The direction of the civic uprising in Syria must seem increasingly incomprehensible to outside observers. Many, including in the United Sates, might well have thought that a virtual alliance with the Arab countries, as represented in the Arab League, could have assisted in resolving the problem as happened in the case of Libya. And in fact, as happened in that situation, the Arab League has been playing its part by seeking to put through the UN Security Council, with NATO countries’ support, a formula for ending the crisis.
But the Syrians have been recalcitrant about accepting this suggested approach. And, unlike the situation of Libya, this time they have the support of Russia and China, who undoubtedly feel that in the Libyan case the solution there was transformed from a United Nations into a NATO solution and victory.
The stalemate in finding an appropriate diplomatic, and therefore peaceful, approach to the Syrian uprising and to the regime, was illustrated by the response of the various major states to efforts by the NATO members of the Security Council, the Arab League and others, to seek to secure a resolution in that body on Saturday, February 4. That draft resolution – a very much watered down version of the Arab League plan – called for the cessation of all violence and the institution of an inclusive Syrian-led political process, among other things.
But Russia and China would not be persuaded to accept it, arguing that the resolution could be an avenue for eventual outside military intervention. And China has insisted that the UN’s first task is to continue “pushing political dialogue” between the contending forces in the country, “rather than complicating things” – presumably an allusion to what it considers a NATO seizure of the initiative in the Libyan case.
The current proposed resolution introduced by Saudi Arabia to the UN General Assembly this time, was under consideration while this was being written. Reflecting the substance of the original Arab League plan rather than the diluted Security Council draft, and calling for the appointment of a joint UN-Arab League envoy, the resolution, should it be passed, will not be binding.
Syria’s various neighbours also seem to be in something of a state of stasis. A glance at a map indicates that Syria’s location has tended to give the country and its long-reigning Ba’athist government a certain strategic significance, even though it is relatively smaller, and possesses relatively fewer critical resources, than its neighbours. Its location, and the particular ideology of the Ba’ath party, has induced it to play a role in the area, and especially in relation to neighbouring Lebanon, that has brought it into conflict with a United States with long influence in that country. Syria has sought to influence the continuing internal instability in Iraq, to the chagrin of both the United States and Israel, and to one of Syria’s immediate other small neighbours, Jordan, an informal NATO ally. It has established, also, a relationship with the regime in Iran, always anxious to limit American influence in the area, particularly in the long period of post-intervention Iraq. Iran has described itself as a “longtime strategic ally of Syria,” suggesting that it, and its diplomatic stance, needs to be perceived as integral to any solution. And naturally, Iran would not countenance a NATO presence in Syria as part of what it considers should be a Middle Eastern solution. The Arab League’s recourse to the UN has, however, placed Iran somewhat outside the sphere of any solution organized within the institution’s framework.
What has, however, been of particular interest to the NATO powers has been the apparent failure of Turkey to influence a resolution of the civil war. The country shares an extensive border with Syria, and has had to absorb large numbers of refugees from the country. In addition it has, for a variety of reasons, been perceived in the West as an emerging economic and political power, legitimizing by example, the relevance of parliamentary-style political rule in the area. And it stands as a member of NATO, but one with an apparent diplomatic independence.
President Erdogan therefore initially sought to insist that the Syrian problem was “a domestic matter,” thus situating Turkey in the diplomatic corridor of those in opposition to any intervention. But at the same time, in publicly seeking to influence President Assad towards instituting some domestic reforms, he has apparently displeased the President. Erdogan has recently found it necessary to conclude that Syria was entering “a road of no return.”
Many states, both within and outside the Middle East, will by now have perceived President Assad as trying to replicate his father’s strategy in liquidating the uprising against him in 1982. He has probably felt that Syria is not economically strategic enough to induce a NATO intervention, though he will be conscious that, unlike in his father’s time, the Israelis have taken a more extensive interest in his country, as instanced by that country’s bombing of alleged incipient nuclear facilities there.
For the time being, he has some protection from the China-Russia stance. But the Americans, concentrating on Iran, will want no long-term distractions. And no doubt they will be focusing on taking some initiative towards the Russians that will induce them to become part of a UN formula. The Russian Foreign Minister has recently argued that those involved in the uprising “are not subordinated to anyone and are not under control,” and therefore not susceptible to sticking to agreements made. Perhaps the NATO powers, in conjunction with Saudi Arabia will be working now to remove that alleged impediment to Russia, and probably China’s participation, should another resolution be brought before the Security Council.
