Population and politics

It was the late Deryck Bernard, a population geographer by profession, who a long time ago drew attention to the changing demographics of Guyana and the possible attendant political consequences. Some of these changes have now become obvious to everyone, although the current ethnic breakdown of the population is not known, since the full results of the last census have not yet been released by the Bureau of Statistics. The PPP, however, with its efficient political machinery, was aware before the main opposition party (Deryck Bernard notwithstanding) that demographic shifts were eating away at its traditional ethnic majority. Moving quickly to make good the deficit, it turned to the Amerindians, whom it showered with ‘gifts’ with a view to locking in their votes. For the most part, the strategy has worked up to this point, although it must be said that it didn’t give them an overall majority in the 2011 election.

Mr Ralph Ramkarran, who is undoubtedly in a position to know, has said in his weekly Sunday column that the PPP is convinced it can return to a situation where it can regain control of Parliament. No one else is so sure. In fact, no one else living within the borders of Guyana is prepared to venture an opinion on what the outcome of a general election would be should one be held before 2016, although most commentators believe it is eminently possible that we would end up in the same situation we find ourselves in now. If indeed that were to happen, it would be more than the writing on the wall for the PPP; the wall itself would have metamorphosed into something the party has never been prepared to confront before.

Some weeks ago the Bureau of Statistics made it known that the region which had experienced the greatest population decline was Region Six – the heartland of the PPP and the bedrock of its ethnic constituency. In the 2002 census Indians accounted for around 43% of the total in ethnic terms, and the speculation that this figure might have decreased further caused something of a buzz among the commentating classes. In one of his columns Mr Ramkarran expressed the view that perhaps it could even be below 40%, but this is presumably no more than a hypothesis. While senior members of the government and party might have an inside track on what the trend of the numbers is, the public at large has to await the Chief Statistician’s official revelations to get incontrovertible figures to work with.

For all of that it seems reasonable to suppose that there has been a contraction at some level in the PPP’s ethnic base, and for them to aspire to an overall majority they would need to keep it solid, no matter what its size. In addition, they would need to keep the Amerindian vote solid and extend it if possible, and they have certainly been assiduous in trying to do this. They have, however, adopted the line of punishing those interior communities which did not vote for them – Region Eight being the most obvious example. This region is not very important in terms of electoral arithmetic, but nevertheless, the party’s actions here have been afforded considerable exposure, and it may well be that the tactic of vindictiveness will turn out to be quite counter-productive for them.

It is no secret that the PPP wants general elections before local government elections, although it is not in too great a rush for a national election either at this point, despite its avowals to the contrary. The turnout for the 2011 poll produced the lowest turnout of any free and fair election in Guyana ever – an indication, perhaps of voter apathy. That low turn-out affected the governing party more than the opposition, and it was exacerbated by the fact that the AFC made some inroads into the former’s constituency. It was the combination of the two factors which denied it the overall majority it had anticipated.

Furthermore, PNCR supporters did go out and vote in strength on that occasion, which they hadn’t done in 2006; a low turn-out by the main opposition supporters would certainly help the PPP, especially if that of their own constituents is not as high as they would wish. However, PNCR turn-out is not something over which the ruling party has much control, and for safety its calculations, one presumes, would have to be based on an assumption that their old adversaries would secure a 42% share of the vote, as they did the last time.

The PPP has, of course, expended a lot of propaganda effort on the disarray in the PNCR and the fiasco of the July Congress, although their efforts are unlikely to influence any main opposition voter. Where the AFC is concerned, the PPP has been on a campaign against them from the beginning, although how much effect this has been having on the voters in its heartland who defected in 2011 is impossible to say. The PPP’s new message to its traditional constituency is that the combined opposition is stymieing everything, and there can be no progress or development unless the ruling party recovers its overall majority.

There are, of course, the usual fulminations against the PNCR, but since the ruling party’s constituents have heard it all before, it is perhaps a moot point as to how effective the repetition is nowadays, and how much credibility the PPP/C still retains. There are a large number of problems affecting its own supporters – in the sugar industry, the rice industry, local government, to name a few – which cannot be blamed on the PNCR, and the average PPP voter is not unaware of this.

There is also the Rodney Commission of Inquiry, which the PPP clearly hoped would bring to the attention of the electorate evidence of the PNC at its worst. Its problem is that the inquiry deals with an era which the vast majority of voters do not remember, and worse, that they are not really interested in.

Mr Ramkarran has written that the party has repaired its neglected machinery, so presumably it feels it now has an efficient vehicle to promote its message and bring voters back into the fold. However, that will take time, and the opposition timetable in relation to a no-confidence vote may not give it the space which it requires, more especially if rather than endure the indignity of being brought down by a no-confidence vote, the government decides to pre-empt the opposition and name an election date itself.

One suspects, therefore, that we could conceivably be into stalling tactics, hence the grumbles about the padding of the Preliminary Voters List with the insinuation that this is happening in PNCR areas, and the repeated concerns voiced about the preparedness of Gecom for any kind of poll. (Gecom did agree to extend the Claims and Objections period.) On his party’s engagement with the commission PPP General Secretary Clement Rohee was quoted by the state newspaper as saying, “We will not leave any stone unturned in our talks with Gecom…we have a lot of experience with electoral rigging…” These kinds of incautious comments merely serve to feed speculation that the ruling party is laying the groundwork for raising questions if an election does not produce the overall majority it craves.

Whether or not those in Freedom House manage it this time around (whenever that might be), the truth is that the overall majority is on its way out in this country, thanks to population changes and the march of time. If we are going to be living with pluralities in government for the next few years, then some constitutional changes are clearly required. There has been a lot of vague talk about shared governance, among other things, but what the possible blueprint for such an arrangement would be has not emerged from any quarter as yet.

 

Given the demographic realities, however, one obvious constitutional change would be to allow coalitions to be formed after an election, as used to be the case here under the 1966 constitution. Freedom House would resist it most likely, because as a party which exists in the penumbra of the past, it remembers with rancour how Burnham first came to office in a coalition with the United Force under Peter D’Aguiar. Any similar move to coalition government would in its mind raise the spectre of a gambit to exclude it from power for an indefinite period.