The euphoria, particularly in official circles in Western Europe, as well as, though perhaps less so, in the United States, over the eviction of President Yanukovich from Ukraine, now seems more tempered than two weeks ago. The swiftness of President Putin’s response has created a situation of transition from elation to deep concern as to what next.
The sanctions introduced by Europe and the United States on individuals close to Putin are largely symbolic, and have been insufficient to induce Putin to pause much in carrying out his strategy of incorporation of Crimea into Russia. And complaints from the West that the new leadership of Crimea is unelected, and therefore illegitimate, have been met by the Russians’ claim that nobody elected the current leadership of Ukraine, following what they consider an illegal removal of Yanukovich.
From Putin’s perspective, the removal of Yanukovich has changed the terms of the relationship developed between Russia and the West after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For from his perspective what happened was a deliberate attempt to move Ukraine from its status of independence-but-partiality to Russia, to outright absorption of the country into the West, by way of virtual incorporation into the European Union.
For Putin then, that initiative represented an attempt to portray Russia as something less than a Great Power on the European continent, further diminishing the country’s status after its de facto loss of diplomatic and geopolitical space within the European sphere when the USSR collapsed.
Putin had previously expressed his disappointment that so many countries in close proximity to, and within the diplomatic space of, the one-time Soviet Union, have been rapidly absorbed within the diplomatic space of the EU. And perhaps he has, on this occasion, been encouraged by the relatively minimal response to his slapping down of Georgia when, in 2008, it sought to move against Russia’s perception of what its place ought to be in European geopolitics.
In a sense, the attitude of President Obama and the United States in the last few weeks, until the actual Russian incorporation of Crimea, may have been perceived by Putin as less than assertive, when compared to that of the EU. There has been some sentiment that suggests that Obama might have preferred a halt in the efforts of the EU to ensure that Ukraine moved quickly into its fold, at a time when the US was heavily involved with Russia in dealing with the situations of the Syrian civil war, and negotiations with Iran over the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
The United States recognizes that present-day Russia is not the state-dominated economic and political system of the Soviet Union, and that Putin and his government are, in substantial measure, subordinated to Russian public opinion. But President Obama will have been well informed on the salience, first, of Crimea’s historical relationship in Russian public opinion; and secondly, of a view held by the Russian government that it cannot afford to see its sphere of influence over closely related countries substantially, or suddenly diminished.
In addition, however, while the Western Europeans seemed to move quickly to incorporate Ukraine-minus-Crimea into the EU, and even while the US made verbal noises about Russian aggression, there appeared a recognition on the part of the US that Russia’s assistance is needed in other spheres of global geopolitical relations in which the US is involved, and there is some justification for keeping an open line to Russia at this time.
In that context, while there has been much public discussion of limiting Russia’s behaviour by economic sanctions, the very fact of an increasingly close integration of Russian energy resources into the Western economies has inhibited any such action without substantial preparation for ensuring supplies from alternative sources in case Russia should retaliate by restricting energy exports through Ukraine to Western Europe. The fact of the matter also is that Russia is no longer the closed economy that the Soviet Union was, in terms of ensuring dominance over the utilization of its resources for geopolitical purposes, and in some degree both Russia and the West have an increasingly mutual interest in not disrupting international trade for short-term political or diplomatic purposes.
In sum, whether it is in this present case of seeking to balance or countervail Russia’s actions, or in the case of seeking to limit Russian influence in areas like the Middle East, all major powers now accept that the balance of relations, in both the economic and political arenas will be subject to, or balanced by a significant factor. This is their recognition that, increasingly integrated relationships inhibit any precipitate orientations towards the use of military power, or major cut-offs of trade and business relations, in situations of dispute.
In that context, it will be observed that, even as he has flexed his muscles in pulling Crimea into his camp, President Putin has been relatively cautious in the statements that he has made, his intention appearing to be to achieve that immediate objective and stop.
It would appear that President Obama has himself been relatively restrained, even to the point that some of his countrymen and people elsewhere, may feel that he has been over-hesitant in throwing what many see as the full and diverse weight of the US against Russia.
The Ukraine-Crimea situation therefore suggests an increasing awareness, even on the part of the major powers, that the risks of war are to be limited to major rebuffs by their opponents. Regardless of his bullish behaviour in the last few weeks, Putin well knows that Soviet superiority of the Cold War era, over a large part of Europe and into parts of Asia, is no longer possible for today’s Russia. And the odds are that he is trying to preserve what he can, particularly on the European continent, as he seeks to manoeuvre the post-Soviet Russian economy into a state of modernisation permitting profitable competition in today’s globalised world.
From his perspective, he cannot be seen to be giving away geopolitical space. But the odds are that, in that regard, the acquisition of Crimea, by relatively old-time means, will hardly be helpful in terms of perceptions of Russia’s status as still a major power. And what is probable is that, in both Russia’s and the EU’s purview, the rearrangement of Europe, following the demise of the Soviet Union, is still unfinished business.