The general direction of my last two columns has been that as things stand, the most likely outcome of the coming general election – whenever it happens and if the major political parties go to the polls individually – is that the PPP/C will obtain sufficient votes to be returned to government, i.e. that politically, nothing will necessarily change.
If we wish to improve upon our unenviable status as one of the poorest countries in Latin America and the Caribbean anytime soon, we must at the very least rid ourselves of that constitutional yoke called plurality that gives government to the party that obtains the greatest number of votes at a general election. As things stand, our best hope of achieving this would be for the major opposition parties to find a mechanism to participate in the election with a common slate.
I have suggested that at a minimum they can commit themselves to a temporary alliance of convenience to contest the coming general election, with a joint programme of action that focuses upon making the requisite constitutional changes.
Since I intend to suggest some of the fundamental changes I believe necessary, I also provided an explanation of my understanding
of our problem. In a nutshell, I argued that our major problem lies with our governments becoming autocratic largely because they have for various reasons been allowed to stay in office too long. Our ethnic political condition is exacerbated when the executive controls the legislature as it seriously compromises the separations of powers.
I have further argued that what may once have been conceived as essentially a bi-communal society with its usual politics of exclusion, appears – particularly since the 2011 election – to be changing into a multi-ethnic society with its usual politics of bargaining and alliances.
But we will still have to protect against the danger of the two major parties forming an alliance, which could make periodic elections, more or less irrelevant, thus opening up the possibility of their becoming a stable ‘one party’ dictatorship. In other words, this new condition does not fundamentally change our constitutional prescriptions.
As I see it, at a minimum at this stage our task must be to establish a political constitution that provides for the possibility of coalition-type governments and thus contains strong institutional checks and balances to guard against the kind of executive abuse that such regimes could engender. The constitution must also seek to facilitate the development of conditions that will promote multi-ethnic politics and the resulting competitive liberal democratic state.
Reform prescriptions
Firstly, since we cannot prevent the formation of alliances that can become entrenched, if our aim is to avoid ethnic alienation, we need, at least for a transition period, to ensure that such alliances as are formed are truly representative of the major ethnic communities.
Why? The constitutional changes will allow for the formation of both pre and post election alliances and as I have argued previously, if it becomes necessary, it is much more likely that the PPP/C will form an alliance with PNCR, with all the resulting dangers of dictatorship.
But let us say that the PPP/C, having gained the greater multiple, decides to join with the AFC with the possibility of their remaining in government for another twenty years. The reaction of the PNCR and its supporters is likely to remain unchanged, with all that entails for national development.
So to deal with the issue of exclusion/inclusion, at least for a transition period, the constitution will need to provide that once a party achieves some threshold (say 10% the votes) at national elections, it has a right to a pro rata share of the government.
Secondly, given our decades of ethnic voting, dealing with the possibility of government entrenchment will be much more difficult and we will need to establish constitutional arrangements that over time will encourage the development of a strong separation of powers. Here we need look no further than the presidential system of the United States, where the president must negotiate with members of his own party and even so, on many occasions, cannot depend upon its support.
The president should be elected by at least 50% of the votes cast. In our developing ethnic situation, this will force those wishing to be president to craft their policies to gain support across ethnic lines and also to negotiate across parties.
Also, to further entrench the separation between the executive and the legislature, as in the US, the executive (ministers) should not be members of parliament. The president will have the right to hire and fire his cabinet but must always keep the party proportionalities.
Contrary to what is sometimes thought, the fact that some ministers are nominated by the opposition would not necessarily cause persistent cabinet dissension. Rather, since the president has the right of dismissal, the opposition will also need to guard against their nominees becoming ardent acolytes of the president.
Furthermore, the president should not be able to prorogue the National Assembly. Both s/he and the Assembly should be in office for fixed periods and the Assembly should manage its own personnel and financial affairs and have the right to adjust and negotiate with the government the formation of national budget.
In this context, we should eschew the notion of parliamentarians viewing themselves as part of the government and opposition and return to the situation where parties in parliament are, as in the US, designated majority and minority parties. They should be encouraged to view themselves as representing constituent and national interests.
To further entrench the legislature as a major power centre of itself, the speaker, leaders of the majority and minority parties and chairpersons of the important commissions/committees, etc., should be given status and remuneration comparable to that of members of the government.
Hopefully, with these and other measures (which I will discuss next week) in place, all parliamentary parties will gradually become less beholden to and more critical of the executive which, by the very nature of these arrangements, will not always be able to be in tandem with their specific interests.
henryjeffrey@yahoo.com
