A 62-year-old woman has had a larceny charge against her permanently stayed by acting Chief Justice Ian Chang, after claiming that her right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time was contravened.
Kunti Sukhdeo, of 195 Vryheid’s Lust North, East Coast Demerara, secured the order on June 21, based on an application to the Constitutional Court filed by her lawyer, Basil Williams.
Sukhdeo said that the failure of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and the judiciary to afford her a fair hearing in a reasonable time of the criminal charge of larceny in a dwelling house that was brought against her since July 4, 2008, was an abuse of the process of the court.
The Attorney General was named as the respondent in the case.
In reaction to the ruling, Williams said that the judge’s decision showed that people’s constitutional right to a speedy trial must be observed. He added that if the order was not granted his client would have been going before more magistrates.
Sukhdeo, in listing the grounds supporting the application, stated that her right to a fair trial as guaranteed under Article 144 of the Constitution was disregarded. As a result, she sought an order permanently staying or alternatively quashing the charge.
According to her Affidavit in Support of the Notice of Motion, Sukhdeo was arrested in March 2008 and detained for three days in relation to the allegations against her but was subsequently released on bail although she had to report weekly to the police station.
She was charged indictably on July 4, 2008 at the Sparendaam Magistrate’s Court and was placed on bail by Magistrate Haymant Ramdhani after pleading not guilty.
Sukhdeo appeared in the court before Magistrate Yohhannseh Cave until he left in September of 2009 without starting the matter. She then continued to appear in the court between September of that year and July 16, 2010 before Magistrate Judy Latchman, but she did not try the case. The matter was then called again between July 19 and September 17, 2010 before Magistrate Chandra Sohan but he also failed to start the matter, the motion added.
Between September of 2010 and November 2011 the matter finally started at the court before Magistrate Latchman but Sukhdeo’s motion stated that the trial was aborted and the matter remitted to the Honourable Chancellor “after the Learned Magistrate took an unfavourable view of the prosecution witness’s evidence in the matter.”
Sukhdeo added that between November 2011 and the time when the constitutional motion was filed, she had been appearing before Magistrate Alex Moore who was asked “not to start the matter to facilitate a recourse to the Supreme Court.”
In an affidavit in response to Sukhdeo, Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions Jo-Ann Barlow did not deny the sequence of events and the “inordinate delay” but noted that Magistrate Moore took no steps in the matter based on representations by Williams that the matter was engaging the High Court. “…I was also informed by the said magistrate and verily believe that he is prepared to commence and complete the matter expeditiously,” she added.
Barlow, who said Sukhdeo’s motion was misconceived, denied the claim that the woman’s constitutional right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time was violated, while adding that the length of the delay is not the only factor to be taken into account when determining if a person’s right to a fair hearing in a reasonable time has been infringed upon. She said she believed that the right of an accused person to be tried within a reasonable time must be balanced against the public interest in having him/her tried for any offence for which they have been charged.
“…I am further advised as aforesaid and verily believe that what is meant by ‘reasonable time’ must depend on the particular circumstances of case, and that in the matter at bar, the length of the delay although inordinate has not resulted in prejudice accruing to the applicant in being able to effectively lead a defence,” she added, while urging that the court consider an appropriate remedy to acknowledge the “inordinate delay” and an order to expedite the hearing to the greatest extent practicable.
