Dear Editor,
Reference is made to Mahadeo Persaud’s ‘Consociationalism cannot work’ (SN, Aug 25), supposedly a critique of Dr Henry Jeffrey’s proposed solution (power sharing) to Guyana’s nagging ethnic conflict. The consociational model (CM) is a subject I am very familiar with having critiqued the theory. I do not have access to Dr Jeffrey’s column and as such cannot comment on his interpretation or explanation of CM. Given that Dr Jeffrey is a person who supports his arguments with sound reasoning, and given that his writings follow academic norms, I expect he would have defined the term (if he used it) and would have stated how it could work in Guyana.
Mr Persaud made several erroneous statements (on events, dates, personalities, parties and conclusions) in relation to Suriname’s politics, but since they do not relate to CM, and because of limited space, I opt not to correct them and direct readers to google for accuracy. As I have stated umpteen times before, no ethnic group has a right to dominate another ethnic group, and every major group in a society should be included in its governance structure – call it whatever you will (power sharing, CM, etc). A group must be made to be feel part of the society and its members should be allowed to choose their own leaders and not have ethnic tokens appointed as its representatives by the leadership of another group, as has been the case in Guyana since 1955. Such tokenism does not solve ethnic conflict as has been the experience in Guyana, Timor, Trinidad, etc. In fact, it worsens conflict as the Guyana case has illustrated.
Consociationalism is a very complex model with a variety of political permutations and with some modification can be utilized to reduce ethnic conflict in polarized societies. The concept of consociationalism as a solution to ethnic conflict was conceived around 100 years ago, but the theory itself was developed by Arend Lijphart, the Dutch political scientist. Prof Baytoram Ramharack wrote extensively on consociationalism as developed by Lijphart, relating it to Guyana when he was a doctoral student at NYU during the 1980s. I also followed up with an analysis and critique of the theory borrowing from Ramharack during my doctoral studies at NYU also during the 1980s.
Dr Edward Dew has not written extensively on consociationalism and is not considered “a leading authority” on it, although he is a specialist on ethnic conflict and has suggested CM as a possible solution to Suriname’s ethnic conflict. Earlier this month, at seminars at JNU and Indira Gandhi University on ethnic conflict, where I was a visitor, Lijphart’s name featured prominently among scholars as the Father of CM. Although Dew’s book is outdated, he would probably make the case that Suriname practices aspects of CM. I believe he would also support CM for Guyana, Trinidad, Fiji, Mauritius, South Africa, Malaysia, Uganda, etc, since they all have similar characteristics.
Contrary to what Mr Persaud penned, consociationalism has never been referred to as “apanjhat consociationalism” in academic literature. Apan jhat politics preceded consociationalism by hundreds of years. While CM was proposed as a solution to ethnic conflict, a concern was expressed by academics that CM could perpetuate ethnic conflict. However, in societies where aspects of the theory were practised, such as Holland, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, etc, apan jhat politics (to use Mr Persaud’s term borrowed from Guyana’s early politics) has declined not intensified. South Africa also followed a consociational model (post-apartheid) until the white party pulled out of the grand coalition. Scholars have argued that ethnicity has also been on the decline in SA as a result of the consociational aspects of the constitution. Suriname does not practice classical consociationalism though an argument can be made, as Dew did in his outdated book, that aspects of consociational (coalition) power-sharing are being practised by the multitude of ethnic parties, and I suppose this is where Dr Jeffrey got his idea for CM for Guyana. In the constitutional development of several states, not least being Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, Angola, Fiji, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, etc, consociationalism was suggested as a solution to address apan jhat politics, but CM was not institutionalized in any of these societies and ethnic conflict has become more (not less) intensified. Consociational power sharing was part of the Fiji constitution of 1999 and it was enforced by the Indian government, but it was toppled after a year in office. The racist governments from 2001 ignored that clause of the constitution making it difficult to assess whether ethnic conflict was exacerbated as a result of CM. So it is not correct to refer to CM as an apan jhat model.
CM essentially involves a grand coalition among the competing ethnic groups to govern a society. Since it involves a coalition
government and is based on a PR electoral model, it may reduce inter-ethnic competition for votes (since the ethnic parties accept they won’t get cross-ethnic votes). It may lead to intra-ethnic competition with parties competing to be the best representative of the ethnic group. As an illustration, it could lead to two or more Indian parties or two or more African parties or two or more Amerindian parties all seeking support from their groups to be a part of the grand coalition – giving people more options rather than being forced to choose among the three ethnic parties currently dominating the politics. One important criterion of CM is to force coalition governance, though it could also lead to political stalemate because Lijphart suggests that one group could have veto power over decision-making. This can be addressed with the principle of a majority coalition vote to resolve a contentious issue.
My critique of CM is it essentially involves a political arrangement among the elites of the ethnic groups – sharing perks and positions among the elite, and not necessarily among the hard-working rank and file supporters. The latter will be taken for a ride as currently obtains with the elite enriching themselves at the expense of the working class and poor – a sin of which all three parties are guilty. But CM can be modified for Guyana to empower the population and limit the power of the elite and the executive as in Holland or Austria.
I do not think the parties would go for power sharing (CM) in Guyana; no party would legislate itself out of office. But minority governance is not an ongoing solution to Guyana’s ethnic conflict; and as such CM or a federalist structure (also proposed by Ramharack, Vassan Ramracha and Ravi Dev)) should be given some consideration. Ethnic tokenism is not an option and it is very clear that none of the three parties will get significant cross-ethnic support; for 60 years the PNC and PPP have failed in this endeavour. This is why I consistently suggest that we return to the democratic constitution left behind by the British or amend the Burnham constitution to let the parliament choose the executive President by majority vote or have the President chosen by a majority vote in a run-off when no candidate gets the required 50% plus one votes. Our political system stifles competition for leadership as it does not allow anyone from outside the party to become a leader. Amending the constitution that removes the Burnhamite aspect of choosing the executive (through plurality) will open up the system leading to a lessening of the ethnic voting pattern, as it would force the ethnic leaders to pitch their appeals across ethnicity to win votes, as opposed to operating within he narrow confines of ethnicity as has been the case since 1955.
Yours faithfully,
Vishnu Bisram
