Last Monday’s edition of this newspaper reported residents of Mon Repos as doubting the claimed success of a mangrove replanting project which had been hyped by the sea defence division of the Ministry of Public Works and Communications.
It may at first glance seem to be much ado about nothing but it is of vital importance to communities living along the extended sea coast, to taxpayers and to the donor community as ultimately the putative success of this programme could be the catalyst for the government to spend large sums pursuing the commendable but testing goal of more mangrove thickets along the coast.
A January 19, 2010 press release issued by the Government Information Agency (GINA) had quoted Ms Agnes Dalyrmple, the acting Chief Sea and River Defence Officer as saying that the year-old mangrove replanting project at Mon Repos had been a success but not the one at Ann’s Grove also on the East Coast.
Ms Dalrymple’s announcement had been preceded by a sweeping statement from President Jagdeo on October 28, 2009 at the commissioning of the Kitty pump station that around $1 billion dollars would be spent this year on developing a programme for mangrove replanting. While he did not mention it on that occasion, mangrove replanting would also dovetail nicely with the Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS) as it would fall into the category of afforestation and potentially attract international funding and plaudits. Discerning observers would immediately see a connection between the two statements. President Jagdeo is intent on proceeding with this mangrove project and the technicians on the ground must show that this is feasible as Ms Dalrymple’s statement set out to do. However, the mangrove seascape painted by the GINA release was far cheerier than the situation on the ground.
In principle a mangrove replanting programme is a capital idea. As Ms Dalrymple pointed out man-made sea defences are currently running at US$2500 to US$4500 per metre. A successful mangrove replanting programme could therefore enable an effective sea defence system at a cost far less, provided, however, the cultivation could be successfully orchestrated. Therein rests the dilemma.
There is a division among the knowledgeables as to whether mangrove agriculture in the face of shifting tides and the vagaries of the seas can be successful along the Guyana coast. So the upshot of the Mon Repos project is its potential to be used as one or a main factor in the decision to expend hundreds of millions of dollars on mangrove replanting.
What was the evidence on the ground? When Stabroek News visited the area to test the veracity of the GINA statement it discovered that there weren’t any lush growths of mangrove. Clumps of stunted plants – certainly not reflective of a year’s growth – were evident and quite disturbingly the area appeared not to be secured and animals were grazing amiably, nibbling here and there. The residents who spoke to this newspaper dismissed the notion that they were gazing at a successful project and one related how the mangrove plants had been put down and not tended to after. Many were washed away and the animals – including voracious goats – ate and destroyed others. In the words of a fisherman and boat builder in the area the project was a “waste of time”.
Following the publication of the news item in this newspaper, Ms Dalrymple responded by way of a letter to clarify various points. Most importantly, she toned down GINA’s description of the project from “successful” to “relatively successful”. She also acknowledged that the issue of the monitoring of mangroves had been a problem and assured that 15 more rangers were to be recruited to monitor the programme. Unconvincingly, she also suggested that the “cows have been very selective in what they ate!”, leaving the mangroves for more succulent grasses. This was not reassuring at all.
As had been announced in December 2007, the European Union is investing $5B in sea defences with special emphasis on fortifying mangrove protections. At the time, Head of the sea defence division Mr George Howard had said that mangrove management would be improved and he noted that re-growing and maintaining mangroves could cost as much as US$3.8m per kilometre – by no means an inexpensive venture. He also signalled that there would be a public education programme to sensitise people to the need to preserve mangroves.
Judging by the Mon Repos experience, this educational programme is languishing in the depths of some state office even though scarce financing was invested in the Mon Repos pilot and the failed Ann’s Grove bid. What the taxpayers and citizens of this country do not want is the careless investing of a $1b in a mangrove cultivation project that has not been properly founded and studied. Considering the recent welcome initiative of the donor community to reach out to all stakeholders one would expect that the European Union would also be keen to demonstrate to the Guyanese public that the mangrove project will be pursued on the basis of results that are far sturdier than the outturn from the Mon Repos project.
One engineer, Mr Charles Sohan, has commendably aired his views publicly about the difficulty in farming mangroves and his and other expert opinions should be carefully considered before a decision is finally taken to proceed.
The evidence would show that the government routinely pays lip service to programmes such as shore zone management and that in the years that it has been in charge there has been little concerted effort to get the programme going. The advent of the LCDS has seen some urgency added to these programmes for varied reasons. Five years ago, this newspaper reported on the destruction of mangroves at Number 66 village on the Corentyne to facilitate the expansion of fishing and had been told that the Guyana Forestry Commission (GFC) had been working on a code of practice and a management plan to enable better management of mangroves. It is unclear how far this code has been developed and why there is little publicizing of it.
A year later, in 2006, Stabroek News also reported on how mangrove degradation at Number 52 Village was causing erosion of the sea dam. It was unclear why a year later the GFC’s code had not been optioned by the villagers in the area and all along the coast.
Before this $1b venture sets sail the public needs to be assured that there is a reasonable chance of success and that value for money has been taken into account.
