“If any generalization about institutional design is sustainable, given the bloody outcomes of countless political systems that appeared to exclude major cleavage groups from power, it is that majoritarian systems are ill-advised for countries with deep ethnic, regional, religious and other emotional and polarizing divisions.” (Andrew Ellis, “Dilemmas in Representation and Political Identity,” International IDEA, 2006). While this quotation represents the general position taken in this series on shared governance, the analysis has opened up an array of possibilities for those wanting to set a country such as ours on a developmental path.
I will conclude this series by considering some of the general issues that have arisen. However, firstly, we should note that like most political theories, these consensual governmental arrangements have been criticized but they are not usually the products of political theorists but of politicians seeking to optimally manage their societies. Indeed, even those commentators who are critical usually eschew majoritarianism for our kind of societies and speak of power division, centripetal approaches, etc. (Donald L Horowitz: “Conciliatory Institu-tions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States.” William and Mary Law Review, 2008; for a good critical overview.)
There is an apparent contradiction between the claim by some in the opposition that the PPP/C could be beaten at the polls and their demand for shared governance. If it is thought that the PPP/C could be beaten, perhaps we should view Guyana as a multi-ethnic/multi party country rather than a bi-communal one. The usual response to this is that staying in the game does not necessarily mean a belief in possible victory, that winning is next to impossible given the incumbent party’s access to and use of state power to ‘subvert’ smaller communities (“PPP/C campaign or the government’s?” SN: 13/06/11) and that in any case “Where cleavage groups are sharply defined and group identities (and intergroup insecurities and suspicions) deeply felt, the overriding imperative is to avoid broad and indefinite exclusion from power of any significant group” (Ellis above). This exclusion has been a fact of life in Guyana and shared governance is seen as a means of reducing tensions and facilitating development.
Nearly two years ago, I wrote the following, which deals with two contentious issues that are again being discussed in the media. “ … notwithstanding the belief that the PPP/C has increasingly been placing its supporters at strategic points in state institutions, Afro-Guyanese still are in the majority in the state bureaucracies, including the security forces. Assume that some shared governance agreement is brokered with the major parties in parliament sharing executive, ministerial, etc, offices: even if the PPP/C is given the majority of ministers and senior executive positions in such an arrangement, where does that leave it in terms of actual control of the state? Is it not conceivable that given ethnic allegiances, it will be at a severe disadvantage and run the risk of effectively losing state power? Would those in the alliance indeed not be in a position to give AK-47s to whom they please? Why then should the PPP/C be interested in any form of shared governance?”(“As an initial step we need to understand…” SN:07/08/09).
In my opinion, if the PPP fears that in an equitable shared governance environment, the Afro-Guyanese in the administration would likely follow the illegal lead of the PNC or any other political party, it has not properly assessed the immediate pre- and post-1992 elections scenario. Perhaps inevitably in a competitive bi-communal environment, it is the mere fact of the PPP/C’s being in government together with the perception among Afro-Guyanese this it is negatively discriminating against them that has led to an increase of ethnic estrangement that only consensus management could solve.
Further, if the PPP does in fact hold the above position on Afro-Guyanese loyalty, this self-interested and self-manufactured fear must have enormous consequences. For, if Afro-Guyanese are not to be trusted, some form of ethnic dominance is required and that would only result in more resentment and distrust and in turn, to the need for even greater dominance!
On the issue of the need for trust before a shared governance arrangement could be put in place, I have stated “… shared governance becomes necessary precisely because communities and leaders do not trust each other. However, the question of trust will become important in determining how the post-election shared governance actually develops” (Ibid). This requires some elaboration.
For any kind of venture, the ‘trust’ initially required is that founded in our belief that each person will look to their own self interest. For example, we would be unable to drive on the roads if we did not ‘trust’ that the vast majority of other drivers will, in their own self-interest, try to avoid accidents. It is only as we develop some acquaintance that we would sufficiently ‘trust’ (another level/degree of trust) one of those drivers to make her a small loan, and only much later would our ‘trust’ develop to a point (if it ever does) that we would lend her a substantial sum without collateral. The ‘trust’ that shared governance initially requires is the primary level at which each group will protect its own interest within the shared governance framework. It is only in actual practice that a higher level/degree of ‘trust’ can be gradually developed.
Finally, there are those who seem to believe that development and prosperity will significantly ease our ethnic problem, but it is precisely the ethnic problem that is hampering development. This aside, Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out that it is not absolute poverty but relative deprivation that contributes to revolutions. It should be noted that relative deprivation is not limited to material things (although even here governments should take proactive approaches to end material disparities) but includes a denial of power, authority, freedom, etc. and is exacerbated in divided societies such as ours where: “… efforts to compromise [given the] psychological predispositions by members of the public, are likely to make even equitable outcomes seem unfair and slanted towards the other group.” (David E Schmitt, “Problems of Accommodation in Bi-communal Societies,” Conflict Quarterly, 1991). Without arrangements to manage our affairs in a more consensual and equitable fashion, the current mushrooming of the means of mass communications, will only increase to the scope and depth of a feeling of hopelessness.
I hope that by considering some of the theory and practice of shared governance, I have been able provide an idea of the precarious nature of our context and of the possible ways forward. Our pre-independence aspiration of becoming one people, one nation with one destiny has been illusory and frustrating and we have taken refuge in blaming various leaders and political parties without, in my opinion, properly appreciating that much of our problem resides in the nature of what we are. How much these leaders and parties truly understand our environment is anybody’s guess.
There is also the added complication that extensive periods in government, whether rooted in geopolitics, ethnicity or whatever, naturally lead to abuse and the consequent demand for retribution. Not losing power then becomes an end in itself; an act of self preservation that subverts any original good intentions. The logical outcome under these conditions is that the longer a regime remains in office the longer it needs to remain in office and the more entrenched our dilemma becomes!
