Dear Editor,
There is this view now in vogue that there should be a ‘coming together’ of the opposition and the ruling party, given the minority status of the current government. Indeed, under any circumstances, government and opposition should work together to effect the nation’s business. Nevertheless, the view apparently implies that a minority government generically presents a unique opportunity for ‘coming together’ and, perhaps, it does. Nonetheless, this ‘coming together’ is not contingent on the arrival of any minority government, as Hansard records may show, within the past structure of a majority government, the opposition and government came together on matters of mutual and national interest a number of times.
And if in the past, government and opposition did come together under a majority government framework, what is special about a coming together now? Given that they previously have come together, it may be reasonable to deduce that both government and opposition are familiar with this ‘coming together‘ path, and possibly both are aware of the need to resolve the plight of the vulnerable.
Therefore, given this is nothing new, why then the sudden revival of this ‘coming together’ cry? The fact of the matter is that the combined opposition, APNU and the AFC, has the majority of seats in Parliament, and, therefore, in theory, should control Parliament (this will not invariably happen). Nonetheless, it is this new-found opposition parliamentary power that drives sections of the opposition, not the entire opposition, to clamour for ‘coming together.’
But with parliamentary power to the combined opposition, the society will witness the gross deficiencies of attempts at power-sharing.
Previously, I had noted that one of the underlying premises for advancing the power-sharing argument in a multiethnic society is that there are marginalization and discrimination practices in the allocation of rewards, where some ethnicities do better than others.
Nonetheless, assuming that marginalization and discrimination practices do prevail, would the implantation of a new power-sharing political structure, replacing the existing political structure, make a difference to the allocation of rewards? And given that racism, marginalization, and discrimination may be outcomes of ethnocentrism, prejudice, and deep-seated class inequalities, how does a new power-sharing political structure correct these deficiencies to the advantage of all ethnic groups?”
At any rate, this coming together vis-à-vis some kind of power-sharing is not happening – at least not yet. At this juncture, the combined opposition’s attempts at power-sharing are a failure, as determining the choice of a Speaker clearly demonstrates. The combined opposition underestimated or had no knowledge or understanding of the challenges that a power-sharing schema presents, albeit not a formal power-sharing arrangement, I want to use Professor Spear’s work on Africa to highlight power sharing challenges, as follows:
* Within the framework of competitive electoral politics, party leaders in the main gravitate toward total power which makes them not too disposed to be part of any power sharing agreement; this would more likely happen where party leaders believe that they can pull the election on their own. Under these conditions, inclinations toward a power sharing agreement would be weak.
* There is the devious scenario, too, where party leaders engage in power-sharing to damage their competitors, with whom they previously had a bitter relationship.
* Another scenario is where including some people and excluding others creates factionalism.
* The zero sum power game, perpetually driving politics, would guarantee the loss of power to some party leaders, dropping them to zero capacity vis-à-vis competitive electoral politics.
* Power-sharing measures hardly ever bestow a package attractive to all party leaders.
* When parliament or a similar-type body approves a measure, some party leaders may feel betrayed consequent upon competing interests among them; some may believe that they have been shortchanged in what the measure offers to them.
* Power-sharing between two equal partners may rarely settle conflicts because one party leader may look for recognition as the winner or hero and caretaker to power; and what would be the situation facing the other party leader, not deemed the winner or hero?
The combined opposition, using its informal power-sharing arrangement, first has to identify and understand, and then attempt to resolve these challenges; there are far too many fumbles in the combined opposition’s quest to agree on a Speaker, and APNU’s proposal of rotating the Speaker demeans the sanctity of Parliament and the people.
Also, more importantly, the proposal represents a concealed refusal to resolve the power-sharing challenges. Rotation of leadership in one stint of Parliament is not the way to conduct the nation’s business, and would result in shortchanging the people’s needs, interests, and concerns.
The Spanish writer Ortega y Gasset who authored Invertebrate Spain, appositely elucidates the process of people coming together: “People don’t live together just like that. That kind of cohesion exists only within a family. The groups who make up a state live together for a purpose. They are a community of projects, desires, big undertakings. They don’t come together simply to be together, but in order to do something tomorrow.”
I focus mainly on the combined opposition’s parliamentary power, as they have a unique opportunity to demonstrate how power-sharing can work within the halls of Parliament. The APNU and AFC offered substantial promises to the people.
And for this reason, the people should hold them to those promises, and would want to see how they use their parliamentary power vis-à-vis power-sharing to meet the people’s needs, interests, and concerns; hence, my focus on the combined opposition. The people are watching how this combined opposition ‘coming together’ unfolds.
Yours faithfully,
Prem Misir
