We feel almost forced to return to the struggle between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) powers and Russia over Ukraine, so soon after our last editorial on this issue. It is not really surprising though, since it has become more and more evident that the struggle really represents a continuation of a concern among these countries as to the future political evolution of Europe as a whole, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
For in effect, the sense of loss of geopolitical influence on the part of the post-Soviet Russian leadership obviously remains, particularly as it relates to the evolving future of Europe as a whole; while at the same time there is an obvious and countervailing determination on the part of the Western European powers to draw the former wards, associates or satellites of the Soviet Union, into what the Western Europeans obviously believe to be their own sphere of influence.
President Putin and his government have obviously been feeling that the increasing drawing of these countries into the schema of European economic integration will leave Russia relatively isolated on the European continent, and without the influence that a still great power, which it presumes itself to be, should have in respect of countries with which it feels itself to bear special relationships either through ethnicity, language or historical affinity.
For some time now, Putin has shown a sense of grievance over the fact that the drawing of these ex-associates into the EU network would imply not simply economic integration. For he would know that there is a certain economic logic in this process, much the same as the increasing network of economic relations that Russia has developed with a country like Germany. What clearly Putin perceives, however, is that the EU system is not inclined to make any distinction between economic integration and an arrangement of political integration that is designed to take place between the EU and even the closest neighbours of Russia.
Putin has obviously been nervous about what he perceives as a direct connection, which Europe and the United States seem increasingly committed to, between the countries bordering Russia and Nato, an institution recognized as the main political and military organ devised to formalize possible military combat with the then Soviet Union. He has obviously been surprised by the determination with which the Western powers have pursued this geopolitical initiative.
He has, however, found no sensitivity on the part of the Western powers to his feelings on the issue. For the fact of the matter with which he has been faced is, that within the last decade and a half he has seen entities deemed particularly close to Russia as members of the now-defunct Warsaw Pact, join Nato.
Putin, and no doubt others in Russia given the rise in his popularity figures since the Ukrainian crisis commenced, have seemed to feel that the adhesion of Ukraine, not only possibly to the EU, but to Nato, is something of a last straw, given the ethnic and linguistic relationships between Russia and that country.
Russia’s increasingly visible presence in parts of Ukraine seems to indicate that Putin wishes to establish a geopolitical fact through military action, and a possible permanent presence indicating that Russia must have a degree of influence over the geopolitical relationships of Ukraine. This is especially so, as he probably sees it as a foregone conclusion that if left to its own devices, Ukraine, with its present leadership, would become not only a member of the EU (which from Putin’s perspective is probably acceptable), but of Nato, which he obviously sees as constituting a direct rebuff to Russia.
So we can probably expect that with some sort of halt to hostilities, following a de facto physical presence of Russian forces, however camouflaged, on the Ukraine ground, the issue of Nato membership for Ukraine is one which Putin would wish to have determined.
A significant issue in any evolution of this matter, however, will be the role of Germany, the major EU economic power, and with an increasing presence in the Russian economy. Clearly, Angela Merkel will be treading with care, given sensibilities within the EU-Nato arena itself, as to Germany’s growing influence in European affairs, including those encompassing non-EU countries on the continent.
Whether, as this confrontation persists, Germany will seek to use its influence in a no doubt somewhat covert, conversation with Russia is left to be seen. And this, even as post-World War Two sensitivities remain in the Western world about the extent of diplomatic autonomy Germany should exercise in international affairs.