Introduction
I would like to remind readers about the four groups upon which the analysis is based (see previous column SN Jan 23, 2013). The groups are: (i) East Indian elites (EIE), (ii) African Guyanese elites (AGE), (iii) East Indian masses (EIM), and (iv) African Guyanese masses (AGM). The groups compete for economic resources and opportunities, whether it be a job or procurement of goods from the State. We will introduce a fifth group later in the analysis but will take their interaction as given. It was noted in the previous column how the constitution allows leaders from the two ethnic elites to mobilize within their own ethnic group. Therefore, we have both class and ethnic interactions determining resource distributions and political behaviour.
Turnover in government can be a good thing in a fledgling democracy. If East Indian and African Guyanese masses forget about their fears for a moment they can not only discipline their respective elites, but also shake up the entire country at the ballot box. They will force elites to reach across to the other group and seek compromise. Elites could become less complacent as their political office is not guaranteed. Believing that they will always win an election, the PPP elites do not care to be accountable. They can always blame others for the mess they create. The PNC elites know that they can extract rewards by mobilizing their masses and making sure no other party challenges their hold.
No government turnover
Unfortunately we do not see the kind of government turnover in Guyana as for example they have in Trinidad and Tobago where a sufficient number of East Indian and African masses vote across ethnic party lines. This allows that country to regularly change leadership from one ethnic elite to another. In this situation no group can always expect to win, while the other always expects to lose.
In Guyana, on the other hand, the winning East Indian elites associated with the PPP do not care that Parliament votes no confidence against a Minister. A similar no confidence vote in other Caribbean territories would result in the resignation of the Minister. In Guyana this Minister has been a complete failure in security. Yet the PPP believes they must protect this individual; they feel assured in their ways because of a guaranteed vote bank of EIMs. Can this situation change? That is the question we hope to answer in the coming columns.
The losing African Guyanese elites will need to protest and use subterfuge to extract political gains as the Hoyte PNC did effectively. This possibly may have provided the opportunity for the planting of saboteurs into the protests of the AGEs so as to blame them for all the trouble. When a protest goes sour, it plays right into the hands of the PPP’s EIEs. Since the Constitution only allows coalitions before the election, they can go into the villages to compound the fears of EIMs.
Resource control and allocations
In Guyana the party which wins the election effectively controls the allocation and distribution of the country’s scarce resources. Since 1992 the EIEs of the PPP won the election and therefore are in a position to control and allocate economic resources. They determine who gets the large swaths of land and who gets small house lots; who gets contracts for State procurements; which foreign investors are let in (mainly investors in natural resource industries thus making it easier to extract off-the-book kick-back taxes); who gets contract employment in the civil service and so on.
They also determine who controls Chronicle and NCN and they build up their own private media outlets to the extent where elections are no longer free and fair but free and unfair.
While the EIEs win the election on the backs of its EIMs, they have to be aware that for them to hold on to power they must redistribute some resources and opportunities to AGEs, EIMs and AGMs. EIMs can become apathetic and fed up with the PPP; therefore EIEs must allocate some resources to these folks. If enough EIMs become apathetic then the main opposition can win the election. In a sense, therefore, EIEs has to decide how to compensate EIMs so as to keep them engaged politically.
This might not seem to be the case given the ironic destruction of sugar under the PPP and the failure to provide security. The US$180 million Skeldon sugar factory is as good as the old one; it will cost millions of US$ to fix hence taking away resources from other activities. Perhaps sugar workers are finally asking why Skeldon failed as they reassess their livelihood without help from families abroad. It would be a mistake to assume the EIEs are not aware of the growing apathy among EIMs.
EIEs face protests and revolutionary discontents from AGMs.
They must therefore redistribute some resources to that group. Strategically EIEs will want to drive a wedge between AGMs and AGEs. Therefore, they would be tempted to provide generous redistributions to a few AGEs connected to the PNC.
This allows one or two individuals in the PNC to operate the party as their fiefdom. They can provide job opportunities and so on to a few children.
In this arrangement the marginalization of AGMs is not effectively represented by AGEs. Imagine during the constitutional reform period the AGEs of the PNC never insisted that coalitions take place after elections.
They handed to EIEs a major trump card for stoking fears among EIMs. EIEs will also want to compensate AGMs enough so as to assuage their discontents. This could be done by offering house lots and other benefits. The same form of resource transfers can be given to EIMs.
Democratic consolidation
The redistribution of some resources to preserve the status quo raises the question of whether Guyana is really a democracy. Do free and fair elections imply a democracy? Guyana saw a reintroduction of democracy in 1992. However, today we have a gradual encroachment of undemocratic practices. In other words, democracy has not yet consolidated in Guyana.
That is why I prefer to say free but unfair elections given how the state machinery is used against opposition parties.
This consolidation becomes difficult given the competition for resources and the informal redistribution schemes. If EIEs believe they can control resources and redistribute at their convenience, then democracy will not be firmly rooted.
In other words, they do not need to reform or become accountable. A question arising from the analysis is at what stage could there be a revolution?
And when will EIMs stay home in large enough numbers so that there is turnover in government? Will AGEs just use their people as leverage to extract resources from the EIEs?
I do not believe these questions can be answered adequately in these columns. They will require specifying a mathematical model and solving for the equilibriums so as to figure out the revolutionary threshold, the apathy threshold and the maximum level of EIE transfers before they accommodate democracy. A point can be reached at which EIEs find it more costly to keeping paying off other groups relative to the benefits of controlling resources. In that case it is just better to accommodate and allow democracy to take root. These questions are the focus of my academic writings and anyone is free to email me for my take on them.
Nevertheless, in the absence of constitutional reform government turnover is an ideal outcome. In the next column, I will explain that this turnover becomes difficult to achieve in a system of fear, distrust and lack of information. I will show clearly how an unbalanced development would occur when politics is as it is in Guyana.
We will close this series by examining the effects remittances and bilateral transfers can have on the consolidation of democracy.
Comments are welcome: tkhemraj@ ncf.edu
