Public resistance to the proposed establishment of a local intelligence gathering body has been loud and steady.  The concerns from several quarters to the aptly labelled CIA have focused on the political.  While there might have been the occasional overreaction, the fear of sinister encroachments – and the potential for the nefarious – has predominated.

In the presence of the alarming, maybe the overblown, perhaps the unfounded, it is appropriate to analyze and review this issue through a few questions.  What has been the history of certain units in Guyana?  Is this proposed intelligence agency necessary?  How have advanced societies fared with them?  Can internal checks and balances prevent excesses?  Most important, can there be any confidence that governmental machinations will not utilize this agency against enemies, including the new opposition?

At the local level, political organizations, particularly the PPP, can attest to improper and unconstitutional scrutiny from the once feared Special Branch.  It was a body that targets can recall from injuries received.  History reflects how far it was directed from its original mandate, and how much it complied.

Then there was the now disbanded Black Clothes squad.  Like most government initiatives, there were laudable objectives at the inception.  Look at how it started, the impact it made, and how it degenerated.  More tellingly, look at how it was protected to the bitter end, even as its stars mutated into the unimaginable.  Here was a classic example of governmental intractability to egregious misconduct, inclusive of a succession of evils, perpetrated while on duty, and sometimes in support of state-sponsored objectives.  And this was not an undercover operation.  But the group was infused with the awareness that zeal resulted in a multi-sourced compensation scheme, as well as necessary immunity.  Thus, lines were nonchalantly crossed in abhorrent ways towards a furtherance of the greater good.

More recently, allegations have surfaced concerning taxmen used as axmen against citizens for official heresy.  Next, think Leonora – how it was discovered and the initial political defences proffered.  Given these disturbing public examples, is the nation ready for an undercover equivalent, and all of the intrusive, far-reaching implications that undercover would spell in a society such as Guyana?  Ready or not, is it really necessary?

Clearly, there can be only understanding and appreciation for any proposal for the presence of such a body.  Intelligence is of inestimable value in countering innovative, sophisticated, and fast-moving criminal networks.  Advanced societies have laudable models within police infrastructures, or, as autonomous, adjacent entities.  They work.  Nevertheless, recognition must be given to the official underbelly of these apparatuses, and that officially instigated excesses do occur.

In America, the DEA has had issues, on occasion, with CIA interference and veto powers rescinding the detention of narcotics kingpins.  The latter agency has a well documented history of infringing on the rights of citizens.  The very public IRS has been used by both Democratic and Republican administrations to target private citizens known to oppose them.  Moreover, the FBI once determinedly focused on reds and pinks and blacks as enemies of the state, but denied the existence of the criminal Mafia; some of the attention was bureau driven, some politically inspired.  And in Great Britain, politicos used MI-5 against the labour movement.  These parallels from both countries should not be lost on Guyanese.  This has happened in societies that are mature and advanced, and with a plethora of checks and balances; societies open, media saturated, watchdog bloated, and balanced on constitutional hair triggers.  This was the USA and UK.  If this happened there, then think of what could happen in dear old banana Guyana.

Locally, there is substantial, if not overwhelming, potential for this undercover intelligence unit –like the defunct Special Branch and Black Clothes – to become a subverted entity, a tool of the domestic Masters of the Universe.  In some circles, there is considerable apprehension that the government can misuse it as an arm to intimidate and blackmail those on its Enemies List.  There is a scarcity of confidence that this government through its operators will not misuse such a unit given recent events.  Remember library books, Bulkan, Leonora, and an aide-de-camp. Remember Felix and SN and KN.  Remember Waddell, Foster, and Bacchus.  In all of these, there was an invisible hand, or connectivity to the invisible hand; and it was mostly political.

Against this backdrop, it still must be said that this agency is definitely necessary.  Similarly, cameras installed for watching, and water cannon contemplated for dispersing can all be reassuring in the hands of the politically principled and responsible.  But in the hands of the calculating and demonstrated vindictive, these mechanisms can become powerful weapons to be misdirected against the unwary.  Thus, there are these fears of unpublicized electronic Leonora horrors – and more – in waiting. And as if all of this is not enough, law-abiding citizens should be more than concerned about the consequences of potential overtures and contamination from the entrepreneurial class of anything remotely undercover in Guyana.  This is the Catch-22 in which the nation finds itself.

It is why society must now be extra vigilant in watching for any governmental pursuit of the obvious synergies between the political and the expedient; and that this unit is not leveraged for unconstitutional and criminal ends.  Special attention must be paid to the expected ceremonial checks and balances, for such will be the usual ramshackle sentinels with no teeth, no bark, and no backbone.  Ditto the fraud of self-policing.  Listen, therefore, Guyanese to Cicero during the First Cataline Oration: “For what is there… you can still expect, if night is not able to veil your nefarious meetings in darkness, and if private houses cannot conceal the voice of your conspiracy within their walls – if everything is seen and displayed?”  So put the government on notice.

Undoubtedly Guyana urgently needs intelligence-gathering capabilities, but not with the ugly attached price tag of the meretricious and monstrous.  The potential for the Machiavellian is too great; the temptations too irresistible; and the probability and consequences of exposure too negligible.