Some observers of the United States’engagement in Iraq since Saddam Hussein’s overthrow, may have been inclined to see then candidate Obama’s election campaign giving withdrawal from Iraq priority, as akin to the advice alleged to have been given to an American President during the Vietnam war: that he should simply declare victory and withdraw his troops and the American presence from the country. In one sense Obama would appear to have attempted to do just that after his election, hoping that the Iraqi elections in March of this year would permit one of the two main candidates, current Prime Minister al-Maliki or the contender, former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, to emerge. Both individuals have long been perceived by the US as substantially pro-US and with sufficient support to ensure the required stability for a relatively complete American withdrawal. But the fact that Allawi achieved a majority of votes in the elections has somewhat upset the Americans’ expectations that their first choice for leader of the country would emerge ahead.
The prolonged period which it has taken for either of the leading contenders to attain a sufficiently viable coalition, in addition to an increase in violence during that period, has now given rise to doubts as to whether the President Obama will have to maintain a larger residual presence than originally planned, and whether the shifting balance of forces in Iraq, once a main repository of Arab nationalism, would permit whoever reached the top, to maintain an essentially pro-US and pro-NATO stance in Middle Eastern and wider international affairs.
The delay in a leading candidate’s ability to form a viable parliamentary coalition has been due to the fact that, of the 325 parliamentary seats up for election, Allawi and al-Maliki were only able to obtain 98 and 89 seats respectively, with Allawi having garnered a fairly large number of Sunni votes, while presenting himself as the more secular of the two men. On the other hand, however, the election results threw up the Shiite leader Muqtada al Sadr’s coalition, said to be anti-Maliki, pro-Iran, and therefore anti-United States, with a virtual balance of power grouping of 39 seats. The intervening period since the elections has seen much manoeuvring, with al-Maliki seeking to maintain the support of the Kurds, while Allawi has sought to encompass the lesser, and more secular groupings more concerned with not being suppressed by the dominant religious forces. The Shiites, of course, had maintained a strong resistance to the rule of Saddam Hussein, for which they had had the support of Iran’s post-Shah revolutionary government.
In recent weeks, however, there had been rumours that a strange twist was taking place in the midst of the political manoeuvrings. One of these was that, on the advice of the Iranian regime, Muqtada al Sadr was prepared to move his support into the al-Maliki column; and the other that in turn, al-Maliki himself was pursuing discussions with the Iranians, as well as with other Iranian regimes including that of Syria, to encourage Muqtada’s shift. These rumours have now materialized into reality and it now seems that, in spite of his lesser number of parliamentary seats than Allawi’s grouping, al-Maliki will emerge as prime minister.
The long period of negotiation has, however, thrown up a range of tendencies within and around Iraq, suggesting that there is now emerging more fluidity on the Iraq issue in the Middle East as a whole. The Iranians, maintaining their hostility to the United States seemed to have perceived the interregnum in Iraq as an opportunity to create support for an al-Maliki regime, such support making Iraq less inclined to automatically facilitate anti-Iranian initiatives by the United States. In addition, particularly relevant is the Iranian hope that it will be able to minimize, if not ensure the complete removal in the medium term, of the American widespread political presence in Iraq – so minimizing the immediacy of the threat which Iran sees to come from the US as long as it maintains such a presence in Iraq. In their manoeuvrings, the Iranians would appear to have received support from the Syrian government, and in part even the government of Lebanon, to which President Ahmadinejad has recently paid a visit, much to the chagrin of the US.
What therefore seems to have been emerging is a flexibility of perceptions, and therefore decision-making in the Middle East. This is most visibly apparent in the strengthening of the Hizbollah influence in Lebanon’s politics, Lebanon being always a country of great sensitivity in American diplomacy. In addition, particularly in the light of American uncertainties about the length and nature of its future presence in Afghanistan, al-Maliki and other Iraqi groupings are closely watching what would appear to be a certain American tolerance of President Karzai’s inclination to pursue negotiations, or at least talks, with some Taliban elements; and Pakistan’s inclination to be selective in pursuing the Taliban elements within its borders.
What all this suggests, without attempting to underplay the continuing US military and diplomatic strength in and around the Middle East, is the emergence of a longer term perception among some Middle Eastern countries. This is, that the anxiety of American public opinion for a reduction of the country’s engagement in the Middle East, or at least, in the internal fissures and fractures of certain Middle Eastern countries, is leading to an inclination among the leaders of the Middle East to take a more active diplomatic participation in the emerging contours of the politics of the region. This is a perception which is being emphasized by Iran, and is also of interest to Turkey which, with a large Kurdish presence in Iraq, wishes to see a ruling regime in that country that encompasses, as it has done in recent years, the interest of the Kurdish regions there. In that regard, Turkish and Iranian interests, would objectively coincide, as some would say, a situation not unwelcome to Syria, always anxious for the reduction of American pressure on itself, and for the retention of some influence on its Lebanese neighbour.
The extent to which all these tendencies will strengthen, including the ability of the somewhat erratic Iraqi Shiite leadership to engage in any relationship with any Iraqi government for long enough, will determine how the President Obama is able to fulfil his obvious ambition to rid himself of his country’s continuing external preoccupations with the domestic politics of Middle Eastern and surrounding regimes. From all appearances, he would wish his main objective to concern a settlement of the Palestinian issue. Of course, what he, like previous presidents, is finding, is that the pace of achieving consensus in Middle Eastern politics, is of a slower motion than Americans, with their historic ability to decisively manipulate relations among certain states, are accustomed to.
