Introduction
This series of columns focuses on the strategic interactions among four groups divided up along class and ethnic lines. There is within group class differences – the PPP connected East Indian elites (EIEs) and East Indian masses (EIMs). And there are African Guyanese elites (those associated with the PNC) and African Guyanese masses (AGMs). It was argued in the previous column of February 6, 2013 that the factor underpinning the persistent ethnic conflict is the desire to control economic resources and opportunities by both elite groups.
In order to claim control of economic resources, the East Indian elites of the PPP must mobilize the East Indian masses (EIMs) by making sure that they vote as an undivided group. One way the mobilization is accomplished is through the command of the state-owned media that excludes the African Guyanese elites (AGEs). It also takes the form of information propaganda and personal attacks against opposition individuals, particularly opposition personalities who are educated East Indians.
This strategy goes far back to the days of Mr Balram Singh Rai and relatively more recently Mr Ravi Dev who was cursed out brutally in front of his home by several key leaders of the PPP. Mr Freddie Kissoon faces continual attacks from the PPP, its proxies and apologists.
Only a few short weeks ago Mr Anand Goolsarran faced a serious series of personal attacks. He was never given an opportunity to respond in the taxpayers-owned Guyana Chronicle, which led the attack.
The PPP has never responded in a serious intellectual manner to the criticisms made by these East Indian personalities. This strategy of personality attack is really meant to send a signal to its masses that the party can debate and is correct in its position. It seems like the party made a calculation that it must shoot as much misinformation as possible so that some will stick. Will the EIMs continue to accept this insult to their intelligence indefinitely?
African Guyanese elites must have leverage when bargaining with the EIEs. They obtain this bargaining power or leverage by seeking to prevent AGMs from splitting their votes. The PNC that has evolved into APNU, it would seem, made the calculation that it will be only an African Guyanese mass party. In the previous election APNU virtually ignored campaigning in East Indian villages.
It appears like they concluded it is better to focus their limited financial resources in the areas where they are most likely to win their votes. While on the surface this strategy seems like a sound decision based on marginal benefits and costs, it is strategically flawed from a game-theoretic point of view. For starters, it sends the wrong signal to EIMs who might be tempted to vote for an independent third party.
The tenuous third party
While each group wants economic opportunities, each cannot be assured that it will receive those benefits. The ethnic and class divide and pernicious winner-take-all Forbes Burnham Constitution preclude every group from being a winner. Only one elite group can win. The bastardized Burnham Constitution gives the President significant powers to do what he wants, even to protect his Minister who allowed a Police Commissioner who allegedly “benefitted materially from the drugs trade” to serve.
Therefore, let us look at the four possible outcomes in order to investigate how economic underdevelopment will be the most likely state; moreover, we study why the AFC faces an existential threat. Let us start off by analysing voting options of EIMs and AGMs. EIMs have three strategies – they can vote PPP (their elites), vote PNC (the elites of AGMs) or vote for a multi-ethnic independent third party (say AFC). AGMs also have three strategies – they can vote for PNC (their own elites), vote for PPP (the elites of EIMs) or vote for the multi-ethnic party AFC.
History guides us to eliminate one strategy from each group. We have seen limited cross over votes where one group will vote for the other in large enough numbers to bring the government turnover I wrote about in the previous column. Therefore, we can eliminate the possibility where EIMs vote AGEs and AGMs vote EIEs as the probability of these events is very low. Elimination of these two strategies does not imply that there is no cross over votes. It just means historically it has not been significant. Let us now look at the four outcomes or possibilities.
Outcome 1: Sufficient EIMs vote for multi-ethnic AFC and sufficient AGMs also vote for multi-ethnic AFC. Here the AFC wins the largest percentage of votes and forms the government. Guyana gets its first post-Independence genuine multi-ethnic government. Since a true multi-ethnic mass party would more likely have across the board ethnic support, its resource allocations are more likely to be balanced, thus there is a greater likelihood of balanced development. Unfortunately this outcome will not occur that easily in a bi-communal society where elites stoke the fears of their respective ethnic group. Nevertheless, it is up to the multi-ethnic third party to anticipate and respond effectively to the strategies of the other parties.
Outcome 2: Sufficient AGMs vote for PNC elites while sufficient EIMs vote for multi-ethnic AFC. Here the PNC could win the election and therefore social networks and intra-ethnic connections would result in more resource access for African Guyanese masses and AGEs. African Guyanese masses may be aware of this and therefore would be tempted to stick with APNU. East Indian masses are also responding strategically. Remember in strategic behaviour one group observes the other’s historical actions and subsequently internalizes this on the day of secret ballot. Outcome 3: EIMs stays with the PPP, while AGEs vote for the third party (for now assume the votes from the fifth group – Indigenous and other Guyanese – are split evenly). In this case the PPP wins and the EIEs are again in control of opportunities and economic resources. We have opposition turnover but not government turnover. Relaxation of the assumption that the fifth group is split evenly presents the best opportunity for the third party. We will take this up in the next column.
Outcome 4: In the final possibility, with the highest historical probability of occurrence, fear and prejudice take over. EIMs fall for the propaganda machinery and vote overwhelmingly for the East Indian elite party, PPP. AGMs decide to stick with APNU. At some level the non-collusive signals and strategies of the two masses reinforce each other as they march towards their own economic impoverishment (economists would call this sub-optimal outcome the Nash equilibrium). Here the EIEs benefit from the control of the State. Backed with their united but numerically disadvantaged votes, AGEs are left to bargaining with EIEs for some redistribution of resources.
The real losers in this pernicious equilibrium are the masses of African Guyanese and East Indians. In this situation, inequality along ethnicity and class lines is the natural outcome; hence underdevelopment is inescapable. Moreover, outcome 4 gives birth to the elected oligarchs who rule by dividing up the economic resources and opportunities among the connected friends and families. Established social and cultural networks guarantee that those who are connected will enjoy a greater share of the redistribution schemes (see previous column).
Conclusion
When fear and uncertainty take over, on the day of secret ballot, EIMs vote for their elites while AGMs vote their elites. However, the elites are the winner in this arrangement, while the masses will experience limited income growth. AGMs are particularly disadvantaged in outcome 4, the sub-optimal equilibrium state. One other crucial result from outcome 4 is the very uncertain position in which the AFC finds itself. The party faces an existential threat at each election. It therefore must evolve effective strategies to increase its chance of survival.
The final column in this series will explain how we might be able to escape the equilibrium of underdevelopment. Constitutional reform is always the best case scenario. However, in the absence of constitutional reforms we will examine some of the strategic choices that can help to increase the possibility of government turnover.
Please send comments: tkhemraj@outlook.com
