Forbes Burnham did not become an autocrat after he ascended to the presidency of Guyana. Indeed, it would be fair to say that his ascension to that office was made relatively simple by the fact that he had already gowned himself in dictatorial powers. Here I am not concerned with the pros and cons of Burnham’s behaviour, but what is certain is that Burnham became an autocrat because of his long stay in office and the resulting political unaccountability, caused by the persistent manipulation of national elections.
All kinds of maladies strike the body politic when politicians are entrenched in office. In our semi-parliamentary system, which is a toxic mixture of the presidential and Westminster types, governments more or less, control parliament. The separation of powers between the executive and legislature is extremely weak, except in unusual conditions such as exist in Guyana at present where the opposition controls parliament.
Added to this, the separation of powers is further weakened as the judiciary, private sector and civil society organizations are all undermined by the regime in various ways (“The government is inviting the courts to usurp the role of the legislature:” SN:18/08/2014)
Burnham achieved all of the above before he became president, which suggests that the main problem is not with the existing executive powers of the president but with his stability in office and control of the legislature.
Our problem with the present PPP/C regime is similar: permanence in office and control of the legislature caused by the structural factor of ethnic voting. This has been made very clear in that now that the regime does not control the legislature and refuses to sensibly negotiate, it has been reduced to near impotency and has only been rescued by some extremely questionable judicial decisions.
As we move towards national elections and in view of my contention last week that the opposition should seek to form a united platform that focuses on constitutional reform, next week this column will make some specific recommendations about constitutional change but here I present some of the background considerations that informed my suggestions.
Of course, there needs to be a substantial national discourse on how we should best structure our political relations and is a pity that our political parties that have been making great noises about national unity government and/or the need for constitutional change have not seen it fit to outline precisely what they have in mind!
I have countless times in this column and elsewhere referred to Guyana as a bi-communal society that is very difficult to manage because the political allegiances of two large ethnic groups foster exclusion and keep governments in office for long periods of time. Managing such societies requires the establishment of regimes in which all the major ethnic groups are at the executive decision-making table to articulate and protect their interests. (“Commitment to shared governance not a rejection of the liberal democratic model” SN:15/06/2011).
But at the 2011 national elections, the PPP lost its overall majority and developments since then indicate that this may well be a permanent loss. If this is so, we must now consider the possibility that Guyana is more likely a bi-communal society in transition to a multiethnic one, the hallmark of which is political bargaining.
Of course, far from welcoming this development as presenting an enormous opportunity for us to truly work together as a nation, the PPP/C has been busying itself attempting to turn back the clock. Nonetheless, as we shall see, this development also means we will have to establish checks and balances similar to those required by a shared governance regime.
It may appear that if the PPP/C has permanently lost its once relatively stable majority, what is required most in terms of constitutional change is a provision that a government must have support of the majority in parliament. What are the possible outcomes of such a change?
Firstly, it is possible that the AFC can team up with APNU or the PPP, but will the level of national cohesion arising from such an arrangement be sufficient to optimize national development? In a competitive political situation, outside of government, both of the major parties will become major obstacles to good governance and progress.
But even worse, suppose APNU and the PPP come together or that all of the parties in parliament decide to be part of a national unity government, controlling both the legislature and the executive, à la Westminster? Then, as they say, “cat eat our dinner” as the possibility of a never-ending, corrupt, dictatorship multiplies many times.
The effect will be similar to our establishing a shared governance regime, and anyone who thinks that in the long run the mere coalition of the PPP/C and APNU (or all the parties for that matter) without proper constitutional checks and balances will necessarily lead to betterment must be living in cloud cuckoo land. Most likely, the periodic elections that make the Westminster-type system tolerable will become meaningless.
The nature of politics, both in terms of acquiring and maintaining office, requires a certain kind of behaviour that over time tends to make even good people bad. It is trite but true that power corrupts and it is best that we put all our energy into devising strong institutions and developing an environment that facilitates our being vigilant in the protection of them.
From this standpoint we should, first and foremost, stay away from Westminster-type political arrangements, for we require, among other things, a strong separation of powers that only presidential-type systems can offer.
Since even multiethnic political developments will most likely lead to shared governance-type arrangements between the PPP and the PNC (as these parties seek to isolate interlopers such as the AFC), our task must be to establish a political constitution that provides for the possibility of a shared government-type arrangement and contains the strong institutional checks and balances against executive abuse that such regimes require. The constitution must also seek to facilitate the development of conditions that will promote multiethnic politics and the resulting competitive liberal democratic state.
henryjeffrey@yahoo.com
