This article was written to clarify my own views of some of the pitfalls and possibilities that may result from the 2011 elections, given my orientation towards shared governance. I could possibly have waited until the outlines of an outcome were known before completing and submitting it, but concluded that thoughts may have slightly more credibility if they were known to have been written pre-results. Firstly, regardless of who wins these elections, I think they have put to rest any residual PPP/C notion that it has been able to bridge the racial divide. Even with massive use of its incumbency, it has not been able to fundamentally change the context and if it wins, the structure of Guyanese society is likely to remain unchanged. As I have argued before, the majoritarian parliament that will result will be all but useless; it will perpetuate the PPP/C’s dominance of the political process, and the abuses to which we have become accustomed and against which there has been so much complaint can recur at any point.
Some believe that as president, Donald Ramotar is likely to be more forthcoming and may even not be opposed to forms of shared governance and inclusiveness. Even if this is so, given the numerous investigations and enquiries that the opposition will require for a return to normalcy, I doubt that he will be given the policy space to make any kind of radical departure from the norm. In any case, as he promises only business as usual, the battle for governance reform will have to betaken elsewhere. Unless something radically happens, I think that the PPP/C is the only party capable of winning these elections outright but if it does not we will be squarely in the arena of real politics, with decision-making taken out of the hands of the electorate and placed firmly into those of the apparatchik. The result is anybody’s guess but is likely to be some mishmash of policy outcomes for which no one has voted. Here is where, in the jostle for power and office, the people’s interests are likely to be compromised. But even this would, in my opinion, be better than what now exists.
The normal expectation would be for two or possibly all of the parties with seats to form some kind of coalition. Both APNU and the AFC have said that if there is a hung parliament they are prepared to be a part of a government of national unity comprising at least the major electoral parties. But there seems to be a significant difference between the parties’ positions: the AFC appears to see a coalition as lasting the entire electoral term, while APNU’s founding charter commits it to radical constitutional reform and new elections within two years.
There are questionable elements in both these positions. Firstly, I have often argued that an effective opposition is a sin qua non for accountable government. I have little faith in good people: I prefer to place my hopes in good systems, and a good system must have proper checks and balances, one of the most important of which in politics is an effective opposition, which a government of all/most of the major parties will make impossible. Nonetheless, if the arrangement is, as APNU’s proposal suggests, only for a specific period and purpose, it is somewhat more tolerable and of course, the new shared governance constitutional arrangement must also cater for an effective opposition.
That said, real politics becomes more complex. In the highly unlikely event that APNU wins the presidency, no party is likely to gain the two-thirds majority required to make the envisaged constitutional changes. The PPP/C does not care for constitutional reform and the AFC position does not commit it to radical reform. Indeed, it speaks to kinds of reform (removal of the executive presidency, etc) with which the PPP/C may be able to live. On the other hand, although APNU has stated a preference for a government of national unity consisting of all the parties, it has not – so far as I am aware – said that it will not form a coalition with any one of the other parties.
From a developmental position, if the PPP/C must form a coalition, APNU will be the best partner. It will reunite the major ethnic groups and promise a return to the spirit of 1953, for which the PPP/C continues to yearn. But APNU could not form a coalition with the PPP/C without clear agreements and/or explanations about constitutional reforms and the numerous enquiries/investigations they have promised the electorate, but which the PPP/C will be reluctant to accept.
Of course, from a strictly structural viewpoint, the PPP/C will prefer the AFC position, for it promises relatively stable government over a longer period of time. However, if we hold the AFC to its commitment that it will not form a government with the PPP/C without the other major parties being part of it, a very interesting position will arise. How long the horse-trading would continue before the populace begins to hear concessions being made “in the national interest,” and what would be the end results, cannot now be known.
So if there is a hung parliament, we should perhaps consider a less usual but more transparent national management arrangement, and the AFC position, that it will not alone form a coalition with the PPP/C, suggests another possibility. Why not let the PPP/C form a minority government and cooperate strategically in the national assembly only if the government meets certain requirements? Minority governments are not unusual and the PPP/C will not want to immediately go back to the electorate with its invincibility so badly tarnished and the opposition having “its tail up”. Since it will not be locked into a coalition government, the opposition parties, both collectively and individually, will have much more policy space to negotiate their reform/enquiry demands at the same time as they mobilise their constituencies in support of such demands (such a mobilisation would be difficult for an opposition that is part of a government).
To secure support in the national assembly, the minority PPP/C government would have to reflect ethnic and gender balance, be shorn of perceived corrupt individuals and include competent people. Such requirements may even help the president get rid of people he would otherwise be stuck with due to party commitment. Again, the national assembly may deconstruct the budget to less than yearly stability and make specific provisions for local government financing, the award of contracts, contractual workers, etc. It could also perform various enquiries, etc, without agreement with the government.
There are those who argue that when real politics kicks in, as it must with any hung parliament, the lure of office for opposition politicians so long in the political wilderness will be too great to withstand and that they will flock to join a coalition government. My own assessment is not so pessimistic and in any case, my intent here is simply to note some of the pitfalls and possibilities of the post-election environment. henryjeffrey@yahoo.com
