As President Obama proceeds through the first quarter of his second term he has found himself coming to terms with the unexpected turmoil in Ukraine that has almost sidelined the civil war in Syria, and what is expected to be a normalization of Iran’s relations with the Western world, issues that dominated the first year of the term.
The President, through the patient diplomacy of his Secretary of State Kerry seemed to be on the way towards negotiating a solution to the situation in Syria. But he has had to divert his efforts to Russia’s pulling of Crimea out of Ukraine, at just the time when he seemed to have elicited Russia’s support for dealing not only with the Syrian issue, but also with the ongoing negotiatioins with Iran.
The President had, of course, found dealing with those two issues challenging, as they involved appearing to put his faith in the capacity of Russia to hold a consistent line of intermediation and support on both of them, while facing the possibility of disgruntlement on the part of two of his key allies in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
On the issue of Israel’s stance, the President seemed to have made up his mind that a certain, no doubt limited, alienation of Israel was worth finding solutions to both the Palestinian issue and the normalization of relations with Iran. And he seemed to have taken the same position in respect of Saudi Arabia, the most conservative, but also the most long-standing ally of the United States in the Middle East.
Both of these allies were already somewhat concerned about Obama’s approach to Middle East issues from the point at which, early in his first term, he went to Cairo and made his now famous ‘Arab Spring’ speech. To the Saudis in particular, the President seemed to be lighting a fire that they felt could be difficult to control. And they have apparently become increasingly convinced that their perception was right, as Egypt soon exploded and the Musllim Brotherhood, longtime antagonists of the Saudi rulers, took power there.
But in respect of Egypt, the President seems to have been long convinced that what seemed to be the decaying rule of the Mubarak regime could not sustain itself, taking the view that the United States should be seen as supporting democratization rather than resting its Middle East diplomacy on the old order there. The Saudis now seem convinced that Obama’s orientation towards that issue was not correct. And they no doubt feel themselves to have been correct as what looks like a relative conservative order reimposing itself on Egypt.
Israel’s fury, as indicated in the observations of Prime Minister Netanyahu, has been ignited at the possibility of the US and the Western powers coming to terms with an Iran that can have an increasing scientific capability in what he perceives to be a sure road to the possession of nuclear weapons. But Obama would appear to have taken the view, unconvincing to Netanyahu, that a country like Iran will have some continuing level of determination in Middle Eastern relations. And for him it is better to attempt to rein in the Ayatollahs there within precise constraints, and so sustain a relatively stable, if not enthusiastic, long-term relationship between that country and the Western world.
Still, the Israelis refuse to accept the view, implicit in Obama’s diplomacy, that Iran will have a determining role in the wider Middle East, and in that respect, they are allied with the conservative Saudi regime, in feeling that Obama is going the wrong way.
Obama has now seen, contrary to the implications of his Arab Spring approach, Egypt’s return to a military regime, camouflaged by virtually no-choice elections. His administration has, clearly, not felt it useful or productive in terms of its wider Middle East diplomacy, to pressure General al Sisi to permit normal multi-party elections, following his ruthless overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Obama’s diplomacy there appears to reflect a perception that the Middle Eastern world is re-arranging itself, even though in fits and starts, and that formerly hostile powers like Iran now need to be accommodated as partial partners in determining the region’s evolution.
In that regard then, for Obama the present priority would appear to be resolving relations with Iran, and in that respect Russia is, too, clearly critical to that diplomacy; a fact that must be taken into account even as the US has felt constrained to join the European Union in fiercely, at least verbally, and with limited sanctions, opposing Russia’s usurpation of Crimea.
It goes without saying that there is a certain amount of doubt in the United States about Obama’s line of thinking, and therefore his diplomacy. But it is also the case that there is recognition within American decision-making circles, in particular the Congress, that after the interventions in Iraq, and then Afghanistan, the American people may be somewhat war weary, and willing to walk the road of jaw-jaw, rather than war-war.
So, faced with Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, the American president has allowed his cooperative diplomacy with Russia on Iran and Syria to proceed, even as he simultaneously condemns President Putin’s actions. Clearly, he wishes the European Union states to proceed quickly with reaching an arrangement with Ukraine that will tie the country closer to them.
On the other hand, however, Obama will also be aware that with the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia is itself going through a process of accommodation to the continuing rearrangement of European-wide relations. Putin obviously believes that the EU is trying to draw into its net, so to speak, countries that have been contiguous to Russia and under its influence.
Russia finds difficulty in finding countries with borders contiguous to itself now drawing the European Union’s borders into that position.
We will now, most probably, see a prolonged discourse between Russia and the EU on what its increasing alignment with Russia’s borders means to Russia. For in spite of the sanctions against Russia, it is now a fully participating part of the capitalist economy, its energy resources being the most visible element of this. And that integration means recourse to diplomacy rather than guns.
An integrating, and therefore rearranging Europe – West and East, certainly too, implies jaw-jaw, rather than war-war.
