Stuart Kaufman, speaking of extreme cases of ethnic violence, suggests that politicians can only stir up ethnic discontent if there is some historical experience to support their positions. According to his symbolic political theory of ethnic violence “people respond to ethnic symbols and mobilize …. only if a widely known and accepted ethnic myth-symbol complex justifies hostility to the other group” (Erin K Jenne “Ethnic Bargaining:
The Paradox of Minority Empower-ment,” 2007). Such ethnic myth-symbols are prevalent in Guyanese society and their existence further supports my contention that in bi-communal societies one does not have to provide specific proof of discrimination to make the case for shared governance. However, I believe that sufficient evidence exists to require that all groups be involved in the decision-making process when national resources are being allocated. The following is a most basic assessment but its advantage is that it is easily authenticated.
I will not deal with the well-known fact of the overwhelming racial disparities between Indo- and Afro-Guyanese that exist in the commercial and business sectors. Anyone who wishes to make a rudimentary check need only consider the names of the businesses listed in the Yellow Pages of the telephone directory. (I do not believe that Indo-Guyanese are substantially more egotistical than Afro-Guyanese). Lest I be misunderstood, I am not here condoning the fact of African marginalisation in the business sector: I believe that governments should have a commitment and a policy geared to establish equitability in all areas of social life.
In a few weeks, we will be inundated with political manifestos setting out the policies of the various political parties. We are expected to vote for the policies that we support and the party that wins the election is generally expected to form a government to implement its policies.
In all party systems the leadership oligarchy, e.g. the executive committee of the party, has overwhelming authority in this process. This authority is substantially greater in systems organised according to the principles of democratic centralism. Therefore, the ethnic composition of the members of the oligarchies is a most important factor for our consideration of the distribution of social power. Since the PPP is the party that now forms the government and is refuting the need for shared governance, let us consider the composition of its executive committee.
The executive committee of the PPP consists of 15 members. “Those elected to the Executive Committee from the 35-member Central Committee are Ali Baksh, Komal Chand, Navin Chandarpal, Clinton Collymore, Janet Jagan [now deceased], Bharrat Jagdeo, Roger Luncheon, Zulfikar Mustapha, Harripersaud Nokta, Reepu Daman Persaud, Robert Persaud, Ulric Ramanah, Ralph Ramkarran, Clement Rohee and Gail Teixeira, a release from the People’s Progressive Party said yesterday” (“Few new faces on PPP Executive Committee:” SN: 13/08/2008). My understanding is that Dr. Frank Antony has taken the place of the late Ms. Janet Jagan. One need say no more about the most basic distribution of ethnic power – based on individual votes – in this most important national policy-making and monitoring body.
Now that we have considered policy formation, let us in a similar basic fashion, turn to policy implementation and consider the presidency, the cabinet, the heads of the various ministries and some state agencies The ethnicity of the president is known and it is only for us to note that in modern times heads of government tend to be very powerful and our experience in Guyana is a testament to this. Indeed, our constitution appears to speak with a “forked tongue” on the relationship between the president and his ministers.
On one level it claims that the ministers are advisers to the president and on the next that there is collective cabinet responsibility.
Ministers comprise the next most important level of government administration and here we find that approximately 62% are Indo-Guyanese, 29% Afro-Guyanese and 9% Amerindian. Regional Chairmen are elected officials of whom about 50% are Indo-Guyanese, 40% are Afro-Guyanese and 10% are Amerindians. In terms of the Permanent Secretaries (the accounting officers of the ministries), about 50% are Indo-Guyanese, 44% are Afro-Guyanese and 6% are Amerindians. However, in terms of the Regional Executive Officers (the accounting officers of the ten regions) approximately 70% are Indo-Guyanese, 20% Afro-Guyanese and 10% Amerindians (Estimates of Guyana, Vol. 2, 2011).
There is a section (4.5) in Vol. 1 of the same Estimates entitled Budget for Statutory Bodies and also some other public enterprises at Appendix C. Together these bodies comprise about 51 governmental organisations and agencies and going again by strict name recognition, about 55% of the heads of these organisations are Indo-Guyanese and 45% Afro-Guyanese and others. It should be noted that these are not all the institutions of the state and that some important ones are not included. Furthermore, this cursory consideration does not go beyond the heads of these organisations or deal with their relative importance.
If the usual opposition criticisms of Burnham and the PNC are anything to go by, this substantial Indo-Guyanese presence in the state administration must be of recent origin, and coupled with the situation in the business and policy sectors, it provides fertile ground for the negative aspects of bi-communalism to flourish. As such, it also signals the need for a more consensually driven management of the resources of the state.
Following Arend Lijphart, I will say that at a minimum such a mechanism should include: executive power-sharing that allows for: the existence of a significant opposition and also provides opportunities to further enhance the position of that opposition; the separation of powers, both formally and informally; minority representation for groups who feel threatened; proportional representation to foster constituency autonomy and encourage cross-party voting and territorial decentralisation with adequate income regimes (“Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries,” 1984).
When these kinds of proposals are made, the mantra goes up: “they can’t work!” I will next consider whether they can, but would here point out that what we have now is not working in any meaningful manner and that it is foolhardy to sit back and hope that time will solve our problems. Indeed, unfolding international events indicate that time has an uncanny way of taking its own course.
