A preliminary inquiry into a fire aboard a trawler that led to the death of a crew member and left the captain missing and presumed dead has made scathing safety criticisms of Pritipaul Singh Investments Inc (PSII) and has concluded that a faulty alternator aboard the vessel sparked the blaze.
The fire occurred on June 19th aboard PSII vessel, Captain Lloyd 97 and led
to the death of Orlon Munroe, 18, who succumbed to his injuries weeks later. Missing and presumed dead is the captain of the vessel, 48-year-old Delbert Williams.
The report, released today by the Government Information Agency, found that the vessel belonging to PSII was not a seaworthy vessel and that previous complaints about a faulty alternator had not been acted upon. It also slammed the company for not paying enough attention to the competence or experience of the crew employed by the captain “thus resulting in young men who have no experience or relevant training being employed to go to sea; an extremely dangerous practice”.
The inquiry also cited the company for having maintenance personnel who are not licensed to be in command of a vessel in harbour areas, pointing out that this poses a threat to the safety of mariners.
The report was compiled by Captain R.E.W Adams – lead investigator; Captain Michael Tennant, River Navigation Officer MARAD; Lieutenant Commander Ron Charles, GDF Coast Guard; Major Gary Baird, Fisheries Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Amanza Walton-Desir, LLM, Legal Consultant to MARAD. The team was put together after Transport Minister Robeson Benn ordered an inquiry into the deadly fire.
PSII has declined to speak to Stabroek News and other media in the months since the fire.
The report gives a graphic account of the fire that started and revealed that the lifeboat aboard the vessel did not have paddles.
Elvis Todd, 18, who like Munroe and another crew member 20-year-old Keith Adams had no maritime training, had been instructed by the captain to tend to a hose which was to be used to transfer fuel from one compartment of the starboard fuel tank to another. The captain and Munroe were in the engine room at the time. The report said that Todd had been told to allow the dirty water from the hose to run out and to then place it in the fill for the fuel tanks and to signal to the captain when this was done. The report said that Todd did as instructed and the fuel began to flow. Immediately, the report said, he heard screams from the engine room.
According to the report, Todd said “he then looked back towards the after section of the vessel and saw the deck already engulfed in flames and the galley door “fly” open. He ran to the bow and saw fire coming through the accommodation windows, Elvis Adams and George Fitzpatrick were already at the bow. He then saw Munroe who was in the engine room with the captain, run out through the starboard wheelhouse door and jump overboard.
The accommodation and wheelhouse were engulfed in fire. He then heard the engine stop. He threw Munroe a line but it was too short. He then saw the Captain come out through the after engine room door in his underwear alone; most of his skin was burnt off, his hair was burnt off, his heels were almost coming off from his feet and he was bleeding from his knees down.
The captain saw Munroe in the water and instructed that he Todd, launch the lifeboat, and crew member Adams assisted him in launching it. The life boat started drifting away so Adams jumped overboard swam towards it, climbed into it and paddled towards Munroe with his hands, as no paddles were provided on the trawler. Adams then assisted Munroe to get into the lifeboat.
The seas being rough, the lifeboat could not be controlled without the paddles so it drifted away. The captain being fearful that the trawler would explode decided that the vessel had to be abandoned. The captain was then assisted into a shrimp box which was put overboard. The cover for the shrimp box was then put overboard, Fitzpatrick jumped on to the cover and Todd jumped overboard and held on to it.
Keith Adams and Orlon Munroe were first rescued by a passing ocean going vessel, M.V. Santa Paula, after which Elvis Todd and George Fitzpatrick were rescued.”
Munroe who suffered burns about 90% of his body and succumbed weeks later at the Georgetown Public Hospital was interviewed at the hospital. He told the inquiry that while he and the captain were about to transfer fuel, an exposed section of the alternator wire sparked and ignited the fire. Munroe told the inquiry that the captain had been trying to place the wire out of harm’s way but that the moment he lifted it up it began sparking and the sparks made contact with the hot main engine which was running and the entire room became engulfed in flames. Munroe said he immediately ran outside and jumped overboard.
