Part II
Introduction
Last week, we discussed four aspects of the Public Service that prevailed at the time I served. These are: (a) political neutrality; (b) recruitment of public officers; (c) qualifications, pay and grades; and (d) duty-free concessions. On the question of political neutrality, I should mention that the Head of the Presidential Secretariat (HPS) and the Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet were public servants appointed by the Public Service Commission (PSC). The Deputy Secretary did all the work for Cabinet, and the last official to hold that post was Mr Sherlock Isaacs, a politically neutral person and now Clerk of the National Assembly. There is now no Deputy Secretary, and since 1992, the HPS, a political appointee, functions as the Cabinet Secretary.
Today, we continue our discussion of the Public Service by looking at contracted employees, retirement of public officers, state vehicles versus government vehicles, and public procurement.
Contracted employees
Contracted employees are those officials recruited on a renewable fixed-term contract, usually for three years. The PSC is not involved in the recruitment process and in determining the pay and grades for these officers. The Permanent Secretary in consultation with the subject Minister makes the determination, particularly with regard to senior appointments. However, this practice arguably lacks transparency and has the potential for abuse.
Contracted employees are not part of the pensionable establishment, and in lieu of a pension, they are paid a gratuity every six months. They also enjoy enhanced compensation packages, compared with those in the traditional Public Service. Some of them obtain duty-free concessions to acquire vehicles, contrary to the principle involved in the grant of this facility, as explained last week.
Contracted employees were sparingly used prior to 1992 and perhaps up to the time I left the Service in January 2005. This was in recognition of the need to have a uniform, fair, equitable and transparent system in place for the recruitment of public officers and for compensating them. The National Assembly approved staffing tables for each ministry/department/region, and the PSC administered the related human resources management processes.
While the above practice continues, there is concern in many quarters about the extensive use of contracted employees. In 2013, 20,282 persons (excluding teachers, police officers and soldiers) will be employed, of which 4,607 or 23 per cent will be engaged on a contractual basis. If the Regions are excluded, the percentage is 40. The Ministry of Health tops the list with 787 contracted employees, followed by Region 6 (307), Labour (290), Public Works (261), Youth and Sport (256), Georgetown Hospital (255), and Education (215). The Office of the President will have 171 contracted employees out of 252, or over two-thirds, while at the Ministry of Finance, they account for 58 per cent (148 out of 254).
Several former Ministers serve as advisors either in the Office of the President or in a ministry, on a contractual basis. One such Minister is now the head of the water company. This ‘revolving door’ practice raises a number of questions. For example, is it necessary to have two former Ministers serving as advisors to the Minister of Local Government when there is the Permanent Secretary and senior technical staff to assist the Minister? Should not the same apply to the President, who is surrounded by advisors although he has the services of the entire Cabinet of 21 Ministers? This is not to suggest that the President does not need a small number of technical persons to assist him, in which case they could be more appropriately described as political assistants.
Who is better placed to offer financial advice to the President than the Minister of Finance? The same can be said of legal matters. What competitive procedures were followed in the recruitment of these contracted persons, bearing in mind that public resources are being used to fund the associated costs? Did the National Assembly approve of these positions, and should there not be a limit to the number of advisory positions?
Retirement of public officers
The retirement age for public servants was (and still is) 55, though officers could have opted for earlier retirement on attaining the age of 50, subject to the approval of the Minister of Public Service. No extensions beyond the retirement age were allowed. This was necessary for the health of the Public Service. When officers left the service, they made way for those next in line. There was also a rigorous system of both internal and external training as part of succession planning.
Today, several officials who retire are re-employed the next day in the same position on a contractual basis. This practice calls into question the issue of fairness and equity. For example, how will the official next in line feel about such a practice? Are public servants in the traditional Public Service not likely to be de-motivated when they stand little or no chance of promotion to higher positions? How would they feel when contracted employees with enhanced emoluments work alongside them?
