In 1989, after some twenty-five years in office, the PNC lost its strategic advantage over the PPP, and arguably left Guyana a more divided society than it was when it came to office in 1964.
The fact that we can make a similar statement today after two decades of PPP rule points to the peculiar nature of our society and part of that unusualness is the incapacity to respond positively which is presently being exhibited by the PPP/C now that it has also lost its strategic advantage.
Most relationships are established and maintained because they offer benefits that both parties are unwilling to forgo, even if on occasion one party is able to dominate the relationship because of its strategic positioning. Thus, by strategic advantage I mean the advantage one party in a relationship has that allows it to have an inordinate amount of control over the course of the relationship in the medium to long run. Whether or not they are conscious of it, countries, companies, individuals and political parties sometimes find themselves in such strategic positions which could however in time lose their salience and/or totally disappear.
Such strategic advantages may have resulted from natural or contextual conditions that may have developed gradually, but they usually need to be continuously nurtured if they are to be optimally effective.
Before becoming more country specific, two quite familiar international examples should help us to appreciate the vicissitudes of this strategic condition.
First let us briefly look at the position of Britain in strife-torn Europe before the end of the Second World War, and perhaps more appropriately, in the 17th and 18th centuries. Britain’s island status provided a natural foundation for its strategic relationship with the rest of Europe. Given contemporary technology, invasion from the continent was naturally problematical but such a geographical position was not sufficient in itself.
It had to be bolstered by a foreign policy grounded in a balance of power theory that sought to prevent the development of any single continental power or alliance strong enough to pose a significant threat, and sufficient shipping hardware to dominate its surrounding waters. Thus, British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston in about the mid nineteenth century observed “Nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests.”
Indeed, Britain never felt more threatened than when, at the end of the 19th century, Germany rose to become a naval power that substantially threatened the strategic advantage it had built up and protected for over a century. As the famous Crowe Memorandum (written by a British foreign office official, Sir Eyre Crow) stated of German ambitions: “The union of the greatest military with the greatest naval power in one state would compel the world to combine for the riddance of such an incubus” (Kissinger, Henry – 1994 – “Diplomacy” Touchstone Books). Two world wars involving Germany followed and in time the technological developments of warfare diminished the strategic importance of the surrounding waters and the balance of power rooted in it. This demanded new approaches that focused on collective security and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the special relationship with the United States, etc, must now suffice.
Secondly, and perhaps more contextually, strategic advantage can wax or wane over a period of time. The general attractiveness of the Western world, what we now call its soft power, has been and still is a major strategic advantage in its struggle with the communism and authoritarianism. Despite all the propaganda against the capitalist West, given the chance, large numbers of persons from most countries, particularly authoritarian ones, still flock to it, particularly the United States. The communists had to build the Berlin Wall to keep people in and the fall of that wall is seen as symbolizing the official fall of the communist world.
In its early period when communism appeared to many as an alternative to capitalist oppression, it was viewed with much sympathy. For example, Hubert Critchlow, back from representing the labour movement at an international conference in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, voiced his appreciation and support for the system, much to the chagrin of the then ruling group. “We are very interested in the account Mr. Critchlow brought back to the West Indies of his activities in the Soviet Union.
We believe all he has said of his experiences and wish to assure him that if and when it suits him we will accommodate him in a cell” (Chase, Ashton (1965) “The History of Trade Unionism in Guyana”, New Guyana Company). However, the gradual awareness of the actual workings of the Soviet system, e.g. Stalin’s barbarianism and the slaughter of millions, the excessive privileges and corruption of the ruling elite, etc, all of which were supposed to be absent under communism, put paid to this initial popularity.
But what happened to the goose could also happen to the gander.
For a time, the fall of communism left us with a unipolar world in which the United States was the top dog. The hubris to which this gave rise led to the kind of unilateralism that gave us the Iraqi “shock and awe” of the US neo-conservatives and the decline of American soft power, which Obama’s studied multilateralism has retrieved somewhat.
In the eyes of the West, Cheddi Jagan was a communist and thus to be avoided at all costs and Forbes Burnham was the best alternative available. Numerous times during his regime when the West became bothersome, Burnham would raise the bogey of an alliance with the communist Jagan. Notwithstanding his outward bravado, Burnham was most mindful of his geopolitical context.
When the Working People’s Alliance began to make inroads into his support, he labeled WPA as meaning the “Worst Possible Alternative.” Here, Burnham was not simply speaking to the Guyanese people but was attempting to convince his Western backers that Jagan’s communism was child’s play in comparison to what the WPA had in store.
The existence of the Soviet Union and international communism gave the PNC a strategic advantage over the PPP and perhaps the PNC’s Western allies that was to last for some three decades until the fall of the Berlin Wall. As with Britain, that advantage was totally eliminated by circumstances beyond the PNC’s control.
Many believe that the late President Desmond Hoyte failed to sensibly couple the reality of this loss to the nature of our society, thus losing us a glorious opportunity but is that true? The PPP/C appears to believe that its strategic advantage has simply waned and can be rebuilt, but can it?
