Not too long ago the Government of Mexico was host to Latin American and Caribbean heads of states and governments at a meeting which resulted in agreement to establish a Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. This institution will, unlike the OAS, exclude the other hemispheric countries of the United States and Canada. This initiative seemed to surprise observers from those two countries. They seemed to suggest that another, in effect, strictly sub-hemispheric  institution,  might be superfluous given the existence of the relatively recently created Rio Pact and UNASUR. And there seemed to be some sentiment too, that Mexico, from the point of view of the establishment of sub-hemispheric institutions, had already found its place, with Canada and the United States, in the North American Free Trade Area  (NAFTA).

American opinion had tended also to suggest that a reason for Mexico’s agreement to the establishment of the new institution might derive from a sentiment in that country itself. This is that, within Latin America itself there had been emerging, at both the economic and political levels, some countries – in particular Brazil and Venezuela, and perhaps Argentina – who seemed to have taken diplomatic initiatives that have placed them on a rising curve in terms of wider global perceptions of their international status. From that perspective, Mexico, which could be perceived as having fallen behind, in terms of previous assertions of its diplomatic independence during the years of the Cold War and initiatives for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), needed to reassert itself as a major player, certainly in Latin America and the wider hemisphere.

President Calderón, succeeding a more pro-American President Fox in this contemporary period of global economic disorder and reorientation and of assertions of emerging powers, will certainly have been feeling these sentiments. And their influence in Mexico will perhaps have been enhanced by a perception developing in the George W Bush era, that Mexico itself, ensconced in the NAFTA from which in the Americans’ perception it has benefited immensely, was a relatively satisfied power within Latin America, and too well economically integrated with the United States to assume positions hostile to US diplomacy, as for example, Brazil has done at the World Trade Organisation. It will be recalled that President Fox had fallen somewhat in Latin American eyes, when he sought to facilitate President Bush’s attendance at a development conference in Mexico by seeking to have President Fidel Castro depart from that country before the American President’s arrival. It was widely felt that Fox’s action was intended to inhibit any negative American reactions to concessions or undertakings sought from the US within the framework of NAFTA.

In the course of seeking election in 2006, however, as the candidate of President Vicente Fox’s Pan Party, Mr Calderón sought to ride a middle road between what were considered the somewhat conservative  positions of Fox, and those of the more radical PRD candidate, Manuel Obrador. He will have attempted this not simply in a bid to satisfy external (developing countries or Latin American states) sentiment. For it had become increasingly clear that a growing  domestic Mexican sentiment itself had been indicating dissatisfaction with its perception of a degree of American neglect of Mexican interests, and inordinate pro-US positions taken by Fox. There seemed, in their view, to be a certain lack of appreciation in terms of action by the United States particularly, on the issue of the influence of the drug cartels moving their loot to the United States and the associated criminal violence; and on that of immigration, this latter concern being exacerbated by the determination of the Bush administration to build a huge fence on the Mexican-American border.

Calderón’s instincts in these respects were justified by the narrowness of the vote, the difference between the two main candidates being 0.58 per cent. Calderón subsequently moved quickly to indicate his expectations from the newly elected President Obama, and certainly Obama in turn quickly reciprocated in terms of making Calderón one of the first heads of state whom he received in the White House on his assumption of the presidency. No doubt the new American President’s interest in Mexico, apart from the strong support which he got from the Latin vote in the United States itself, would have been primed by briefings on the developments in Latin America. These were being interpreted in American circles as being assertive, interested in taking independent initiatives in major international issues, and seeking to organize alternative coalitions of countries against the Americans’ traditional ones  still seen as deriving essentially from the Cold War era.

In making his second state visit to the United States last week, President Calderón has been, however,  well aware that he is seen in Mexico as having a duty to continue to assert Mexico’s dissatisfaction with current American attitudes to his country. He would know that then candidate Obama had taken a protectionist stance on NAFTA in order to appease the American unions, but that the President had muted that position in the face of widespread pressure to take a more activist stance on protectionism generally in the face of a growing Chinese economy.

But in spite of his good intentions, President Obama has been unable to make much of a dent on many of the issues affecting Mexican-American relations. The construction of the border fence continues. American anti-immigration sentiment – meaning anti-Mexican immigration sentiment in particular – has spread as a major issue with the recent Arizona legislation on the apprehension and checking of persons deemed to look like Latins; a pre-US election issue concerning American trade union opposition to the use of Mexican trucks to move manufactures and produce to the United States has made the issue of the implications of NAFTA trade even more severe; and  the export of assault weapons from the US to  the Mexican drug cartels – an issue on which Calderón spoke particularly strongly last week – continues.

The meeting of the Presidents last week could hardly make much of a dent on these issues. The American President will have felt it useful to remind his Mexican counterpart that his country’s exports have continued to grow, thanks to NAFTA; and that in that context the US has always, in the life of NAFTA, sought to ensure that temporary Mexican financial difficulties have been met with prompt positive responses from US administrations. In addition, President Calderón will have been called upon to empathise with President Obama on the travails of the American economy, and with the American concern to halt the pressures keeping employment at a still low ebb – a situation which can only be detrimental to Mexico in the context of US purchasing power.

So while President Calderón will have been wanting his citizens to be impressed by his efforts to get some movement on the issues of major concern to them, and in particular the border and drug issues, the American answer will have been more of the same, rather than an American attempt at any new initiatives. So at least it appears to have turned out, in spite of the American attempt to emphasise the symbolism of President Calderón being only the second visitor to the White House to be granted the privilege of a state dinner by the new American President.

So indeed, as the President has returned to Mexico, his own citizens will probably have reinforced in their minds the pre-eminence of the North American relationship for Mexico, as against any other relationships, at least at present, that might extend into the South American continent. Particularly in the light of the closeness of the last vote between the major parties, however, Calderón will want to continue the new effort of reinforcement of relations within South America, as evidenced by the recent agreement to establish a formal trade agreement with Brazil, while continuing to assert Mexico’s case, particularly in respect of border issues, the drug issue, and on the removal of American interest group-inspired barriers to Mexican exports.  But the Mexican citizenry will recognize that his tackling of the US will necessarily continue to be mild.