The inquiry then visited three PSII locations: Providence Shore operations, McDoom Shore operations and the Trawler Operations where it found various problems. At Providence, there was no documented organisational chart or job descriptions of senior or junior staff. The report said there was also no documented Standard Operating Procedures for any shore or ship operations or procedures for emergencies. It noted that the Operations Manager Taahir Ismail is an accountant by profession and has no technical qualification or competence but is however responsible for the maintenance of vehicles at Providence. Ismail who is also responsible for contracting captains for the vessels was unaware of the qualifications if any of Delbert Williams. Ismail further acknowledged that no one in the company is qualified in maritime safety and he was not aware if any maritime training was ever conducted in the company.
The investigators found that all fire extinguishers inspected had expired and needed to be serviced or replaced. Further, fire points were not numbered, fire extinguishers had no service certificates, there was no evidence that fire drills were carried out, there was no emergency plan in place and no evacuation plan was compiled.
The report concluded following this visit that “It is abundantly clear that the emphasis in the Company is to maximize production, which is expected and understandable, but this ought not to be achieved at the expense of Health and Safety of employees and contractors.”
Personnel, the report charged, are “clueless” as to the requirements necessary to maintain functioning and serviceable fire- fighting equipment and that no safety management existed at this facility.
At the head office, the investigators found a clean and tidy environment with serviceable fire extinguishers but there was no evidence that fire drills were carried out. It also concluded that there was no organisational chart and that safety management was lacking.
In relation to the safety equipment aboard the Captain Lloyd 97, the report found that there was one small lifeboat on board without paddles or oars neither was there a bailer. There were no fire buckets on board, no hand or rocket parachute flares, no orange smoke signals, no code flags and no signal lamp.
In terms of maintenance, the report said that there is documented evidence of a malfunctioning alternator. There were several work sheets indicating problems with the alternator throughout this year but no signatures. The Fleet Operations Manager, Wilfred Singh, said that while he knew that there was a problem on the vessel “he was not aware of the specifics of the problem”.
The report was scathing in its conclusions in this section. It said that in keeping with the contract with the captain, the company undertook to provide a vessel that was structurally sound and fitted with serviceable equipment i.e. a seaworthy vessel. “The company was in clear breach of this obligation”, the report contended.
Further, the vessel was also to be provided with fuel and all pertinent equipment by the company with the captain having to employ his own crew competent to perform functions on board the ship. “This was not complied with. While the company has overriding power as regards the quality of the crew, the company clearly has not paid any attention to the competence or experience of crew employed by the captain, thus resulting in young men who have no experience or relevant training being employed to go to sea; an extremely dangerous practice”.
The report added that had the faulty alternator been carefully checked, serviced and or repaired or replaced the fire might not have occurred. “From the statements of crew members the board has concluded that there was nothing they could have done when the fire instantly engulfed the vessel but to try to save themselves”.
The full report follows.
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE FIRE
ABOARD TRAWLER “CAPTAIN LLOYD 97”
ON SATURDAY JUNE 19, 2010
- 1. BACKGROUND.
On Saturday June 19th the trawler the Captain Lloyd 97 owned by Pritipaul Singh Investments Inc. caught fire resulting in serious injury to members of the crew and the captain presumed to have been lost at sea.
On the 25th of June, 2010 and pursuant to the provisions of section 426 (b) and (c) of the Guyana Shipping Act, 1998, the Minister with responsibility for Shipping and Water Transportation, the Honourable Robeson Benn, ordered a preliminary inquiry into the incident. To this end, Captain R.E.W. Adams, M.N.I was appointed Lead Investigator, and assisted by –
Captain Michael Tennant, River Navigation Officer MARAD
Lieutenant Commander Ron Charles, G.D.F. Coast Guard
Major Gary Baird, Fisheries Department, Ministry of Agriculture
Mrs. Amanza Walton- Desir, LLM (International Maritime Law), Legal Consultant to MARAD
The specific terms of reference for the Inquiry were as follows:
- To investigate the circumstances which led to the incident on board the vessel Captain Lloyd 97 on Saturday, June 19, 2010 and to make recommendations with a view to minimize or eradicate any future incidents.
- To examine the systems of operations at Pritipaul Singh Investments and to make recommendations for the improvement of the safety of the crew and vessels
- Any other important observations which in the opinion of the team are pertinent to this investigation.
On the 9th day of August, 2010, the Board completed its inquiry and submitted its report to the Director General of the Maritime Administration for onward transmittal to the Honourable Minister.
