Since independence several third or independent parties – UF, WPA, ROAR, GAP/ROAR and AFC – have won enough votes to have seats in Parliament, but none was able to win the election outright. With the present pernicious constitution in place, my view has always been that third parties are vital for the fledgling post-1992 democracy, which I have argued has failed to consolidate as Guyana moves closer to dictatorship once again. Some observers have been too harsh to expect a third party to win the general election outright. With the 1980 constitution in place, a third party does not have to win to win. If the leadership of the independent party really understands its role, I feel at present 10 to 15 per cent of the votes are up for grabs.
For starters the leader should not expect to win an election in one cycle. But this raises a fundamental dilemma rooted in the human nature. Which leader 65 years and over will be prepared to lay the foundation of winning 12 per cent of the votes now for a younger generation to extend the advantage to win outright eventually? This type of forward-looking and visionary leadership does not come in abundance in the third world. Visionary leadership is one crucial variable in the formula for economic development. Barbados, for instance, was blessed with outstanding leaders during the early years after independence. Guyana, on the other hand, seems to have a knack for selecting bad ones.
Let us examine the dilemmas facing the independent party because these should shape the strategies of the party. The first and obvious dilemma is there is no loyal ethnic base for the third party. Its political marketplace is made up of mainly independent voters, disaffected individuals from the dominant political parties, young professionals and free-thinking individuals. The implication is the political support of this class of voters is likely to be very responsive on the downside. This means that it takes a long time for the third party to win support on the upside, but can quickly lose supporters owing to poor strategies and policies. Hence, the upside gains are slow and difficult, but the downside risks are high and severe.
The second dilemma facing the third party is the “don’t split the votes” strategy of the two main parties. In recent elections the PPP has been more explicit in its race-based election campaign strategy. Indeed, the term “don’t split the votes” was coined by Janet Jagan. Mr Jagdeo and Mr Ramotar have used the occasion of the Cheddi Jagan memorial at Babu John to openly declare the crudest form of race-based electioneering to drive fears into the minds of rural East Indians. The underlining message behind the crudeness is the strategy to paint African Guyanese political leaders and the dominant party of African Guyanese, PNCR, as responsible for crimes against East Indians. The now infamous gun distribution message at Babu John was intended for this purpose. The rhetoric, however, is never backed up by arrests thoughtful observers might expect. No opposition leader has ever been arrested or prosecuted for promoting crimes against East Indians. The post-1992 court evidence in New York and Wikileaks have shown that crimes are driven mainly by narco-trafficking for which there have never been prosecutions inside Guyana.
The purpose underpinning the Rodney COI is exactly the same as the race-based campaigning strategy often expounded at Babu John. The COI has revealed so far that the police commissioner who likely executed Burnham’s plans was retained by the PPP after 1992. Why? The COI also reveals that a KGB advisor was brought to Guyana. Which political leaders in Guyana at the time had the closest associations with Soviet Union during the Cold War? Several of the characters from the cult House of Israel and the former military have become extremely close friends with the Jagdeo oligarchy. Some, whose names were called in the COI, have become tremendously wealthy, by their associations with the Jagdeo PPP. My personal take so far is the COI, intended to drive fears into the minds of East Indians, has and will backfire.
The third dilemma facing the independent party is the old economic ethnic security dilemmas (EESD). As the two previous Development Watch columns have argued, the ethnic security dilemmas are underpinned by economic incentives and concerns; hence, I prefer to add the term economic in front of the acronym (ESD). I have explained this goes back in history as indentured immigrants disrupted the nascent labour market the former slaves were envisioning. Therefore, our society is wired for conflict, distrust, sabotage and non-cooperation. The 1980 constitution makes cooperation even more unlikely. It will take an extremely enlightened leader to reverse course and use the constitution for good instead of the continuing entrenchment of the economic interests of the oligarchs. However, enlightenment and the present government cannot be used in the same sentence. The logic of the prisoners’ dilemma is staring the independent party in its face. See Development Watch “Social Contract and Strategic Voting” SN Jan 29, 2014 and the previous two columns “The Sonu Nigam show and the incentive not to cooperate” SN June 4, 2014 and SN June 6-18-2014 for an explanation of how the prisoners’ dilemma game underpins the EESD in the Guyanese context.
How can the third party respond to this barrage of propaganda that is magnified by the taxpayer- funded NCN and Guyana Chronicle and the oligarchic aspect of the private media? The media advantage of the oligarchs and government presents unfair competition and sometimes I get the feeling the third party (and main opposition) forgets to factor into their strategies this disadvantage. My view is the leadership of the third party has got to be more like teachers instead of instinctive politicians always on the attack. It requires going to the villages, urban centres and the hinterland communities to explain constantly why certain decisions are taken. Simple messages should be printed in short pamphlets and distributed to all corners of the country.
A few days ago the AFC, today Guyana’s main third party, issued a threat of no confidence against the government. My reading of game theory tells me it is not a credible threat. Threats without credibility are never a good idea. It will take a complete column to explain why this is not a credible threat. Suffice to say, the party followed up its threat with ten demands it wants from the government. Some of them are admirable while some need to be fleshed out. Why didn’t the AFC come up with such a system of vision immediately after the 2011 election? The leadership should now switch to political teacher mode and constantly enlighten and expand on its 10-point demand. For example, how is the party likely to finance the high rise bridge across the Demerara River? And where would it locate the bridge if it were in government? How the proposed tax reform is likely to impact on the fiscal position and ultimately debt accumulation and the exchange rate? I am not being unreasonable here in asking these questions. Everything the “independent” AFC does must demonstrate it is capable of running the country. Recall the election marketplace in which the AFC operates. It does not possess a reliable ethnic vote bank.
It is admirable that the AFC listed local government election as one of its demands. This is a sensible strategy since the constraint of the EESD (and prisoners’ dilemma) does not bind at the local level. But the biggest omission from the list is constitutional reform that, for example, could involve diminished powers of the President, favour an executive Prime Minister who attends Parliament and disband the list system. It appears like the AFC has not yet figured out its purpose.
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