There is, understandably, a lot of fuss surrounding the surprise selection by the PPP (independent of the Civic component) of Ambassador Elisabeth Harper as the prime ministerial running mate for President Donald Ramotar in the forthcoming elections. For now, the general impression is that, as a political neophyte, she will be very much the junior partner on the campaign trail.
There is, moreover, a great deal of vagueness regarding the role she would play as prime minister, if the PPP/C is successful on May 11. How, for instance, without any parliamentary experience, would she function as leader of government business in the National Assembly? And exactly how much clout would she have in a cabinet that might contain two of her former bosses at Takuba Lodge, Clement Rohee and Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, as well as others with prior ministerial experience, to whom she would previously have had to defer as a public servant?
On the other hand, APNU and the AFC have laid out in the Cummingsburg Accord, which contains the basic terms of the their coalition, a clear division of labour for David Granger and Moses Nagamootoo, respectively the designated presidential and prime ministerial candidates. With attention having been diverted over the past week from the APNU-AFC agreement, now is as good a time as any to take a closer look at what might be regarded as a sort of power-sharing arrangement.
In sum, by committing to “future constitutional reform” and to ‘reorganising’ the presidency, the APNU-AFC coalition appears to have signalled that it intends to move away from the Burnham constitution, with the inordinate amount of power vested in the presidency, so derided by many over the years, including the PPP/C, but yet so conveniently appropriated by the same PPP/C whilst in office.
The Cummingsburg Accord states that the President, as Head of State, Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, shall have responsibility primarily for national security, foreign affairs and constitutional agencies and commissions, and will delegate to the prime minister, responsibility for chairing cabinet and “recommending ministerial appointments and providing the organizational structures of ministries for the approval of the President,” domestic national affairs including domestic security, and the appointment of heads of agencies and non-constitutional commissions.
If this proposed new dispensation is to be taken as a hint of what direction any attempt at constitutional reform might take, especially with regard to reducing the powers of the executive presidency and taking the country closer to a true semi-presidential system – for instance, one in which the prime minister and cabinet have responsibility for the day-to-day running of the country and a greater degree of accountability to the legislature – then it should be viewed as an encouraging step. In this respect, the French model, generally regarded as the semi-presidential model par excellence, is perhaps instructive.
In the French system, the president appoints the prime minister, who forms a government, choosing ministers for the approval of the president. The president chairs the cabinet and is responsible for foreign policy whilst the prime minister is responsible for domestic policy. Of course, when the president and the prime minister are from the same party, the former can still be expected to exercise de facto control over domestic policy. When, however, the president and the prime minister come from opposing parties – a system known as ‘cohabitation’, which has occurred three times since 1986 – the division of responsibilities is more pronounced and the arrangement can create an effective system of checks and balances or, on the flip side, political gridlock. The French model can be particularly attractive, especially if embraced by mature politicians willing to compromise for the good of the nation.
The case of the APNU-AFC coalition would appear, at this point, to bear some resemblance to the French model of cohabitation, although the top two officials and their parties are obviously on the same side. But these are still early days and it remains to be seen, if put to the test by the electorate, how close the proposed division of powers would resemble the French model, in theory and in practice. In the meantime, with negotiations between APNU and the AFC ongoing, the devil, as in so many other things in this country, is in the detail.