On the 8th day of October, 2010, the Board was asked to reconvene at the request of the Honourable Minister in order to re-examine the Report with a view to the re-formatting of same. The board wishes to make pellucid that the request by the Honourable Minister was in no way extended to the findings of the Board, nor did the request in any way affect or alter the Board’s findings.
The Board notes with deep regret the passing, after a lengthy period of hospitalization, of crew member of the ill- fated trawler, Orlon Munroe, as a result of this incident.
These circumstances serve to further underscore the importance of the recommendations made in this report and the need for urgent action by all stakeholders.
- 2. SUMMARY
Trawler “Captain Lloyd 97” owned and operated by Pritipaul Singh Investments Inc. of Mc Doom Village East Bank Demerara, Georgetown, Guyana, a Company engaged in harvesting, processing and exportation of seafood, namely fish, sea bob and prawns, departed the Company’s Providence facility on Friday June 18, 2010. The vessel transited the Demerara Harbour Bridge on the 0900 hours opening and berthed at the Company’s Mc Doom wharf. The captain of the trawler Mr. Delbert Williams then went out to look after his personal affairs and left the crew on board.
Mechanic, Mr. Ray Griffith then took the vessel on a trial run in the Demerara River which lasted for about forty- five (45) minutes, after which he berthed the vessel alongside Mc Doom wharf and told the crew to inform the captain that everything on board was functioning effectively. He then disembarked.
The captain later returned and the vessel departed for sea sometime between 1430 hours and 1500 hours on Friday June 18, 2010. On Saturday June 19, 2010 whilst at sea, the captain and Mr. Orlon Munroe, the rigger, proceeded into the engine room to transfer fuel from one tank to another when the vessel caught afire. The vessel was shortly after abandoned and the crew, except Captain Williams was rescued by a passing ocean going cargo vessel, M. V. Santa Paula.
The rescued crew was later transported to Port Georgetown by the Company’s vessel “Hampton Roads”, berthed at the Harbour Master’s Boathouse, from where they were transported to Georgetown Public Hospital Corporation.
The ill-fated trawler was towed to Georgetown by one of the Company’s vessels and berthed at the Company’s Mc Doom wharf.
Three of the crew members sustained varying degrees of burns, while one escaped unharmed. The captain has not been found, and is presumed to have perished. No pollution to the environment as a result of the casualty has been reported.
- 3. PARTICULARS OF VESSEL
Name: Captain Lloyd 97
Port of Registry: Georgetown
Official Number: 0000532
Call Sign: No Call sign issued by NFMU
Length: 19M 72 cm
Breadth: 6M 71cm
Depth: 3M 35cm
Gross Tonnage: 114.82
Net Tonnage: 78.08
Type of Engine: Cummins Diesel; 6 cylinders 425 BHP
Date & Place built: 1997 Alabama USA, Steiner Shipyard Inc, Bayou La Batre.
Owner Name & Address: Pritipaul Singh Investments Inc. Mc. Doom East Bank Demerara, Guyana.
- 4. CREW
- Mr. Delbert Williams –
- Age: 46 years old
- Position: Captain
- Qualifications: Guyana Harbour Licence
- Service on board: From September 14, 2008 to time of casualty. Previously Captained Trawler “Sunset” from May 25, 2005 as stated in his Employment Record. Reportedly worked as captain on trawlers when the Company was owned and operated by Georgetown Seafoods Limited.
- Orlon Munroe
- Age: 18 years old
- Position: Rigger
- Qualifications: Has no Maritime Training.
- Service on board: two (2) years
- Keith Adams
- Age: 20 years old:
- Position: Sailor
- Qualifications: Has no Maritime Training
- Service on board: This was his first voyage at sea.
- Elvis Todd
- Age: 18 years old:
- Position: Sailor
- Qualifications: Has no Maritime Training
- Service on board: Six (6) weeks service at sea, third trip on this trawler.
- George Fitzpatrick
- Age: 40 years old
- Position: Sailor
- Qualifications: has no Maritime Training.
- Service on board: at sea for twenty (20) years on trawlers. Joined this vessel April 2010,
- 5. NARRATIVE OF CASUALTY
Trawler Captain Lloyd 97 owned and operated by Pritipaul Singh Investments Inc. departed the Company wharf at Providence East Bank Demerara on Friday June 18, 2010, transited the Demerara Harbour Bridge on the 0900 hours opening and berthed alongside the Company Mc Doom Wharf. On board were Delbert Williams the captain, Elvis Todd, Orlon Munroe, Keith Adams and George Fitzpatrick all crew members and Ray Griffith a mechanic from ashore.