Government vehicles v state vehicles
There was a distinction between government vehicles and state vehicles. The former were attached to a ministry/department for official use only, had dedicated drivers, and had to be parked in Government compounds after working hours. Logbooks were maintained for these vehicles, and monthly returns of fuel consumption and journeys undertaken were submitted to the Public Service Ministry. State vehicles, on the other hand, were assigned only to holders of constitutional offices, High Court judges and Ministers of the Government. Chauffeurs were provided for these vehicles that were usually kept at the residences of these officials.
Today, the distinction between state and government vehicles is very much blurred, and many of the latter category can be seen at all hours on our roads and are parked at officers’ residences. Just look around where you live and you see the abuse, which has significant cost implications, staring at you.
Trade unionism
The Guyana Public Service Union (GPSU) was very vibrant in the defence of workers’ rights, and regular meetings were held with the union to apprise it of developments, to seek its support to lift standards of efficiency and to discuss matters of mutual interest. At one time, there were intense discussions about “professionalizing” the Audit Office. This meant significant amendments to job specifications and descriptions. Some officers were affected by this development, and there was significant resistance. In the end, the union saw merit in the new approach. As a result, there was a sudden rush to go to the University of Guyana to acquire the much-needed diploma and degree in accounting in order to obtain promotion. The current Auditor General was one of the beneficiaries of the struggle.
Today, the GPSU appears to be a pale version of its former self. How does one explain its marked silence in relation to the appointment of contracted employees that has the effect of undermining the traditional Public Service? Its mooted reaction to the non-appointment of the members of the Public Service Appellate Tribunal as well as the Ombudsman is also a source of concern. Is the GPSU indifferent to the thought that the traditional service is dying a slow and unnatural death?
Public
procurement
The Tender Board Regulations were used in the procurement of goods and services and in the execution of works. They did not have the force of the law but were working satisfactorily, except for a few agencies, such as the army and the police. Goods and services had to be acquired from state agencies, and only on the strength of a “not available” stamp were purchases made from other recognized suppliers. Some time in 1994, the requirement to purchase from state agencies was removed because of the Government’s privatization programme.
The Procurement Act 2003 is largely modelled around the Tender Board Regulations. However, the Minister of Finance’s overwhelming involvement in the selection of the members of the various tender committees remains a source of concern. The membership of these committees, including evaluation committees, is also not known publicly, and there is no evidence of the rotation of members as well as ineligibility after serving, say two terms of three years, in keeping with international best practices.
The non-appointment of members of the Public Procurement Commission militates against any attempt to address perceptions of high levels of corruption, and Cabinet continues to offer “no objections” to contracts of G$15 million and over. Both the Transparency Institute of Guyana Inc and the Private Sector Commission have voiced concern in this regard. In addition, how long more are we going to await the appointment of members of the Integrity Commission to review the annual declarations of assets and liabilities of all senior public officials (including those who are involved in public procurement), Ministers and Parliamentarians? In any healthy economy, a fully functioning commission, staffed by competent and independent persons, is indispensable to securing the highest standards of integrity in public life and in any fight against corruption.
Conclusion
The traditional Public Service is dying a slow and unnatural death with the widespread use of contracted employees as well as what appears to be a politicization of the service. A reformed, unified and professional Public Service is therefore needed with transparent and accountable procedures for the recruitment, remuneration, promotion, transfer, discipline and retirement of public officers.
The functioning of the PSC needs to be reviewed to ensure that its members are seen to be independent of the political directorate. In addition, the PSC should be involved in the recruitment of contracted employees, and the same procedures relating to the traditional Public Service should apply. The wide disparity in emoluments between these two categories also needs to be addressed, and there should be a system of rigorous training for succession planning.
The Government must take steps now to re-activate Public Service Appellate Tribunal and to appoint an Ombudsman to address workers’ grievances. In addition, with over 70 per cent of public expenditure relating to the procurement of goods and services and the execution of works, the appointment of the members of the Public Procurement Commission needs to be given the highest priority.
If the above measures are taken, perceptions of high levels of corruption are likely to be significantly reduced. The public interest demands that we act now before it is too late.
