Last week’s column showed how similar our constitution is to that of the United States of America when it comes to the power relations between the institutions that we call “supreme organs of democratic power” (in my view this phrase is nothing but archaic socialist hyperbole). This relationship has not prevented the USA from being considered one of the most open and inclusively democratic countries. My concluding question was why then should these power relations negatively affect our perception of democracy in Guyana?
AFC’s Mr. Nigel Hughes would answer the question by saying because it does not fulfill the constitutional commitment contained in Article 13 of the Constitution, which states:
“The principal objective of the political system of the State is to establish an inclusionary democracy by providing increased opportunities for the participation of citizens and the organisations in the management and decision making processes of the State with particular emphasis on those areas of decision making that directly affect their well- being”.
Bearing in mind that the commitment to inclusionary democracy is to be found in the general principles in Part 1 of the Constitution and that those who crafted it obviously felt that inclusiveness could be achieved within the normal structure of a presidential system, I believe that the framers had a broader notion of inclusive democracy.
Alexis de Tocqueville, quoted last week, gave us a hint of this when he claimed that a flourishing democracy can be distinguished by its commitment to local government, civil society and religious freedom. In other words, inclusive democracy refers to the opportunity for the people to meaningfully participate, as directly as possible, in the workings of the state at all levels.
Thus, the present constitution contains some sixteen standing and constitutional commissions, which, by way of how they are to be appointed, will include a significant number of individuals and civil society organisations not usually involved in the political process. These commissions are also expected to do their work by, as much as possible, interacting with and involving the public on a regular basis.
Furthermore, the various levels of local government arrangement – villages, districts, sub-regions, regions, etc. – again have the potential to involve thousands of persons directly in their actual management and many more as participants. When these are added to the constitutional support for trade unions and other civil society organisations, this is the kind of broad-based inclusion that I believe is meant by the constitutional promise of greater participation by citizens in those areas of decision making that “directly affect their well-being”.
Indeed, last week, when, in light of the fact that the demand for constitutional change was gaining momentum, Mr. Clement Rohee, General Secretary of the PPP, signaled his party’s satisfaction with the present document as one of the most advanced in the Caribbean, it is to these kinds of arrangements he was alluding (“Call for constitutional change a slap in the face of Guyanese – Rohee”, SN: 17/12/2014).
In a comment to my column last week Mr. Dave Martins, in a single paragraph, placed Mr. Hughes’ demand for inclusive democracy, the limitations of the Constitution and Mr. Rohee’s comments, in their proper context.
“Henry Jeffrey, he wrote, “is presenting some telling similarities of the role of the President in comparing the American and Guyanese forms of government. However, an essential difference, omitted in the comparison, is that America does not have to contend, as Guyana does, with a scenario of two dominant political groups each resorting to racial politics. It is an impediment to the inclusion that Nigel Hughes is talking about which extends beyond the present Constitution’s ability to solve.”
The burden of this column over the years has been this very point. Guyana is a bi-communal society and so requires different kinds of management arrangements. Notwithstanding the language and the innovative and progressive efforts at increasing broad-based participation, the framers left us with a normal constitution. They locked us in a majoritarian political framework which allows a majority ethnic group to monopolize national management almost indefinitely. The deleterious consequences of this we are all witnessing today.
Mr. Hughes’ project, the details of which I will consider next week, appears intended to deal with this level of exclusion by tacking a shared governance executive on to the majoritarian framework of our Constitution. Unless we wish to limit our vision and unwittingly be diverted from our path, we need to construct new political institutions upon an explicit understanding and acceptance of the ethnic nature of our society and the requirements flowing therefrom.
Of course, it is not surprising that we have the present constitutional arrangements. During the constitutional process at the turn of the century, neither the PPP nor the PNC as yet truly grasped the nature of the political system. It was not until 2002 that the leader of the latter, who forced constitutional change upon the PPP by way of mass protest, came around, somewhat reluctantly, to the view that our system needs inclusion at the national executive management levels. Like most of us president Hoyte was bred in and trained by the Westminster political orientation.
In other words, Mr. Rohee, Guyana is not politically like most other Caribbean countries and therefore there is no point in comparing its Constitution to what they have. Our political disputes are not “merely because of political disagreements:” they are structural. As Mr. Martins observed, those countries do not “have to contend, as Guyana does, with a scenario of two dominant political groups each resorting to racial politics.”
It is well known that the constitution of the United States is notoriously difficult to change, but it may be useful for Mr. Rohee, who appears to believe that our Constitution is too new to be changed, to take note that the US Constitution came into effect on 4 March 1789 yet in June of the same year James Madison introduced 39 amendments of which 10 were added four years later in December 1791. Indeed, this suggests that problems with constitutions tend to surface in the early days of their operation.
henryjeffrey@yahoo.com