No member of the crew is an engineer or mechanic. The captain left the vessel shortly after berthing and the mechanic, who is not certified to do so, took command of the vessel shortly after and departed on a trial run in the Demerara River. The trial run lasted for about forty-five (45) minutes after which it was taken back alongside Mc Doom wharf. On leaving the vessel the mechanic told the crew to inform the captain that everything was functioning effectively and disembarked. The captain returned sometime after, and the vessel departed for sea between 1430 hours and 1500 hours on Friday June 18, 2010.
Elvis Todd a crew member said that while the vessel was proceeding to sea, the rigger, Orlon Munroe observed that the alternator had an exposed wire and he reported it to the captain. The rigger then attended to the problem. The vessel did not stop while the problem was being rectified, but continued on its passage towards the shrimp grounds. At about 0300 hours the following morning (Saturday June 19, 2010) the crew then put out the shrimp nets and commenced trawling.
Elvis Todd further said he began to prepare breakfast sometime between 0400 hours and 0430 hours after the nets were overboard. The captain then instructed him to leave the galley and tend a hose which was to be used to transfer diesel fuel from one compartment of the starboard fuel tank to another compartment of the same tank. The captain and Orlon Munroe were in the engine room at the time. Elvis Todd was further instructed to allow the dirty water from the hose to run out then put the hose in the fill for the fuel tank and signal him when that was done. Todd did as instructed. The fuel started to flow and he Todd immediately heard screaming coming from the engine room.
In narrating the sequence of events Todd stated that he then looked back towards the after section of the vessel and saw the deck already engulfed in flames and the galley door “fly” open. He ran to the bow and saw fire coming through the accommodation windows, Elvis Adams and George Fitzpatrick were already at the bow. He then saw Munroe who was in the engine room with the captain, run out through the starboard wheelhouse door and jump overboard.
The accommodation and wheelhouse were engulfed in fire. He then heard the engine stop. He threw Munroe a line but it was too short. He then saw the Captain come out through the after engine room door in his underwear alone; most of his skin was burnt off, his hair was burnt off, his heels were almost coming off from his feet and he was bleeding from his knees down.
The captain saw Munroe in the water and instructed that he Todd, launch the lifeboat, and crew member Adams assisted him in launching it. The life boat started drifting away so Adams jumped overboard swam towards it, climbed into it and paddled towards Munroe with his hands, as no paddles were provided on the trawler. Adams then assisted Munroe to get into the lifeboat.
The seas being rough, the lifeboat could not be controlled without the paddles so it drifted away. The captain being fearful that the trawler would explode decided that the vessel had to be abandoned. The captain was then assisted into a shrimp box which was put overboard. The cover for the shrimp box was then put overboard, Fitzpatrick jumped on to the cover and Todd jumped overboard and held on to it.
Keith Adams and Orlon Munroe were first rescued by a passing ocean going vessel, M.V. Santa Paula, after which Elvis Todd and George Fitzpatrick were rescued.
Orlon Munroe who sustained burns over ninety percent of his body was interviewed while in hospital. His account of the events are that while he and the captain were in the engine room about to transfer fuel , the alternator wire which had an exposed section was being handled by the captain who wanted to place it in a position where it would not come into contact with anything, but as soon as he lifted the wire it began sparking, the sparks made contact with the hot main engine which was running, and the entire engine room immediately became engulfed in flames. He immediately ran out of the engine room, through the accommodation into the wheelhouse, out through the starboard wheelhouse door and jumped overboard.
He was subsequently rescued by Keith Adams who jumped overboard and assisted him in getting into the lifeboat. He was sometime later rescued by a passing cargo vessel, transferred to a company vessel and was transported to Georgetown and taken by ambulance to Georgetown Public Hospital Corporation. He could not say how long he was in the life boat before he was rescued. Munroe stated that the defective alternator was reported about three trips previously but it was never attended to.
The exact coordinates where the casualty took place is unknown as there is no record to this effect.
- 6. ANALYSIS OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE COMPANY
The Board investigated three areas of the Company, namely Providence Shore Operations, Mc. Doom Shore Operations and the Trawler Operations.
