The recent decision, taken on February 23 by most of the countries of Latin American and the Caribbean, to transform the Rio Group and the Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development (CALC) into a formal institution, the Community of Latin American States, is being advanced by them as another stage in a process of regional integration to which they have formally committed themselves at various times. On the other hand, however, this initiative has been perceived in various quarters as a challenge to the existence and competence of the long standing Organisation of American States(OAS), the main post-World War Two collective institution in the Americas.
This perception of challenge has been advocated by both advocates of, and skeptics about the new institution, with controversy raging around the fact that the main countries of the North American section of the OAS have not been invited to join the institution, specifically designating as constituting only Latin American and Caribbean states. Countries like Cuba and Venezuela have been vigorous in their proprogation of the objectives of the community as being anti the objectives of the the “Empire” as they refer to the United States. For them, therefore, it will not be subject, as in their view the OAS is, to the dominant influence and direction of that country.
On the other hand, other countries including Chile and the host country for the February 23 conference, Mexico, have been insisting that the new institution is established on the foundations of the Rio Group and the CALC, institutions more specifically dedicated to the objectives of economic integration and development of the Latin American-Caribbean space. And they further insist that its mandate is not in opposition to, or conflict with, those of the OAS, or the United States government. In reference to the arguments about the “exclusion” of the United States and Canada, reference is made to the establishment of the Union of South American States (UNASUR) which does not include Mexico, but is not perceived by that country as exclusionary.
Further, some western analysts have pointed to the fact that the committee created to elaborate on the structure and functions of the new community, including Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, is largely composed of so-called moderates in terms of stances taken towards the United States.
Nonetheless, two factors stand out that have perhaps made governments in the hemisphere question the efficacy of the OAS in terms of its advocacy of objectives to which they are presently committed. First, the Mexican President, Felipe Calderón, in speaking of the new community, asserted that it should “prioritize the advancement of regional integration with a view to promoting our sustainable development, advancing our regional agenda in global forums, and having a better position in response to relevant world events.” Mexico, of course, has been a part of the North American regional economic integration system, NAFTA, but has been fully conscious in recent years of the extent to which NAFTA, which appeared at the point of its establishment in 1992 to be likely to be, together with the EU, a dominant force in international trade and spread its influence outwards to other regions, has not in fact done so. What Mexico, as well as other states see is that China’s more recent, and perhaps unexpected, increasing influence in international trade and production trends, regardless of the country’s interconnectedness with the US economic system, has changed the balance of forces in the diplomacy of international trade negotiation.
But in the meantime, the system which might have been seen as the United States and implicitly Mexico’s instrument for enhancing NAFTA and adding to its arena of influence and dominance, the Free Trade Area of the Americas announced by President Clinton in 1994 at the first Summit of the Americas, has failed to materialize. This has left Mexico itself with diminishing influence in the Latin American sphere compared for example, to Brazil and Venezuela (for differing reasons).
More importantly, and this takes us to the second factor, it was the OAS which was designated as the framework for negotiation of the FTAA, as well as the framework for the extension of the North-South American interests and influence (at least as perceived by the US and indeed Mexico at that time). And added to this, the OAS was designated as the forum for the Summit of Americas process by heads of states and government, which would extend the cooperation process between North and South America to spheres related to economic integration and development, in particular those of sustainable development now seen as the basis of viable development. Further, the OAS would provide for the summit’s commitment to new security objectives, now interpreted in the post-Cold War context as focusing on the issue of the movement of narcotics throughout the two continents and the Caribbean Sea. And finally, to these mandates, the OAS was also designated as the continuing location for the monitoring of the observance of governance processes in the hemisphere, in the context of the new post-Cold War ideological frame, and countries’ commitment to the Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001.
It is probably fair to say that in the minds of many, the OAS, as the forum for operationalisiing the first two of these two initiatives, is perceived to have failed in its mandate. Or, put another way, its operatives, embodied in the Secretary Generalship of the institution, are seen as not having, or not being able to garner, a sufficient commitment of member-states in the face of opposing trends, to see the two mandates materialize. The decision of the United States to virtually abandon the FTAA in the face of domestic opposition, and to adopt a strategy of bilateralism in trade strategy vis-à-vis selected states of groupings in the hemisphere, has robbed the OAS of influence in that regard. And it has also left an opening for Latin American initiatives led in particular by Brazil and Venezuela, now obviously seen even by Mexico, as providing at least greater potential diplomatic leverage in the current manoeuvrings relating to international economic negotiations. The minimal consideration of regional free trade at the last Summit of the Americas in Trinidad & Tobago brought this factor into relief. And now, some Caricom states perceiving the growing influence of neighbouring Latin American states, seek to inch closer to them and join the institutions which they are proposing, even though as a sub-region we have as yet given no clear indication of what it is we would like them to support in terms of our regional integration process or the ongoing international trade negotiations.
In addition, in spite of the stasis at the Copenhagen Climate Change conference, it can also be argued that the whole issue of sustainable development has been taken to an international level in the face of the Trinidad summit’s failure to really advance the issue at the OAS level. The concern of a Brazil on issues of the environment and development now loom larger in our region, as the US continues with its reluctance to meaningfully support initiatives in that regard in an OAS context, with its financial resources.
All these issues have come to a head at a time when the positions of Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General of the OAS are due for election. The only nominee for the top post is the current SG, Mr Insulza, but some radical states in the system question his effectiveness in the context of the outcome of the events following the removal of President Zelaya from Honduras. These more radical states see the outcome as a manipulation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, with the Secretary General unable to cope with the pressures they see exerted by the US in the matter. This reinforces their opposition to him, and to the legitimacy of the OAS. And against that background they do not see even the lifting of the exclusion of Cuba from the institution as a great achievement in contemporary circumstances.
Secretary General Insulza has, however, achieved the support of key states like Brazil, Chile and Mexico, indicating their own desire, and in particular Brazil’s desire, not to rock the boat as this latter country now pursues its extended and complex diplomacy in Latin America and beyond towards today’s new and older Great Powers’ repositioning in global economic and political affairs. For these Latin American states, the OAS remains a useful, even if limited, convenience.
