Every government that I have known has laid claim to the principle of cabinet ‘collective responsibility,’ in the conduct of its business but an understanding of its scope remains vague even to those who commit to it. The intention here is not to deny the administrative usefulness of this much entrenched convention, but given that it is at the core of our political system, an in-depth understanding of its operation should be a requirement for all those wanting to participate in the political process. Indeed, I venture to argue that in our “third-world” context, certain of its provisions could lead to band-wagoning and cronyism.
The convention arose out of the 16th century power struggle between the British monarchs and their ministers. At the time the monarch was not only the head of state but also the head of government but as the belief in the divine right of kings diminished and greater monarchial accountability became widespread and acceptable, politicians sought to use, among other things, collective action to wrestle control from the palace. It should be noted that in those days there were no cabinet meetings as we have come to know them. The king had set meetings with his ministers on a one on one basis in a palace room called the closet and with the exception of the most senior ones, a minister was expected to only speak for his ministry.
To arrive at collective decisions, ministers held caucuses in the great houses of England and as it turned out, the very anteroom in which they waited their turn to consult with the monarch provided the main opportunity for collective action. The government was thus able to take policy positions which were opposed by the monarch.
Also, the Reform Acts of the 19th century, which liberalised the electoral system and led to the formation of political parties meant that governments now had to have a majority control of parliament and this added to the need for executive discipline.
As Lord Melbourne said to his cabinet in 1841: “Bye the bye, there is one thing we haven’t agreed upon, which is, what are we to say? Is it better to make our corn dearer, or cheaper, or to make the price steady? I don’t care which: but we had better all tell the same story”. The Government was now an entity and its members were not to be criticizing government policy and embarrass each other. In other words, one’s individual freedom is curtailed the minute one takes cabinet office.
This is the system that we have inherited and cabinets are still expected to “tell the same story” but as with every social construct, nothing is as simple as it appears.
Collective responsibility is said to rest upon three basic principles. Firstly, there is the confidence principle which holds that a government can only remain in office if it has the confidence of (in our case) the national assembly. It follows from this that if a minister abstains or votes against government policy she must immediately resign or expect dismissal. Whatever is the minister’s personal opinion, a vote indicates non-support of the government of which she is a member.
Secondly, a somewhat similar principle insists that except in instances where the Prime Minister or Cabinet agrees otherwise, all members of the government must speak the same supportive general and specific language.
A minister must not speak against government policy and if the head of government insists, must speak in defence of the given policy.
Finally, there is the confidentiality principle which means that a minister should not without authorization, disclose the existence of cabinet committees or attributes and policy, arguments or voting positions that were taken in Cabinet. This is the usual behaviour of ministers who wish to distance themselves from given policies or discredit given colleagues. Generally, even when they are not members of the Cabinet or a Cabinet sub-committee and did not take part in the discourse that lead to a decision, Ministers are bound by that cabinet decisions. To this day the convention is that Ministers should exercise special care in referring to subjects which are the responsibility of another colleague.
Former ministers cannot reveal Cabinet secrets and in the British case, a minister who resigns and wishes to make a public statement which may reveal major policy positions and differences in the cabinet, must acquire, by way of the Prime Minister, the consent of the Queen. Of course, there are acceptable and unacceptable exceptions to the convention.
The ‘free vote” which is commonly used where issues of conscience are involved and has been used in our case on the issue of capital punishment, is an example of the acceptable method. The “free vote” is as it says: it allows Ministers and parliamentarians to speak and vote in accord with their personal beliefs even if this is contrary to the general party position. The unacceptable exception is the not infrequent Cabinet leaks in which Ministers and others indulge and of which the government is usually most critical. There are those who view the leak as “the mechanism by which the doctrine of collective responsibility is reconciled with political reality. The un-attributable leak is itself a recognition and acceptance of the doctrine that members of a Cabinet do not disagree in public.”
It is the head of government and/or the Cabinet which determines when such a “free vote” is held and other such exceptions are allowed and generally sets the standard of what could be made public. Thus British Prime Minister James Callaghan is quoted as saying “You know the difference between leaking and briefing. Leaking is what you do and briefing is what I do.” (See “The collective responsibility of Ministers- an outline of the issues” British House of Commons, 2004 for a more in-depth discourse).
My experience with the doctrine of collective responsibility, points to an important problem which the literature, perhaps because of its focus on the developed world, appear to have ignored.
In my view where there is no unanimity on an issue before cabinet (and there rarely is) and a decision is arrived at by way of consensus, to the extent that the resultant decision must be publicly defended, collective responsibility and a greater degree of moral responsibility and individual freedom within that doctrine, should require those who agreed with that decision to take the lead in its public defence. Those who disagreed should only be requested to do so if absolutely necessary.
After all, no consensus can be reached if a substantial number of ministers, numerically sufficient to defend the issue publicly, were not supportive. This certainly will not prevent it, but such a requirement might mitigate tendencies toward “follow the leader band-wagoning and cronyism”.
henryjeffrey@yahoo.com