6.1. Providence Shore Operations
6.1.1. Operations
A slipway is located at this facility. Prawns are processed here. Twenty-three trawlers are based at Providence.
6.1.2. Management
Mr. Taahir Ismail the Operations Manager is the person in charge of the facility. He reports directly to Mr. Pritipaul Singh, Chief Executive Officer of Pritipaul Singh Investments Inc. whose office is located at Mc. Doom. This information is not substantiated by any documentation. There exists no documented Organisational Chart, neither is there any documented job description of senior or junior staff. There is also no documented Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for any shore or ship operation and procedures for emergency situations. The Company has not implemented any Quality Management System. Mr. Ismail, an accountant by profession, has no technical qualification or competence, but is however responsible for the maintenance of vessels at Providence.
Mr. Ismail holds responsibility for contracting Captains for vessels located at Providence, but he is unaware of the qualifications, if any, of Delbert Williams the Captain of Captain Lloyd 97. No one in the Company is qualified in Maritime Safety. The Operations Manager also has no knowledge if any Maritime Training was ever conducted in the Company.
Mr. Neville Dallai, the Fleet Manager is the de facto number two person in charge of Providence Operations though there is no documentation to support this. He is a mechanic by profession having attended a course in Alabama, USA on Cummins engines. He reports directly to Mr. Ismail and his duties are to ensure the engines, winches and freezers on board the vessels are kept in good working condition.
He has a staff of eight (8) mechanics. Mr. Dallai was provided with his job description and documented list of duties at his time of employment at Georgetown Seafoods Limited, but this was discontinued when the Company was taken over by Pritipaul Singh Investments Inc.
Mr. Wilfred Singh, Fleet Operations Manager was the Warehouse Manager when the Company was owned and operated by Georgetown Seafoods Limited. He was immediately appointed to the present position when the Company was taken over by Pritipaul Singh Investments Inc. He is responsible for ensuring the vessels are well maintained and equipped. He was never exposed to any form of Technical Training and has no documented list of duties for his appointment
6.1.3. Observations
Visits to this location revealed the following:
- All fire extinguishers inspected had expired and need to be serviced. Some need to be replaced.
- Fire Points were not numbered
- Fire extinguishers have no service certificates
- Personnel are not aware that extinguishers are to be serviced annually
- No fire hydrants, hoses or nozzles were observed
- There is no evidence that fire drills are carried out
- No emergency plan in Place
- No evacuation plan compiled
- No license from National Frequency Management Unit to operate Base Radio Station
- A clean and tidy environment
- Files are kept on the captains.
6.1.4. Conclusions
There is obviously an understanding in the Company, generally, and at Providence in particular as to who is in charge and who is responsible for what. However, there is no documented Chain of Command for the location, neither is there any documented Job Description for any appointment. Though the Operations Manager is the person responsible for contracting Captains for the Trawlers, he is not conversant enough with the seafaring profession to determine their competence other than as it relates to experience and knowledge to harvest marine resources.
There are middle management and supervisory personnel who are not adequately trained to undertake their duties professionally.
It is abundantly clear that the emphasis in the Company is to maximize production, which is expected and understandable, but this ought not to be achieved at the expense of Health and Safety of employees and contractors.
Personnel are clueless as to the requirements necessary to maintain functioning and serviceable fire- fighting equipment, hence the unacceptable state of these equipment. No Safety Management exists at this facility.
6.2. Mc Doom Shore Operations
6.2.1. Operations
The head Office of Pritipaul Singh Investments Inc. is housed at this location. “Snapper Boats” are berthed at this facility. Fish and Sea Bob are discharged, processed and packaged here.
6.2.2. Management
Mr. Brentnol Gibbs the Occupational Health and Safety Officer of the Company is based at this location. He has a Certificate in this discipline from the University of Guyana, but admits he has no knowledge of Health and Safety as it pertains to ships. Mr. Gibbs produced a six (6) page Occupational Health and Safety Booklet dated April 23, 2009 which he did as an assignment when he attended the Certificate Course in this discipline at the University of Guyana. The booklet however does not deal with anything related to vessels. Most of what it contains has not been implemented and it has not been made available to the management of the Providence operations.
Mr. Gibbs is also responsible for ships registration, annual dues and licences, fishing licences, disputes, compilation of data on production and exports and deals with accident reports. He was the only person interviewed from this location.
