Dear Editor,
I wish to comment on a few key points that were raised in the article by Cary Fraser, captioned ‘Power, Politics, and Poverty – The PPP after Jagan,’ in the In the Diaspora column of Stabroek News of January 3, 2011. In the fourth paragraph the author writes, “For the PPP, that shortcoming has been accentuated by the fact that Bharat Jagdeo, who was born in 1964 and became President in 1999, represented a new generation who had not been witness to the traumas of 1962-64. However, his tenure as President has confirmed the PPP leadership’s inability to transcend the bitterness engendered by the ‘troubles’ of the 1960s…” Indeed Mr Jagdeo was not a witness to the traumas of 1962-64. However, let us remember that he was given a ‘baptism’ by fire, yes ‘slow fiah, mo fiah.’ As well, he had to contend with the so-called ‘freedom fighters’ after the 2002 jailbreak, a demoralized police force and army which could not control the violence on the East Coast of Demerara, and a hostile public service union. These were all reminiscent of 1962-64 and therefore served as an early education for the young (both in age and experience) President. The pages of the major newspapers of that period, especially the Stabroek News, should be revisited to recall the trials of the young President. The reality is that the PPP’s hold on government during that period was tenuous. Thus, one can logically deduce that this early experience greatly shaped Mr Jagdeo’s thinking, action, and the future of his presidency, firmly entrenching him in his position to the point where he is now described as being autocratic. In my view, any objective analysis of Mr Jagdeo’s presidency must look at the question: To what extent did the confrontation politics of his early years shape his presidency? In the fifth paragraph, Mr Fraser writes: “…in 1955, the Jagans adopted a strategy of building an ethnic fortress based upon the apanjaht strategy – first articulated in Cheddi Jagan’s address to the 1955 party congress.” This is a bold and clear statement by the writer.
However, instead of supporting this claim by quoting directly from the speech, he offers a quote ascribed to anthropologist Leo Despres, which provides Despres’ interpretation of that speech. Mr Fraser writes, “In that speech, Jagan tried to make ‘the East Indian section politically functional’ according to Leo Despres.” Is this or the statement that “Jagan sought to bring ‘East Indian capitalists’ into the party for financial support…” the evidence of an “apanjaht strategy”? As someone who teaches in a university, I am sure Mr Fraser knows the importance of sourcing to original documentation, especially when the charge is so grave. In my view, readers should be told exactly what Jagan said in that speech so they can interpret and come to their own conclusion. As for “knowledgeable informants” who provided information to Mr Despres, we have seen through various letters to the press that different individuals have different recollections of what transpired.
It seems to me that Dr Jagan’s critics have been unrelenting in their criticism of him for parting company with Messrs Kwayana (formerly Sydney King), Martin Carter and Rory Westmaas, and opening the party to more Indian middle-class and religious elements after the 1955 Jagan-Burnham split. What are not reflected upon are the prevailing conditions at the time which could have led to the demise of the PPP. Leading up to the 1953 elections, Jagan had alienated the Indian middle class and religious leaders. Then, after winning the elections and being in office for a mere 133 days, his party was kicked out of office and the constitution suspended. By the time of the split in the PPP in 1955, he most likely realized that he and his party’s future were at stake. He could not fight the British, the organized Christian churches, the middle-class Africans, and the Portuguese and Chinese business class without having the Indian support solidly behind him. He had previously been associated with the middle-class British Guiana East Indian Association and likely fell back on these people for support which was easier for him to court than any of the other groups which were openly hostile to his politics. On the one hand this could be described as opportunism but on the other, it could be seen as a matter of survival. At times, leaders have to make tough choices in order to survive and pursue their goals. In the US, we saw then presidential candidate Barack Obama severing ties with his former Pastor when Mr Obama’s election was at stake because of perceived incendiary outbursts from the Pastor. And in Guyana, we saw opportunism at play when the AFC backed out of its reported commitment to offer a parliamentary seat to its former secretary.
While Jagan has been raked over the coals over and over again by critics for perceived Indian ‘racism’ because of his parting company with Messrs Kwayana, Carter and Westmaas, none of these critics has uttered a word on his behalf when others have taken him to task for siding with the African-Guyanese B H Benn for his party’s chairmanship, against the Indian-Guyanese B S Rai. In fact, the critics all join together in accusing him of undemocratic behaviour in helping Mr Benn to gain the party’s chairmanship and they steer clear of the fact that he supported the African-Guyanese against the Indian-Guyanese. To this day many Indian-Guyanese believe that had Mr Rai obtained the chairmanship of the PPP in that contest, Guyana’s future would have taken a different course than what actually unfolded.
Yours faithfully,
Harry Hergash
