects this. He feels confident that he will be reinstated, even though he has walked away from the negotiations and he is calling on his supporters to remain in the streets and to reject the November 29 elections if there is no change in the situation.
One now senses a certain desperation behind Mr Zelaya’s bravado, as time runs out for him. He may yet secure reinstatement, but perhaps only at the eleventh hour and only as a figurehead, to allow the elections to go ahead with international recognition. In the meantime, caught between the populist and illegal aspirations of the deposed president and the reactionary and illegitimate response of the Honduran elites, the people of Honduras, the third poorest country of the hemisphere, are the ones who are suffering. Surely it is time for the international community to bang heads together, even as there is talk of getting Hondurans to find a Honduran solution for a Honduran problem.