6.2.3. Observations
A visit to this location revealed the following:
- A clean and tidy environment
- Serviceable fire extinguishers with tags, but no Certificates of Service
- Well painted fire lines and hydrants
- Fire hoses with nozzles
- Numbered fire points
- There was no evidence that fire drills were ever carried out
- No Evacuation Plan.
- No Emergency Plan.
6.2.4. Conclusions
Like the Providence Facility there is an understanding among senior and middle management staff of who is responsible for which functions, and also the chain of command. However documentation such as an Organisational Chart which clearly defines the structure of the Company, Job Descriptions for Staff at various levels, and specific action to be taken by employees in the event of an emergency are all non-existent. This location is better equipped to deal with emergencies such as fire, but again Safety Management is lacking.
6.3. Trawler Operations
The trawler is commanded by a captain who is contracted by the Company, and who, according to the contract “in no way shall be employed or deemed to be employed as an employee, servant and/ or agent of the Company”.
Paragraph 7 of the contract states: “The Company shall pay the contractor for the catch at the end of each trip at the price prevailing at the time when such catch is handed over to the Company at its place of operations”.
Paragraph 8.2 states: “He (referring to the Captain) shall at his sole discretion employ only such persons who are skilled, physically fit and experienced for the work involved in working at sea and harvesting seafood. The amount of persons to be employed shall be at the discretion of the Contractor. The Company reserves the right without assigning any reason, to refuse to allow a person to be employed by the Contractor to work on the said vessel”.
Paragraph 8.3 makes it clear that the Contractor is responsible for paying the crew. While paragraph 8.5 states that the Contractor is responsible for paying his, and the crew’s Income Tax and National Insurance Deductions.
The contract is valid for a period of one year and may be renewed for a further period upon mutually agreed terms and conditions.
The Captains submit a “Captain’s Report/Work Sheet” to the Fleet Manager after each trip. This document is in effect a defect report of equipment on board.
6.3.1. The Captain Lloyd 97.
The contract in relation to Mr. Delbert Williams is signed by Mr. Taahir Ismail on behalf of the Company and Delbert Williams the Contractor. The two (2) witnesses are M. Ali and Y. Persaud. The latest contract is dated September 28, 2009.
The vessel proceeded to sea under the command of Captain Delbert Williams and his crew which comprised four men.
6.3.1.1. Safety and Emergency Equipment on board the Captain Lloyd
The evidence revealed:
- One small life boat was on board; however there were no paddles or oars, neither was there a bailer. The life boat did not have a bow line of sufficient length attached to it.
- Two life buoys were on board, but the Board could not ascertain if they were becketed and had life lines of the approved length attached. The buoys were not fitted with lifebuoy lights.
- The required number of life jackets was on board, but the Board could not ascertain if they were of the approved type for the area of operation.
- Fire extinguishers were on board, but there is no evidence to support their state of serviceability.
- No fire buckets were on board.
- No hand or rocket parachute flares were on board.
- No orange smoke signals were on board.
- No signal lamp was on board.
- No Code flags were on board.
- Other than a log book to record catch the trawler carried no official log book or engine room log book.
- No Emergency Station Bills were posted up on board.
6.3.1.2. Maintenance of the Captain Lloyd
There is documented evidence which indicates that the vessel had a history of a malfunctioning alternator as recorded in the Captain’s Report /Work Sheets dated January 4, 2010, “alternator on main engine not working. Service”. February 15, 2010 “Hatz alternator not charging. Check main engine alternator”. March 10, 2010 “Hatz alternator not working. Change”. May 31, 2010 “Main engine alternator not working. Check alternator on Hatz”. None of these Captain’s Reports/Work Sheets has any signature affixed to it.
Despite all of these recordings, Mr. Wilfred Singh the Fleet Operations Manager at Providence stated that while he knew there was a problem on the vessel he was not aware of the specifics of the problem.
Mr. Annanddeo Jaikaran, an electrician whose duties are to attend to electrical problems on board trawlers, stated that there was no electrical defects on board the Captain Lloyd 97 when the vessel returned to port on the previous trip (June 16, 2010). However, in the Captain’s Report on May 31, 2010 where the problem with the alternator is recorded there is nothing to support that it was attended to. Other electrical problems were attended to and initialed by two electricians, “AJ” (Annanddeo Jaikaran) and “HP” (H. Persaud).
