In part 1 of the column, I argued that cultural practices have to be observed within the constraints of politics and economics of the Guyanese society. The column briefly outlined historical events that set the two main ethnic groups in Guyana on a path of conflict that manifests itself in pernicious ethnic voting and mobilization. I argued that our history and constitution have wired the two main ethnic masses for suspicion and non-cooperation. Peer-reviewed studies on Guyana’s political economy have also documented how ethnic elites have mobilized their respective ethnic masses for leverage when dealing with the other side. Other analysts have labelled this non-cooperation the ethnic security dilemmas (ESD). Early interpretations of the ESD argue that African Guyanese are concerned about their economic security, while Indians have a perpetual fear of the military. The evidence over the past 22 years suggests that the military is willing to serve the constitution and the elected civilian government. The concern these days ought to be whether the military will become compromised by the established class of narco traders and those predisposed to smuggling gold, fuel, beers and the like.
My interpretation of the ESD is economic. Most of the masses of both groups vote for their respective ethnic elites because they perceive intra-group social networks will provide connections to economic opportunities once their elites win the election. Obviously some disgruntled folks would be willing to vote for the third party. But how are these discontented persons going to know whether the disgruntled members of the other group will also vote for the independent party? They can’t be certain; hence they play it safe and vote for their respective ethnic leaders. In the end, they all vote for their underdevelopment because this behaviour makes the elected leaders complacent with little incentive to propose nationalist policies that will benefit all. With the exception of the Hoyte years,