6.3.1.3. Conclusions
In keeping with the Contract with the Captain the Company undertakes to provide a vessel that is structurally sound and fitted with serviceable mechanical, electrical and electronic equipment; “a seaworthy vessel”. The Company was in clear breach of this obligation.
The vessel is also to be provided with ration fuel and all pertinent equipment by the Company. The captain employs his own crew which should be competent to perform the functions onboard the ship. This was not complied with. While the company has overriding power as regards the quality of the crew, the Company clearly has not paid any attention to the competence or experience of crew employed by the captain, thus resulting in young men who have no experience or relevant training being employed to go to sea; an extremely dangerous practice.
Further, the practice of having maintenance personnel who are not licensed to be in command of a vessel maneuvering and testing trawlers in pilotage and harbor areas poses a threat to the safety of other mariners.
- 7. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS.
The Board concluded that the fire was due to the faulty alternator which had an exposed sparking section of wire. The sparks made contact with a hot running main engine and ignition took place. Had this alternator been carefully checked, serviced and or repaired or replaced with a proper functioning one this casualty may not have occurred. From the statements of crew members the Board has concluded that there was nothing they could have done when the fire instantaneously engulfed the vessel but to try to save themselves.
- 8. RECOMMENDATIONS.
8.1. Prittipaul Singh Investment Company.
- The Management of this Company must as a matter of urgency seek to develop:
- A Quality Management System; and it is imperative that the author of this Management System be a qualified and experienced consultant with the relevant nautical knowledge and competence;
- A Company Occupational Health and Safety Manual which must include Health and Safety on board vessels.
- The Company must seek to place personnel in appointments relevant to their skill and qualification; it is unacceptable that personnel with no maritime training of any sort are in key positions of management of maritime operations. To this end, the Company should consider the employment of a qualified mariner among the shore staff, or the services of a Marine Consultant to periodically check that all things in relation to the vessels are in compliance with regulations.
- Job Descriptions for each position within the Company should be compiled, documented and should form part of the Quality Management System.
- The format of the Captain’s Report/ Work Sheet must be changed. A column needs to be included which would record exactly what action was taken when defects are reported. It must be mandatory for the relevant signatures to be affixed to this document.
- Safety:
- The Company must ensure all emergency and safety equipment on shore and aboard ship are acquired and maintained in a serviceable state.
- Emergency drills are to be carried out periodically ashore and on board ship.
- Recruitment:
- The Company must ensure it contracts qualified Captains and that these captains employ experienced crew members or at least persons who have attended the Basic Safety Training Course. As far as possible trawlers should have a mechanic on board, not necessarily as an addition to the crew, but as a utility man.
- The flow of information between and among management staff needs to be improved.
viii. The Company must acquire a Base Station Licence and Call sign from National Frequency Management Unit.
- Trawlers must acquire Ship Station Licences and Call Signs from National Frequency Management Unit.
8.2. The Maritime Administration.
- i. The Maritime Administration Department should seek to develop a syllabus for Skippers of Fishing Vessels. The present practice of holders of Harbour Lincences being deemed as competent to operate vessels at sea should be discontinued. The Guyana Harbour Regulations specifically state the limits within riverain areas where Licensees are authorized to operate.
- ii. It must be made mandatory that all seamen or potential seamen attend the Basic Safety Training Course.
- iii. There must be developed standard operating procedures to be followed prior to departure. Such procedures should contemplate checks to ensure that all safety and emergency equipment are on board before departing for sea. The emergency equipment must include hand and rocket flares, signaling lamp, orange smoke signals, life buoys with beckets and life lines and approved life jackets for each person on board. The length of life lines are to be in keeping with regulations and life boats must be properly equipped.
- iv. The Administration should develop on board operating procedures to regulate activities such as the transfer of fuel between compartments of tanks.
- v. There must be clear guidelines to govern the handling of evidence to ensure its preservation for forensic purposes.
Submitted by:
Captain R. E. W. Adams M. N. I., Lead Investigator
Captain Michael Tennant, River Navigation Officer MARAD, Member.
Lieutenant Commander Ron Charles, G.D.F. Coast Guard, Member.
Major Gary Baird, Fisheries Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Member.
Mrs. Amanza Walton- Desir, LLM (International Maritime Law), Legal Consultant to MARAD, Member.
